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JANUARY-MARCH 2000

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
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## EDITORIAL

Efforts at preventing infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) and countering terrorism by foreign mercenaries in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) have met with some degree of success, but there is yet a long way to go before stability is restored. Low-intensity conflict situation has been prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir for over a decade. Thousands of innocent lives have been lost. Across the borders, General Pervez Musharraf's actions have not matched his declared intention of a dialogue with India. There have been eight major show-downs along the LoC in the last couple of months and a number of terrorist attacks in the Valley. The killing of seven Indian soldiers in Naushera on 27 February 2000, and the attack near Akhnour on 22 January 2000, in which some Pakistani soldiers were killed, are indicators of a further possible escalation during the summer months.

\*India and Pakistan successfully conducted nuclear tests during May 1998. In May 1999 the Kargil War erupted between the two countries. It was a short sharp war in which the Indian Army and the Air Force suffered 474 killed and 1,109 wounded. The Pakistani casualties were assessed to be many more, and the consequence of its failure for Pakistan has been a change of government and the ongoing trial of the former Prime Minister Mr Nawaz Sharif. The Indian Armed Forces succeeded in removing the aggression and restored the position on the LoC.

In July 1999, the Government of India constituted a four-member committee with Mr K Subrahmanyam as the Chairman, to go into the Kargil episode. The Committee has finalised its Report and handed it over to the Government of India. It was placed on the floor of the parliament in late February 2000. The Executive Summary of the Report is reproduced in the Journal. The Report briefly recounts important facets of developments in J & K, Indo-Pak relations since 1947, the proxy war in J & K and the nuclear factor. The Committee has looked at developments immediately preceding the intrusions intensively. The findings of the Committee

reveal deficiencies in our Intelligence System, effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, need for integrated manpower policy for effective counter-insurgency operations, need for optimal utilisation of advancement in technology of weapon systems and better media relations, and more effective use of Information Technology. The Committee has made a number of recommendations for the enhancement of National Security. It is to be hoped that these recommendations will be acted upon soon.

The tensions on the LoC and the International Border between India and Pakistan remain high. As nuclear powers with a common land border, there is no alternative to a dialogue and to keeping the lines of communications open – in the best and worst of times. At the same time, there is a case for not expecting too much from any colloquy with Pakistan because of the mindset of its leaders. Our Government is rightly insisting that Pakistan stop cross-border terrorism before any meaningful talks can commence. In the meanwhile, to safeguard national security, India must retain a robust military capability.

# **Report of the Kargil Review Committee : Executive Summary**

## **Introduction**

**A**gainst the backdrop of an animated public discussion on Pakistan's aggression in Kargil, the Union Government vide its order dated July 29, 1999 constituted a Committee to look into the episode with the following Terms of Reference:-

- "(i) To review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and
- (ii) To recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions."

The Committee comprised four members namely K. Subrahmanyam (Chairman), Lieutenant General (Retd.) K.K. Hazari, B.G. Verghese and Satish Chandra, Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) who was also designated as Member-Secretary.

Given its open-ended terms of reference, the time constraint and, most importantly, the need for clarity in setting about its task, the Committee found it necessary to define its scope of work precisely. To deal with the Kargil episode in isolation would have been too simplistic; hence the Report briefly recounts the important facets of developments in J&K and the evolution of the LOC, Indo-Pak relations since 1947, the proxy war in Kashmir and the nuclear factor. However, the Committee's 'review' commences essentially from 1997 onwards coinciding with Nawaz Sharif's return to office as Prime Minister of Pakistan. This has enabled the Committee to look at developments immediately preceding the intrusions more

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\*The text of the Executive Summary of the Report of the Kargil Review Committee, headed by Shri K Subrahmanyam. The Committee was set up on 29 July 1999 and it submitted its Report to the Union Government on 15 December 1999. The Report was tabled in Parliament on 24 February 2000.

intensively. The Committee has sought to analyse whether the kind of Pakistani aggression that took place could have been assessed from the available intelligence inputs and if so, what were the shortcomings and failures which led to the nation being caught by surprise. However, the actual conduct of military operations has not been evaluated by the Committee as this lay outside the Committee's mandate and would have called for a different type of expertise. The Committee's recommendations for preventing future recurrence of Kargil-like episodes are confined to the country's land borders. Since some of these are generic in nature, they would have a bearing on future threats to the country whether on its land borders or otherwise.

The Committee approached its task in a spirit of openness and transparency with its focus on establishing the facts. It viewed its task as a cooperative venture with the concerned Ministries, Defence Services, Intelligence Agencies and other concerned organisations and avoided getting into adversarial relationship with the officials and non-officials with whom it was required to interact. Given this approach it was able to enlist the willing cooperation of all concerned.

Although the Committee was not statutory in nature, as a result of Cabinet Secretary's directions, it was able to secure the widest possible access to all relevant documents, including those with the highest classification and to officials of the Union and J&K Governments. In the pursuit of its task the Committee sought presentations from the concerned organisations and agencies. It held meetings with those who in its judgement were in a position to throw light on the subject. In this process, it met former President R. Venkataraman, Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, ex-Prime Ministers V. P. Singh, P.V. Narsimha Rao and I. K. Gujral, the Home Minister, External Affairs Minister, Defence Minister, the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, the Governor and the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, the National Security Adviser, the Cabinet Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and a host of other officials and non-officials, including media persons. The Committee held over a hundred meetings. the records of which are appended to the



Report. Detailed questionnaires were prepared by the Committee to elicit information. It made four visits to various parts of J&K to hold discussions with local officials and non-officials, and to get a better sense of the terrain and the prevailing field conditions. It undertook a visit to Bangalore to obtain a first hand knowledge of certain defence research and development facilities and for discussions with experts regarding technological options. The Committee invited reliable information from the public pertaining to events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in Kargil through a press note in the national dailies and the regional media. It scanned a large number of news items and commentaries published in the national dailies, journals and magazines. Apart from this, it perused several books published in recent months on the Kargil episode.

The Committee's Findings are based primarily on official documents, authenticated records and copies of documents, while other parts of the Report draw on materials received by the Committee and views of experts and knowledgeable persons who were invited to interact with it.

The Committee's Report comprises 14 Chapters in addition to a Prologue and an Epilogue. Important documents referred to by the Committee are enclosed as annexures with the main Report. Other relevant documents, Records of Discussions and source materials have been put together in 15 volumes and appended to the Report. The Findings and Recommendations of the Committee are set out in the succeeding sections of this summary.

## **FINDINGS**

### **I — Developments leading to the Pakistani aggression at Kargil**

The Review Committee had before it overwhelming evidence that the Pakistani armed intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the Indian Government, Army and intelligence agencies as well as to the J&K State Government and its agencies. The Committee did not come across any agency or individual who was able clearly to assess before the event the possibility of a large scale Pakistani military intrusion across the

Kargil heights. What was conceived of was the limited possibility of infiltrations and enhanced artillery exchanges in this Sector.

A number of former Army Chiefs of Staff and Director Generals of Military Operations were near unanimous in their opinion that a military intrusion on the scale attempted was totally unsustainable because of the lack of supportive infrastructure and was militarily irrational. In the 1948, 1965 and 1971 conflicts, the Indian Army was able to dominate the Pakistani forces on these heights. This area has been the scene of fierce artillery exchanges but minimal cross-LOC military activity. These factors, together with the nature of the terrain and extreme weather conditions in the area, had generated an understandable Indian military mindset about the nature and extent of the Pakistani threat in this sector.

The developments of 1998 as reported in various intelligence inputs, notably the increased shelling of Kargil, the reported increased presence of militants in the Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) region and their training were assessed as indicative of a likely high level of militant activity in Kargil in the summer of 1999 and the consequent possibility of increased infiltration in this area. The Pakistani reconnaissance mission in August 1997 in Gharkun village was noted and a patrol base established in Yaldor. An operation was also planned to apprehend the infiltrators if they returned in the summer of 1998. They apparently did not do so.

The nearest approximation to the events of May 1999 was a 15 Corps wargame in 1993 which envisaged a Pakistani long range penetration group positioning itself south of NH 1A and bringing the Srinagar-Leh highway under fire from both sides. Even that assessment did not visualise an intrusion to hold ground by hundreds of Pakistan Army regulars.

Intrusions across the LOC are not uncommon. Pakistan had in the past intruded into the Indian side of the LOC and the Indian Army had responded adequately. There had, however, been no intrusions since 1990. An attempt to capture a post or two on the LOC was, however, anticipated as revealed in the press briefing of the acting GOC 15 Corps on January 11, 1999. Even this was

not the kind of intrusion that actually took place in the Mashkoh, Dras, Kaksar and Batalik areas.

The terrain here is so inhospitable that the intruders could not have survived above 4000 metres for long without comprehensive and sustained re-supply operations. They were even running short of water at these heights towards the end of the operations. Though heavily armed, the intruders did not have rations for more than two or three days in many forward 'sanghars'. Re-supply could have taken place only if there was no air threat and the supply lines could not be targeted by Indian artillery. In other words, it would appear that the Pakistani intruders operated on the assumption that the intrusions would be under counter attack for only a few days and thereafter some sort of ceasefire would enable them to stay on the heights and be re-supplied.

Such an assumption would be totally unsustainable in purely military terms. It would only be logical on the expectation, based upon political considerations, that Pakistan would be able to engineer international intervention to impose an early ceasefire that would allow its troops to stay in possession of the territory captured by them. Such an assumption could not have been made without close consultation with the Pakistani political leadership at the highest level. General Musharraf has disclosed that the operations were discussed in November 1998 with the political leadership and there are indications of discussions on two subsequent occasions in early 1999. The tapes of conversations between General Musharraf and Lieutenant General Aziz, Chief of General Staff, also revealed their expectation of early international intervention, the likelihood of a ceasefire and the knowledge and support of the Foreign Office.

In retrospect, such an expectation was unreal. The Pakistani establishment has a long and consistent history of misreading India's will and world opinion. In 1947, it did not anticipate the swift Indian military intervention in Kashmir when it planned its raid with a mix of army personnel, ex-servicemen and tribals under the command of Major General Akbar Khan. In 1965, it took Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's advice that India would not cross the international border to deal

with Pakistan's offensive in the Akhnur sector. In 1971, it developed high but totally unwarranted expectations about the likelihood of US-Chinese intervention on its behalf. The same pattern of behaviour was evident this time too. This is presumably the price the Pakistani leadership has paid for its inability to come to terms with the military realities. It has obviously been a victim of its own propaganda.

It is evident from Pakistani pronouncements and the writings of those with access to the highest decision making levels, that at least from 1987 onwards, when Dr. AQ Khan conveyed a nuclear threat to India in a Press interview to an Indian journalist, Pakistan was convinced that its nuclear weapons capability would deter India's superior conventional forces. Written accounts of foreign observers have highlighted that since 1980, the Pakistani military establishment had entertained ideas of deterring Indian nuclear and conventional capabilities with its nuclear weapons and of carrying out a brash, bold strike to liberate Kashmir which would go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive.

Successive Indian Chiefs of Army Staff and Director Generals of Military Operations told the Committee that bringing to bear India's assumed conventional superiority was not a serious option in the last ten years for a variety of reasons; commitments in Sri Lanka, subsequent deployments in Punjab, the North East and Kashmir, and a drastic reduction in Defence outlay. Pakistani writings over the years have highlighted the Indian Army's involvement in counter-insurgency in Kashmir and its perceived degradation as an effective fighting force.

Several Pakistani writers agree that the 'Kargil plan' was formulated in the eighties in the last years of General Zia-ul-Haq. There are different versions on whether it was sought to be operationalised during the tenures of Benazir Bhutto and General Jehangir Karamat, Chief of Army Staff. General Musharraf's disclosure that it was discussed with the political leadership in November 1998 soon after he assumed office has been referred to in the Report. It is difficult to say whether the initiative for this move came from the Army or was politically driven. There was a

heady combination of circumstances and personalities. Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister, had successfully removed from office the President, the Chief Justice and the then Army Chief, General Karamat, in whose place he appointed General Musharraf who superseded two others. General Musharraf himself served in Afghanistan and had ties with Osama Bin Laden and other extremists. He is a Mohajir and an ambitious, hard driving man. He had served in the Northern Areas for several years and had been associated with the crackdown on the Shias. He had commanded the Special Services Group (SSG) which launched an attack on Bilafond La in Siachen but was frustrated.

Some Pakistani columnists claim that Nawaz Sharif thought that if he succeeded in seizing a slice of Indian territory in Kashmir, he would be hailed as a 'Liberator' and thereby enabled to gain absolute power through amendment of the Shariah law. There is no clear evidence on the basis of which to assess the nature and extent of Nawaz Sharif's involvement in the Kargil adventure. The balance of probability suggests that he was fully in the picture. This is borne out by the tapes referred to earlier and the repeated assertions of General Musharraf. Those who know Nawaz Sharif personally believe that he has a limited attention span and is impatient with detail. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Nawaz Sharif was at least aware of the broad thrust of the Kargil plan when he so warmly welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in Lahore.

Influential sections of the Indian political class and media have been outraged at the duplicity of the Pakistani leadership. Some argue that Nawaz Sharif could not have been so duplicitous and therefore tend to absolve him and lay all blame on General Musharraf. However, having a declaratory policy different from that actually pursued is not unknown in international realpolitik and diplomacy. This existentialist divergence between the two necessitates diplomatic interaction, continuous political analysis, Track-II diplomacy and intelligence collection, collation and assessment.

The Committee has not come across any assessment at

operational levels that would justify the conclusion that the Lahore summit had caused the Indian decision-makers to lower their guard. This has been confirmed by the discussions the Committee had with a number of concerned officials. Nonetheless, there was euphoria in some political quarters, among leaders in and out of office, though some others saw serious pitfalls in the Lahore process.

The Committee has attempted a partial reconstruction of Operation BADR based on diaries and notebooks recovered from Pakistani personnel during the operation as well as intercepts. It would appear that reconnaissance parties comprising officers started crossing the LOC in late January/early February 1999. They established a first line of administrative bases within a limited distance across the LOC in February. March saw heavy snowfall and so they could move further forward only in April. At that stage, more men joined them and perhaps the bulk of the intruders entered Indian territory in late April. This sequence of events appears logical as earlier induction of larger numbers would have added to logistic problems and increased the risk of detection. Care was exercised by the intruders to move only in the gaps between the Indian winter posts and to avoid detection by Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO). They were equipped for extreme cold and snow conditions. In the initial advance, they used Igloo snow tents and constructed 'sanghars' of loose rock. Perhaps late in April, they moved up a further two to three kilometres. WASO helicopters and operational reconnaissance flights repeatedly flew over them as is evident from one of the diaries captured in Mashkoh Valley. A combination of factors prevented their detection: camouflage clothing; helicopter vibrations which hampered observation; opportunity for concealment on hearing the sound of approaching helicopters; and peace time safety requirements of maintaining a certain height above the ground and a given distance from the LOC. Since the effort was largely to detect infiltration, most flights flew along valleys and not across the ridges. All these factors made the WASO patrols of negligible value as is also evident from the records of previous years.

After a lull in the winter from late December 1998, there was

very heavy snowfall in March 1999 which compelled 121 Infantry Brigade to vacate one of its 25 winter posts in the South West Spur of Point 5299 in the Kaksar sector, popularly known as Bajrang post. Winter patrols sent out in early April 1999 were unable to carry out their task due to adverse snow conditions. The Pakistanis creeping forward also suffered avalanche casualties in the month of March 1999 as revealed by a diary captured in the Mashkoh Valley. All the Indian military commanders the Committee met emphasised the point that while it would have been possible for patrolling to be carried out even under these conditions, it would have required the troops to be specially equipped to withstand glacial conditions, as in Siachen, and a willingness to accept possible casualties. Until now, this had not been considered necessary or acceptable.

It would appear from the locations of 'sanghars' [\*\*\*] that the plan was to avoid initially confronting the Indian forces by moving stealthily along the unheld gaps. The Pakistani intruders were meant to disclose themselves in the later part of May 1999 and demonstrate that they were in possession of the Kargil heights along a "new LOC" before the normal opening of the Zojila pass when regular patrolling by the Indian Army would commence. Presumably they felt that with the advantage of the commanding heights, their better acclimatisation and by now their more secure logistics, the situation would be distinctly in their favour. The Indians would need time to assemble their forces, acclimatise their troops and build up their logistics which would be difficult before Zojila opened. They would also have to suffer unacceptable casualties in attacking the heights. This would ensure time enough for an internationally arranged ceasefire.

This was probably Pakistan's expectation. In fact, however, the intrusion was detected on May 3, 1999, by "shepherds" who are occasionally retained by the Brigade Intelligence Team for forward information gathering. The patrols sent out in the next few days confirmed the presence of intruders on May 7. The Indian Army's response was very rapid and by May 9, two well acclimatised battalions returning from Siachen had been

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\*\*\*Government Security Deletion

concentrated in the Batalik sector to contain the intrusion. In the next few days, three more battalions were moved from the Valley into the Kargil sector to counter known and possible intrusions in other sub-sectors. By May 24, two additional Brigades had moved into the area and the Indian Air Force was committed on May 26. By the end of May an additional divisional headquarters had been inducted to take over command of a portion of the Kargil Sector from 3 Infantry Division. This rapid and strong Indian reaction was obviously not expected by the Pakistanis. It was now their turn to be totally surprised [\*\*\*]. Simultaneously, Pakistan tried to lobby with the international community for a ceasefire, which would leave it with some Indian territory and thereby justify its misadventure. Initially, there was support for a ceasefire but once Tololing fell and the Indian Government and Army exhibited their determination to clear the entire intrusion, the international community called on Pakistan to withdraw from and respect the sanctity of the LOC.

The sitrep issued by 15 Corps on May 11, 1999 was explicit on eight identified intrusions in the Batalik sector involving 160 to 240 intruders. The Northern Command had already made a request for the use of helicopter gunships on May 8. The Northern Command issued orders on May 12 that the whole J&K theatre be put on alert and additional troops be inducted into the Kargil sector. There are obvious discrepancies between the documented responses of 15 Corps and the Northern Command and the information regarding the nature and extent of intrusions at that stage, then available in the Ministries of Defence and Home in Delhi as is evident from the statements of concerned officials.

Movement of forces within a corps is entirely within the competence of the corps commander and does not require clearance from any other authority. For the 15 Corps, an operation on a single brigade front was a 'localised' action. The record establishes that the 15 Corps Commander carried out his deployment with commendable expedition and competence providing adequate margins for all possible contingencies.

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The Committee found that though the Corps Commander had moved adequate forces to contain the intrusion in the Batalik sector and followed it up with a similar deployment of forces in the Kaksar, Dras and Mashkoh valley sectors, there was still no clarity in the assessment of the magnitude of the intrusions and the composition of the intruders. This is evident from the statement of the Corps Commander on May 19, [\*\*\*]. Pakistan insists on projecting most of the intruders as Mujahideen, with NLI troops in a supporting role. The assessment of the nature and composition of the intruders was hampered by a number of factors. Pakistan deliberately violated the normal rules of war by sending in servicemen as Mujahideen and obfuscating their service identities. Secondly, as pointed out elsewhere, there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. This was lacking even at the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) because of the low level of representation by DGMI at the assessment process and the DGMI representative not coming fully briefed on the latest situation. It is also apparent that the assessment was conditioned by the two decade old mindset that Kargil was unsuitable for cross-LOC military action.

There are reports in the media, some of which are said to have originated from young officers, JCOs and other ranks, that in the initial stages, the Indian Army suffered avoidable casualties, taken as it was by surprise. However, the progressive data of Indian casualties from May to July 1999 obtained by the Committee does not entirely support this hypothesis. The Committee did not go into the matter further as its terms of reference do not require it to do so.

There were also comments in the media that Army jawans were inadequately equipped for the extreme cold and hazardous conditions when ordered to assault the Kargil heights. Their weapons and equipment compared unfavourably with those of the Pakistani intruders. The Army had prescribed extra-cold clothing meant for heights between 9000-13,000 feet in this sector for use in normal times, and special (glacial) clothing for heights above

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that. Special clothing is issued for use in the Siachen area and certain limited reserves were held in stock. When hostilities commenced, this reserve clothing was issued to the men. Troops returning from Siachen duty discard their special clothing which is then usually disposed of by auction. However, in the previous year, the Corps Commander had ordered that part-worn serviceable (PWS) Siachen clothing be preserved. This PWS stock was also issued to the troops during the Kargil action. Despite this, there was still an overall shortage. This warrants a review of standards of provisioning for reserves as well as a policy of holding special clothing for a certain proportion of other troops in the Kargil and other high altitude sectors.

Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm Insa) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed at high altitudes. In broader terms, increasing the firepower and combat efficiency of infantrymen has also suffered as has the modernisation process as a whole. This needs to be speedily rectified. [\*\*\*]

The Air Chief further maintained that if air power was to be used, the country should be prepared for a Pakistani response. Therefore, the relevant Air Commands and units were activated. The CCS finally authorised the use of air power on May 25. [\*\*\*]

In order to ensure that Pakistan would be deterred from any adventurous escalation, the Indian Armed Forces progressively moved to deploy in a deterrent posture. These measures sent out a clear message to Pakistan and the rest of the world that India was determined to oust the invader by military means. The Western and Eastern fleets of the Indian Navy were concentrated in the North Arabian Sea. From intercepted signals, it would appear that these steps had a healthy restraining effect on the Pakistani Armed Forces. This was impliedly admitted by Nawaz Sharif in his address to the nation on July 12, 1999.

The Kargil action saw the deployment of a limited number of

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troops and aircraft on a restricted front in response to a shallow Pakistani penetration across the LOC of no more than eight to nine kilometres at most. Nevertheless, given the terrain and political implications were a "new LOC" to be created, and in the background of nuclear capability on both sides, this was not a minor skirmish but a short, sharp war in which the Indian Army and Air Force suffered 474 killed and 1109 wounded (as of July 26, 1999). To regard it as anything less would be mistaken. The consequences of its failure for Pakistan are there for all to see.

## II — Intelligence

It is not widely appreciated in India that the primary responsibility for collecting external intelligence, including that relating to a potential adversary's military deployment, is vested in R&AW. The DGMI's capability for intelligence collection is limited. It is essentially restricted to the collection of tactical military intelligence and some amount of signal intelligence and its main role is to make strategic and tactical military assessments and disseminate them within the Army. Many countries have established separate Defence Intelligence Agencies and generously provided them with resources and equipment to play a substantive role in intelligence collection. For historical reasons, the Indian Armed Forces are not so mandated. Therefore, it is primarily R&AW which must provide intelligence about a likely attack, whether across a broad or narrow front. Unfortunately the R&AW facility in the Kargil area did not receive adequate attention in terms of staff or technological capability. The station was under Srinagar but reported to Leh which was not focussed on Kargil but elsewhere. Hence intelligence collection, coordination and follow up were weak.

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is meant to collect intelligence within the country and is the premier agency for counter-intelligence. This agency got certain inputs on activities in the FCNA region which were considered important enough by the Director, IB to be communicated over his signature on June 2, 1998 to the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Home Secretary and Director-General Military Operations. This communication was not addressed to the three officials most concerned with this

information, namely, Secretary (R&AW), who is responsible for external intelligence and had the resources to follow up the leads in the IB report; Chairman JIC, who would have taken such information into account in JIC assessments; and Director-General Military Intelligence. Director, IB stated that he expected the information to filter down to these officials through the official hierarchy. This did not happen in respect of Secretary (R&AW) who at that time was also holding additional charge as Chairman, JIC. The Committee feels that a communication of this nature should have been directly addressed to all the officials concerned.

Such lapses, committed at one time or the other by all agencies, came to the notice of the Committee. These illustrate a number of deficiencies in the system. There is need for greater appreciation of the role of intelligence and who needs it most and also more understanding with regard to who must pursue any given lead. It further highlights the need for closer coordination among the intelligence agencies.

There were many bits and pieces of information about activities within the FCNA region. Very few of these could be considered actionable intelligence. Most of them tended to indicate that Kargil was becoming a growing focus of Pakistani attention which had been clearly demonstrated by the marked increase in cross-LOC shelling in 1998. The reports on ammunition dumping, induction of additional guns and the construction of bunkers and helipads all fitted into an assessment of likely large scale militant infiltration and yet more intensive shelling in the summer of 1999. The enhanced threat perception of Commander 121 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier Surinder Singh also related to increased infiltration. R&AW assessed the possibility of "a limited swift offensive threat with possible support of alliance partners" in its half-yearly assessment ending September 1998 but no indicators substantiating this assessment were provided. Moreover, in its next six monthly report ending March 1999, this assessment was dropped. In fact, its March 1999 report emphasised the financial constraints that would inhibit Pakistan from launching on any such adventure.

No specific indicators of a likely major attack in the Kargil

sector such as significant improvements in logistics and communications or a substantial force build-up or forward deployment of forces were reported by any of the agencies. Information on training of additional militants with a view to infiltrating them across the LOC was not sector-specific. There was an increase in shelling in 1998 both in the Neelam Valley (in POK) and Kargil (India). The Indian side resorted to heavy firing since it was necessary to suppress Pakistani fire aimed at disrupting the traffic on NH-1A from Srinagar to Leh. While the intelligence agencies focussed on ammunition dumping on the other side, they appeared to lack adequate knowledge about the heavy damage inflicted by Indian Artillery which would have required the Pakistani army to undertake considerable repairs and re-stocking. That would partly explain the larger vehicular movements reported on the other side. The Indian Army did not share information about the intensity and effect of its past firing with others. In the absence of this information, R&AW could not correctly assess the significance of enemy activity in terms of ammunition storage or construction of underground bunkers. This provides another illustration of lack of inter-agency coordination as well as lack of coordination between the Army and the agencies.

The critical failure in intelligence was related to the absence of any information on the induction and de-induction of battalions and the lack of accurate data on the identity of battalions in the area opposite Kargil during 1998. Prisoners of War have disclosed the presence of 5, 6 and 13 NLI battalions and 24 SIND in the FCNA region from October 1998 onwards. The Indian Army has also assessed that elements of 5, 6, and 13 NLI were amongst the units that were initially used by Pakistan to launch the intrusions in April/May 1999. These units did not figure in the Order of Battle (ORBAT) supplied by R&AW to the DGMI dated April 1998. Since then, and until Indian troops came into contact with these battalions in May-June 1999, there was no information of their presence in the area. R&AW issued another ORBAT on June 1, 1999 which also did not show any changes in the area opposite Kargil between April 1998 and May 1999. An analysis carried out by the Committee on the basis of information now available shows that there were in fact a number of changes in the ORBAT of Pakistani forces in the

FCNA region during 1998/early 1999. These changes included the turnover of some units, induction of two additional battalions over and above the 13 already in the Sector as reported by R&AW in April 1998 and the forward deployment of two battalions from Gilgit to Gultari and from Skardu to Hamzigund (near Olthingthang) respectively. In other words, if no de-inductions took place, for which the Committee lacks evidence, there was a net increase of two battalions in the FCNA region over and above R&AW's projections as well as a forward deployment of two battalions within the sector during the period April 1998 to February 1999. The responsibility for obtaining information on them was primarily that of R&AW and, to a much lesser extent, that of DGMI and the Division or Brigade using their Intelligence and Field Surveillance Unit (IFSU) and Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) capabilities.

It could be argued that given the nature of the terrain, the climatic conditions and the unheld gaps in existence since 1972, there was no way of anticipating the intrusion during the winter provided Pakistan accepted the risk of incurring casualties in avalanches, which it did. However, since Pakistan was focussing upon Kargil, information regarding the induction of two additional battalions in the FCNA region and the forward deployment of two battalions could have proved to be an indicator of the likely nature of Pakistani activity in this sector. In that event, perhaps greater risks in patrolling in snow conditions might have been found acceptable. More focussed intelligence about the activities of Pakistan in the FCNA region would have followed. In the Committee's view, a significant gap in information prior to the detection of the Kargil intrusion was the inability of R&AW to accurately monitor and report changes in the Pakistani ORBAT in the FCNA region during 1998 and early 1999 and to a lesser extent that of DGMI, the BITs and IFSUs to notice the additional forward deployment of troops in the vicinity of the LOC.

The Kargil intrusion was essentially a limited Pakistani military exercise designed to internationalise the Kashmir issue which was tending to recede from the radar screen of the international community. It was, therefore, mainly a move for political and diplomatic gain. The armed forces play their war games essentially

within military parameters. Unlike other countries, India has no tradition of undertaking politico-military games with the participation of those having political and diplomatic expertise. If such games had been practiced, then the possibility of limited military intrusions to internationalise the Kashmir issue might have been visualised.

One of the most realistic assessments of Kashmir developments as they unfolded during Pakistan's proxy war was "Operation TOPAC", a war game written by a team of retired Indian Army officers in 1989. It is interesting to note that "Operation TOPAC" has since been mistakenly attributed even by high placed Indian officials and agencies to Gen Zia-ul-Haq. This shows how close the authors of "Operation TOPAC" were able to get into the mind of the Pakistani establishment in relation to their aims in J&K.

As mentioned earlier, WASO did not provide intelligence inputs of significant value. Those of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) of R&AW were no doubt extremely valuable. The Army makes six-monthly indents and, wherever necessary, special indents on the ARC. These indents and their prioritisation depend on the nature of the threat perception which, in turn, is shaped by inputs from R&AW. This circular process entails the Army having to depend upon inputs from R&AW for its own threat assessment. In other words, the Indian threat assessment is largely a single-track process dominated by R&AW. In most advanced countries, the Armed Forces have a Defence Intelligence Agency with a significant intelligence collection capability. This ensures that there are two streams of intelligence which enables governments to check one against the other.

The Indian Intelligence structure is flawed since there is little back up or redundancy to rectify failures and shortcomings in intelligence collection and reporting that goes to build up the external threat perception by the one agency, namely, R&AW which has a virtual monopoly in this regard. It is neither healthy nor prudent to endow that one agency alone with multifarious capabilities for human, communication, imagery and electronic intelligence. Had R&AW and DGMI spotted the additional battalions in the FCNA region that were missing from the ORBAT, there might have been

requests for ARC flights in winter and these might have been undertaken, weather permitting. As it happened, the last flight was in October 1998, long before the intrusion, and the next in May 1999, after the intrusions had commenced. The intruders had by then come out into the open.

The present structure and processes in intelligence gathering and reporting lead to an overload of background and unconfirmed information and inadequately assessed intelligence which requires to be further pursued. There is no institutionalised process whereby R&AW, IB, BSF and Army intelligence officials interact periodically at levels below the JIC. This lacuna is perhaps responsible for R&AW reporting the presence of one additional unit in Gultari in September 1998 but not following it up with ARC flights on its own initiative. Nor did the Army press R&AW specifically for more information on this report. The Army never shared its intelligence with the other agencies or with the JIC. There was no system of Army authorities at different levels from DGMI downwards providing feedback to the Agencies.

There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. The assessment process has been downgraded in importance and consequently various agencies send very junior officials to JIC meetings. The DGMI did not send any regular inputs to the JIC for two years preceding the Kargil crisis. The JIC was not accorded the importance it deserved either by the Intelligence Agencies or the Government. The Chairmanship of JIC had become the preserve of an IPS officer who was generally a runner-up for the post of Secretary (R&AW) or DIB. The post was in fact left unfilled for 18 months until December 1998. During this period, Secretary (R&AW) doubled as Chairman, JIC.

There are no checks and balances in the Indian intelligence system to ensure that the consumer gets all the intelligence that is available and is his due. There is no system of regular, periodic and comprehensive intelligence briefings at the political level and to the Committee of Secretaries. In the absence of an overall,



operational national security framework and objectives, each intelligence agency is diligent in preserving its own turf and departmental prerogatives. There is no evidence that the intelligence agencies have reviewed their role after India became a nuclear weapon state or in the context of the increasing problems posed by insurgencies and ethno-nationalist turbulences backed with sophisticated hi-tech equipment and external support. Nor has the Government felt the need to initiate any such move.

### **III — The Nuclear Factor**

A lot has been written both at home and abroad about Pakistan being able to commit limited aggression in Kashmir because of the mutual nuclear deterrence deemed to have been established as a result of the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1998. The Committee examined this proposition in detail. It studied the Indian perception of the Pakistani nuclear threat as well as the sequence of developments of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. The Committee's findings are based on published literature, classified reports, statements by some of the main actors in the Indian nuclear weapons programme, former Intelligence Chiefs, former Foreign Secretaries and former Prime Ministers. These are summarised below.

President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto committed Pakistan to acquiring nuclear weapons at a meeting held in Multan on January 24, 1972 in the wake of the country's defeat in the Bangladesh war. As has been highlighted by a number of eminent Pakistani writers, the primary motivation for this effort was to deter India's conventional arms superiority. According to Pakistani perceptions, it was able to do so on three occasions. This was well before the Pokhran and Chagai tests in May 1998.

According to a statement made before the Committee, R&AW had assessed that by 1981-82, Pakistan had enough weapons grade enriched uranium to make one or two uranium weapon cores. Former President Venkataraman and the then Scientific Adviser, Dr V.S. Arunachalam, both said that Indira Gandhi agreed to a nuclear weapons test in 1983 but called it off under US pressure.

A report published in 1984 indicated that Pakistan had obtained from the Chinese the design of its fourth nuclear weapon tested in 1966. It was therefore a proven design. By the early 1980s, Indian intelligence was aware of the China-Pakistan nuclear weapons deal. So also the US, as evident from a declassified document of 1983.

In 1987, Pakistan conveyed a nuclear threat to India at the time of Operation BRASSTACKS. This was officially communicated by Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani to the Indian Ambassador in Islamabad, SK Singh. It was also communicated by the Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr AQ Khan to the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar.

In January 1990, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yakub Khan, visited Delhi and spoke to the Indian Foreign Minister, IK Gujral and the Prime Minister VP Singh in terms which they regarded as verging on an ultimatum. Some time later, the Indian Air Force was placed on alert following the Pakistan Air Force being similarly ordered. The Indian Prime Minister inquired of the then Air Chief whether it was possible for the IAF to intercept hostile Pakistani aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Air Chief Marshal Mehra replied that no such guarantee could be given and that the only logical answer for India was to acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own. American accounts describe Robert Gates' visit to Islamabad in May 1990, and his warning to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General Aslam Beg against any rash action against India. The Pakistanis describe this as one more instance when their nuclear deterrent prevented Indian aggression. During this crisis, the Kahuta establishment was evacuated, a fact that the Indian mission in Islamabad communicated to Delhi. On the 1990 events referred to above, there are varying perceptions among Indian officials. The majority view is that there was an implied threat.

In August 1990, information was received from a sensitive intelligence source that in any future confrontation, Pakistan might use nuclear weapons as a first resort. VP Singh and IK Gujral have a vivid recollection of this report. In October 1990, the US

imposed sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, implicitly confirming to the world that Pakistan possessed nuclear explosive capability.

The Committee was informed by Air Chief Marshal Mehra, the former Air Chief, that flight trials for delivery of Indian nuclear weapons were conducted in 1990 and that efforts to adapt the delivery system to the weapon commenced even earlier. VP Singh said that he inherited the programme from Rajiv Gandhi and pursued it further. Gujral added that every Indian Prime Minister sustained the nuclear weapons programme. While all Indian Prime Ministers treated this programme as strictly confidential, they reassured the public that the country's nuclear option was being kept open. On the other hand, Pakistan's Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, and its Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg, openly talked of Pakistan having acquired nuclear weapons.

It would not be unreasonable for Pakistan to have concluded by 1990 that it had achieved the nuclear deterrence it had set out to establish in 1980. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that it could sustain its proxy war against India, inflicting thousands of casualties, without being unduly concerned about India's "conventional superiority". Even as late as May 1998, when both sides conducted their nuclear tests, India had not used its conventional superiority during the preceding nine years of sustained proxy war by Pakistan in Kashmir. Successive Indian Army Chiefs and Director Generals of Military Operations told the Committee that the idea of using India's conventional superiority did not arise for various reasons other than the nuclear factor.

The 1998 Pokhran tests were the outcome of a policy of consensus on nuclear weapons development among Prime Ministers belonging to the Congress, Janata Dal, United Democratic Front and BJP. For reasons of security, none of these Prime Ministers took any one other than Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (not all), and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister into confidence. The Chiefs of Staff, senior Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop.

The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation.

Successive Indian Prime Ministers failed to take their own colleagues, the major political parties, the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Secretaries into confidence on the nature of Pakistan's nuclear threat and the China-Pakistan nuclear axis. The Prime Ministers, even while supporting the weapons programme, kept the intelligence and nuclear weapons establishments in two watertight compartments. Foreign policy was being conducted without Foreign Ministers and Indian diplomats being apprised of the nature of the threat to the country or of India's own nuclear capability. It is quite likely that this secretiveness on the part of the Indian Prime Ministers and the country's inability to exercise its conventional superiority could have confirmed Pakistan in its belief that its nuclear deterrent had indeed been effective in Kashmir since 1990 and it could therefore pursue the proxy war and the Kargil adventure with impunity on the basis of its own prescribed rules of the game.

Pakistan fully understands that nuclear deterrence can work both to its advantage and detriment. In a speech on April 12, 1999, General Musharraf stated that though the possibility of large scale conventional war between India and Pakistan was virtually zero, proxy wars were not only possible but very likely. At the height of the cold war, when mutual deterrence was in operation between the superpowers, it used to be argued by strategists that 'salami slicing' of small pieces of territory which the adversary would not consider worth escalating to nuclear levels was always feasible. To counter the risk, the US developed a strategy of flexible response. What Pakistan attempted at Kargil was a typical case of salami slicing [\*\*\*]. Since India did not cross the LOC and

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reacted strictly within its own territory, the effort to conjure up escalation of a kind that could lead to nuclear war did not succeed. Despite its best efforts, Pakistan was unable to link its Kargil caper with a nuclear flashpoint, though some foreign observers believe it was a near thing. The international community does not favour alteration of the status quo through nuclear blackmail as this would not be in the interest of the five major nuclear powers. Pakistan obviously overlooked this factor.

The P-5 statement of June 4, 1998 and the Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 6, 1998 condemned the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. It exhorted both countries to sign the CTBT and NPT and referred to Kashmir as a root cause of tension between them. This could have encouraged Pakistan to conclude that what its caretaker Prime Minister in 1993, Moeen Qureshi, claimed as the objective of linking Kashmir with the nuclear issue had been achieved and that Pakistan was in a position to implement a strategy outlined as far back as 1980, namely, to seize Kashmir in a bold, brash move when the Indian leadership appeared weak and indecisive.

President Clinton's statement in China assigning a role to that country in South Asia must have further encouraged Pakistan. The US also tilted in favour of Pakistan in imposing sanctions following the nuclear tests on the ground that its economy was weaker. At the same time, Pakistan would have realised that the impact of sanctions on India was only marginal and should the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbot talks make progress, the nuclear card might not be available for too long. With the passage of time, "crying nuclear wolf", even if linked to Kashmir, would progressively lose credibility.

Further, Pakistan's image was damaged by its association with the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden and increasing Islamisation. Within Kashmir, the Indian Security Forces were steadily gaining ascendancy over militancy. It is possible that Pakistan's political and military leadership concluded that the window of opportunity for internationalising the Kashmir issue by projecting it as a nuclear flashpoint was fast closing. Pakistan, therefore, needed to act in

1999. This conclusion is borne out by the veiled nuclear threats held out by Pakistan's political leaders and officials at the time of the Kargil crisis. Except for one irresponsible editorial in an Indian party paper, there were no analogous pronouncements in this country.

Some accounts claim that the Kargil intrusion was planned in 1997 and that preliminary reconnaissance and training of personnel commenced that year. If this is accepted, while Pakistan's reliance on its nuclear deterrence to prevent India from escalating would still be important, the actual nuclear tests conducted in May 1998 would not in themselves be all that significant as nuclear deterrence between the two was in place as far back as 1990.

#### **IV — CI Operations, Kargil and Integrated Manpower Policy**

In going on alert to deter any Pakistani escalation and then focussing on eliminating the intrusion at Kargil, the Army had to withdraw [\*\*\*] battalions deployed in J&K from their counter-insurgency role. This caused consternation in the State Government and some worry even to the para-military forces which were largely reliant on the Army in this regard. The heavy involvement of the Army in counter-insurgency operations cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression. This point has often been emphasised by Pakistani analysts. Such a situation has arisen because successive Governments have not developed a long-term strategy to deal with insurgency. The Army's prolonged deployment in a counter-insurgency role, adversely affects its training programme, leads to fatigue and the development of a mindset that detracts from its primary role. However, the Ministry of Home Affairs, State Governments and para-military forces tend to assume that the Army will always be there to combat insurgency. This was vividly demonstrated when the Committee was referred to the Union Home Ministry's "Action Plan" for fighting militancy and the proxy war in J&K prepared in May 1998. This defined the role of the Army as being to ensure "zero infiltration" across the LOC.

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The para-military and Central Police Forces are not trained, raised and equipped to deal with trans-border terrorism by well-trained mercenaries armed with sophisticated equipment who are continuously infiltrating across the border/LOC. Over the years, the quality of these forces has not been appropriately upgraded effectively to deal with the challenge of the times and this has led to the increased dependence on the Army to fight insurgency. The net result has been to reduce the role of the Indian Army to the level of a para-military force and the para-military forces, in turn, to the level of an ordinary police force. Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, J&K and the North East to involve the Indian Army in counter-insurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. Having partially achieved this objective, it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions. A coherent counter-strategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through.

The Committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. In the present international security environment, proxy war and terrorism have become preferred means of hurting a neighbour's social, political and economic well being. Given Pakistan's unrelenting hostility towards this country, it is necessary to evolve a long term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counter-insurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem.

There has also been criticism that redeployment of military units from CI duty in the Valley to the Kargil sector resulted in providing easy passage for a large number of hardened militants who were infiltrated by Pakistan across the Shamsabari Range into the Kupwara-Uri area and even South of the Pir Panjal.

The Unified Command was also reorganised, with the Director General Rashtriya Rifles (DGRR) being brought in from Delhi to replace GOC 15 Corps. The latter was relieved of this responsibility to enable him to devote full attention to his principal national defence task. However, within weeks of the conclusion of Operation VIJAY, the status quo ante was restored. DG RR returned to Delhi and

GOC 15 Corps resumed his place in the Unified Command. The Committee also found Unified Command HQ's intelligence structure lacking in timely and continuous analysis and assessment of intelligence, which is critical for the success of CI operations.

More thought must be given to all these issues. Unified Command HQs have also been set up in Assam from time to time under different circumstances and with a somewhat different structure. But whether in J&K or Assam, there has sometimes been tension both between the Army and Para-military/CPO/Police formations and between the civil and military authorities. This is an unhappy state of affairs and should not be allowed to linger. The kind of manpower reorganisation the Committee proposes could provide a partial answer, but would still leave untouched the question of how best to structure Unified Command HQs in the future, wherever they might be required.

The decision taken two years ago to reduce the Indian Army's strength by 50,000 men and reinvest the savings on establishment costs in force modernisation, was a wise one. This reduction in numbers had no bearing on the Kargil crisis and it would be a gross misunderstanding of military realities to believe otherwise.

In spite of continuing counter-insurgency operations over the past many years, there has been no integrated equipment policy in respect of the Army, para-military and Central police forces. The manpower integration proposed would also ensure compatibility of equipment and render it easier for the Army and the other forces to operate side by side effectively when required to do so.

There is an equally pressing need to fashion an effective border management policy which covers not only terrorist infiltration, but illegal migration, smuggling and the flow of narcotics. These are all matters of national concern but are being looked at compartmentally. The inevitable result has been sub-optimal border management at a time when the narcotics trade has been playing a crucial role in Pakistan's promotion of cross-border terrorism.

## **V — The Technological Dimension**

Technology has added significantly to the potential of armies



and terrorists. The AK 47 has transformed the lethal potential of the terrorist who has often outgunned the country's security forces in Punjab and J&K. The terrorist comes equipped with rapid fire, stand-off weapons, high explosives, wads of currency (real and fake) and sophisticated communications equipment. He can act alone and also as a member of an integrated team. He is highly motivated and often a person conditioned by years of fundamentalist schooling. Despite the challenge of terrorism over the past many years, the Indian Army and other security forces have lagged behind in the quality of their surveillance and communication equipment although technologically superior equipment is readily available the world over. Only after the Kargil intrusion was direction-finding equipment acquired in increasing numbers. Helicopters employed for air surveillance patrolling do not have sophisticated monitoring and sensing devices. The Kargil battle was fought with less than optimum communications capability. While self-reliance and indigenisation are sound principles, the availability of critical equipment in time of combat is the supreme consideration that must govern acquisition policy. This does not appear to be the case at present and there is no mechanism to monitor that the process of equipment acquisition serves the best interests of the country.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the chain of defence laboratories under its jurisdiction is responsible for indigenising and constantly upgrading the country's weapons and equipment inventory and related supplies. The dilemma has always been to determine the correct balance between "make or buy". There are obvious constraints such as of foreign exchange and the non-availability of state-of-the-art technology from advanced nations which are at best only prepared to share these with their military allies. As a non-aligned power, India has not had access to some of the Western technologies that have flowed to Pakistan. Dual-use technology-denial regimes have also operated against India. These considerations demand that the country develop a degree of self-reliance in defence-related technology and military hardware. Considerable progress has been made in this direction. The achievements in this field can neither be denied nor denigrated. Nevertheless, a number of instances

were brought to the notice of the Committee in respect of which there have been significant cost and time overruns in the development and induction of indigenous weapons and equipment for the three Armed Services. While extenuating circumstances can be cited, the fact is that the Services have had to do without such items whereas Pakistan has not been similarly handicapped. Some of these issues were in fact examined in detail by the Committee on Defence Expenditure (1990-91). This report has unfortunately not been made public and, the Committee understands, many of its more substantial recommendations await implementation.

## **VI - Media Relations and Information**

If the media served the country well, much of the credit goes to the initiative it itself took and to some individuals within the Government and the Armed Forces. Information is power, especially in this Information Age. The media moulds national and international opinion and can be a potent force multiplier. This was evident at Kargil – India's first television war. All things considered, coverage by the print and electronic media was by and large satisfactory. Yet it was apparent that, with some exceptions, media personnel lacked training in military affairs and war reporting and that the Armed Services lacked training and preparedness to facilitate the task of the media and counter disinformation.

Defence Public Relations is routinely handled by the Ministry of Defence through regular Information Service cadres. This establishment is not equipped to handle media relations during war or even proxy war. The briefing function during the Kargil crisis was taken over by a triad of senior military and civil spokesmen. Army Headquarters set up an Information and Psychological Warfare Cell under an officer of the rank of Major General with direct access to the Army Chief. This enabled Army Headquarters both to monitor and disseminate information in a better calibrated manner than would have been the case otherwise.

Reporting on the campaign revealed a lack of public information about the command structure of the Armed Forces and how responsibilities are distributed within the national intelligence

framework. While arrangements were made for official briefings at Delhi, there were inadequate arrangements at the Corps, Division and Brigade levels. Nor were there arrangements to brief officers and men at the ground level on daily developments nor to interface with the civil authorities. The result was generation of a lot of inaccurate information such as the reported capture of a number of Indian Army bunkers (whereas the enemy only occupied one permanent patrol post which had earlier been vacated on account of extreme weather conditions), the existence of three-storied enemy bunkers equipped with television sets, and the purchase by the intruders of cement from the Dras-Kargil market.

A number of simple misperceptions became apparent in newspaper reports questioning the absence of the Army Chief in Poland during the early part of May 1999 and the Northern Army Commander going to Pune about the same time. The early military appreciation was of limited infiltration in Kargil. Nevertheless, the Corps Commander, in whose area of responsibility the intrusion (as it was subsequently discovered to be) occurred, had acted promptly and vigorously to deal with even larger eventualities. There was no need to cancel the Army Chief's visit which had been long planned and was of some political significance. The COAS remained in touch with developments at home and there was no vacuum in the higher military leadership because of his absence abroad during the early phase of Kargil developments. The Army Commander, in turn, went to Pune for a briefing from his predecessor, Lieutenant General S. Padmanabhan, now Southern Army Commander. He too was in constant touch with his Command and HQ 15 Corps and had already set in motion various precautionary measures.

Some of all this is inevitable in the fog of war. But efforts have to be made to review information handling procedures within the Armed Forces and their public dissemination. The Army needs such improved public relations capability even otherwise when deployed on counter-insurgency duties. Public relations are presently managed by the Ministry of Defence and at the formation level by military officers who have no media background.

A comprehensive account of the Kargil operations remains to be brought out. Pakistani political and military leaders have repeatedly highlighted their nuclear capability and their will to use it. Accounts have also appeared in Pakistan of how India was thrice deterred by its nuclear capability. India's reticence in setting the record straight about the earlier conflicts and the developments in the nuclear field appear to have influenced the Pakistani mindset and led to the adventurous miscalculation over Kargil.

The first overall briefing on the Kargil situation in the Military Operations Room was given to the Defence and External Affairs Ministers on May 17 with the Chiefs of Staff Committee in attendance. This was followed by a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) chaired by the Prime Minister on May 18 and a briefing of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on May 24, with the COSC in attendance, by when the magnitude of the Kargil intrusion had been more or less fully assessed. The Army Chief had returned from Poland by May 20 when the CCS met again on May 25\*, with the COSC in attendance, and the use of the air power was cleared.

War and proxy war do not leave the civil population untouched. Human rights violations, civilian casualties, destruction or commandeering of property, refugee movements and the disruption of infrastructure and livelihoods must be expected. This calls for the creation of a civil-military interface at various levels to deal with a whole range of problems on an emergency basis. Such liaison was lacking during the Kargil action and points to a deficiency that must be made good.

The outcome of the Kargil operation was both a military and diplomatic triumph for India. The Pakistani intruders were evicted with heavier casualties than those suffered by India. The sanctity of the LOC received international recognition and Pakistan was isolated in the comity of nations. While attending to such shortcomings as have been brought to light, the nation can be proud of the manner in which the Armed Forces and the people as a whole acquitted themselves.

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\* CCS met formally only on 25-5-99; earlier meetings of May '99 were briefing sessions.

## VII - Was Kargil Avoidable?

A Kargil type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168 km. stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La. This would have entailed establishing a series of winter cut-off posts with communications and other logistic support and specially equipped and trained troops to hold these positions and undertake winter patrolling despite risk of cold injuries and avalanche casualties which would have had to be accepted. Such a dispersal of forces to hold uninhabited territory of no strategic value, would have dissipated considerable military strength and effort and would not have been at all cost-effective. If, however, it has had to be done now, such a policy can only be regarded as no more than a temporary expedient. The alternative should be a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and wilful violations of the sanctity of the LOC. This should be supplemented by a comprehensive space and aerial based surveillance system.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Findings bring out many grave deficiencies in India's security management system. The framework Lord Ismay formulated and Lord Mountbatten recommended was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of national security management. There has been very little change over the past 52 years despite the 1962 debacle, the 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory, the growing nuclear threat, end of the cold war, continuance of proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade and the revolution in military affairs. The political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the background in time of peace and is considered too delicate to be tampered with in time of war and proxy war. The Committee strongly feels that the Kargil experience, the continuing proxy war and the prevailing nuclearised security environment justify a thorough review of the national security system in its entirety.

Such a review cannot be undertaken by an over-burdened

bureaucracy. An independent body of credible experts, whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient, is required to conduct such studies which must be undertaken expeditiously. The specific issues that require to be looked into are set out below.

### **National Security Council**

The National Security Council (NSC), formally constituted in April 1999, is still evolving and its procedures will take time to mature. Whatever its merits, having a National Security Adviser who also happens to be Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, can only be an interim arrangement. The Committee believes that there must be a full time National Security Adviser and it would suggest that a second line of personnel be inducted into the system as early as possible and groomed for higher responsibility.

Members of the National Security Council, the senior bureaucracy servicing it and the Service Chiefs need to be continually sensitised to assessed intelligence pertaining to national, regional and international issues. This can be done through periodic intelligence briefings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with all supporting staff in attendance.

### **Intelligence**

Kargil highlighted the gross inadequacies in the nation's surveillance capability, particularly through satellite imagery. The Committee notes with satisfaction that steps have been initiated to acquire this capability. Every effort must be made and adequate funds provided to ensure that a capability of world standards is developed indigenously and put in place in the shortest possible time. It is for consideration whether a two-stream approach – civil and military – in regard to the downloading and interpretation of the imagery may not be a better alternative than depending on a single agency. Some countries have created a national surveillance command. Since the Indian system is still in the initial stages, decisions taken at this juncture will have long term implications.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) also known as Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), are extremely useful and effective in surveillance, especially if they have night vision and thermal imaging capabilities. UAVs have just been inducted and are operating in the plains under the charge of the Army. Similar efforts should be made for the acquisition of high altitude UAVs. Institutionalised arrangements should be made to ensure that the UAV imagery generated is disseminated to the concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible. UAVs could also prove effective in counter-insurgency operations. They may replace WASO patrols in the long run. However, in the interim, the possibility of using more stable WASO platforms than Cheetah helicopters and equipping them with thermal imaging sensors should be explored.

The most spectacular intelligence coup of the Kargil operations was the interception of a series of high level Islamabad-Beijing telephone conversations. This highlights the capabilities of communication intelligence which in India is fragmented among a number of agencies and is not adequately funded. The equipment needs to be modernised in keeping with the advances made by Pakistan in inducting advanced communication technologies. There has also been a gross shortage of direction-finding equipment which could contribute significantly to counter-insurgency operations.

The United States has grouped all its communication and electronic intelligence efforts within a single organisation, the National Security Agency (NSA). The desirability of setting up a similar organisation in India with adequate resources for this extremely important and non-intrusive method of gathering technological intelligence calls for examination. Adequate attention has not been paid to developing encryption and decryption skills. The centralised communication and electronic intelligence agency should feed all the information it generates to the country's premier national intelligence agency which should in turn disseminate this material to all concerned users. The problems and purposes of monitoring communications within the country and the effort devoted to listen in on external communications are different. Increasingly, organised crime and anti-national elements are using encrypted communications. While the effort to build up adequate

communication and electronic intelligence capability should be tailored to suit India's particular needs, parochial departmental interests should be effectively countered.

In many advanced countries, technological intelligence collection is undertaken by an integrated Defence Intelligence Agency with adequate resources. In India, the defence intelligence effort is limited in relation to the role assigned to the external intelligence agency (R&AW) except for limited tactical and signal intelligence. The resources made available to the Defence Services for intelligence collection are not commensurate with the responsibility assigned to them. There are distinct advantages in having two lines of intelligence collection and reporting, with a rational division of functions, responsibilities and areas of specialisation. The Committee is of the view that the issue of setting up an integrated defence intelligence agency needs examination.

The Committee has drawn attention to deficiencies in the present system of collection, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence. There is no institutionalised mechanism for coordination or objective-oriented interaction between the agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is no mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. These are all standard features elsewhere in the world. In the absence of such procedures, the Government and the nation do not know whether they are getting value for money. While taking note of recent steps to entrust the NSCS with some of these responsibilities the Committee recommends a thorough examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to remedying these deficiencies.

All major countries have a mechanism at national and often at lower levels to assess the intelligence inputs received from different agencies and sources. After the 1962 debacle, the then existing JIC under the Chiefs of Staff Committee was upgraded and transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat. It was further upgraded in 1985 with the Chairman being raised to the rank of Secretary to



the Government. The Committee finds that for various reasons cited in the Report, the JIC was devalued. Its efficacy has increased since it became part of the National Security Council Secretariat. However, its role and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of overall reform of the system.

Pakistan's action at Kargil was not rational. Its behaviour patterns require to be carefully studied in order to gain a better understanding of the psyche of its leadership. In other countries, intelligence agencies have developed large 'White Wings' of high quality analysts for in-house analysis. They also contract studies with university departments and think tanks with area specialisation. This is sadly neglected in India. The development of such country/region specialisation along with associated language skills is a time consuming process and should not be further delayed. A generalist administration culture would appear to permeate the intelligence field. It is necessary to establish think tanks, encourage country specialisation in university departments and to organise regular exchanges of personnel between them and the intelligence community.

### **Counter-Terrorist Operations**

There is general agreement that in the light of the new situation of proxy war and large scale terrorism that the country faces, the role and the tasks of the para-military forces have to be restructured particularly with reference to command and control and leadership functions. They need to be trained to much higher standards of performance and better equipped to deal with terrorist threats. The possibility of adopting an integrated manpower policy for the Armed Forces, para-military forces and the Central Police Forces merits examination.

The Army must be young and fit at all times. Therefore, instead of the present practice of having 17 years of colour service (as has been the policy since 1976), it would be advisable to reduce the colour service to a period of seven to ten years and, thereafter, release these officers and men for service in the

country's para-military formations. After an appropriate period of service here, older cadres might be further streamed into the regular police forces or absorbed in a National Service Corps (or a National Conservation Corps), as provided for under Article 51A(d) of the Constitution, to spearhead a range of land and water conservation and physical and social infrastructure development on the model of some eco-development battalions that have been raised with a fair measure of success. This would reduce the age profile of the Army and the para-military forces, and also reduce pension costs and other entitlements such as married quarters and educational facilities. The Army pension bill has risen exponentially since the 1960s and is becoming an increasing burden on the national exchequer. Army pensions rose from Rs.1568 crores in 1990-91 to Rs.6932 crores (budgeted) in 1999-2000, the equivalent of almost two-thirds of the current Army salary bill.

The para-military and police forces have their own ethos and traditions and might well be chary of such lateral induction as has been proposed. This objection might be overcome were the para-military forces to undertake recruitment on the basis of certain common national military standards and then send those selected for training and absorption in the Army for a period of colour service before reverting to their parent para-military formations. The Committee is aware of the complexities and sensitivities involved in any such security manpower reorganisation. Nevertheless, national security dictates certain imperatives which the country may ignore only at its peril. The proposed reorganisation would make a career in the armed forces attractive on the basis of the lifetime employment offered by the two or three-tiered secondment formula.

### **Border Management**

Border management has become immensely more complex over the years. It is now handled by the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Border fencing in Punjab has produced positive results. Elsewhere, vested interests have come in the way of effective border management. The smuggling of narcotics, man-portable arms and explosives, illegal migration and the infiltration of trained mercenaries have all

exacerbated border management. Narcotics is dealt with by the Finance Ministry while other aspects are handled by the Home Ministry. If the country is to acquire increased capabilities for area surveillance and electronic fencing, the present structure and procedures for border patrolling must be reviewed. The Committee is therefore of the view that the entire issue needs detailed study in order to evolve force structures and procedures that ensure improved border management and a reduction, if not the elimination, in the inflow of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and arms.

### **Defence Budget and Modernisation**

A number of experts have at various times suggested the need to enhance India's Defence outlays as budgetary constraints have affected the process of modernisation and created certain operational voids. The Committee would not like to advocate any percentage share of GDP that should be assigned to Defence. This must be left to the Government to determine in consultation with the concerned Departments and the Defence Services.

Among aspects of modernisation to which priority should be given is that of equipping infantrymen with superior light weight weapons, equipment and clothing suited to the threats they are required to face in alpine conditions.

### **National Security Management and Apex Decision-Making**

India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. The Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of operational commanders of their respective forces rather than that of Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. They simultaneously discharge the roles of operational commanders and national security planners/managers, especially in relation to future equipment and force postures. Most of their time, is, however, devoted to the operational role, as is bound to happen. This has led to a number of negative results. Future-oriented long term planning suffers. Army Headquarters has developed a command rather than a staff culture. Higher decisions on equipment,

force levels and strategy are not collegiate but command-oriented. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decisions are more consensual and broadbased. The present obsolete system has perpetuated the continuation of the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command whereas what is required is a National Defence Headquarters. Most opposition to change comes from inadequate knowledge of the national security decision-making process elsewhere in the world and a reluctance to change the status quo and move away from considerations of parochial interest. The status quo is often mistakenly defended as embodying civilian ascendancy over the armed forces, which is not a real issue. In fact, locating the Services' Headquarters in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy.

Structural reforms could bring about a much closer and more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Services. The Committee is of the view that the present obsolete system, bequeathed to India by Lord Ismay, merits re-examination. An effective and appropriate national security planning and decision-making structure for India in the nuclear age is overdue, taking account of the revolution in military affairs and threats of proxy war and terrorism and the imperative of modernising the Armed Forces. An objective assessment of the last 52 years will show that the country is lucky to have scraped through various national security threats without too much damage, except in 1962. The country can no longer afford such ad hoc functioning. The Committee therefore recommends that the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganised.

### **India's Nuclear Policy**

The Report clearly brings out that, beginning with Indira Gandhi, successive Prime Ministers displayed extreme sensitivity towards the nuclear issue and consistently supported an Indian nuclear

weapons programme. They judged it necessary to envelop it in the utmost secrecy and consequently did not take their own party colleagues, the Armed Forces and senior civil servants into confidence. This has caused many in the country to believe that India's nuclear weaponisation programme is a departure from the traditional policy of merely keeping the nuclear option open indefinitely. The record must be set straight. The contribution of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, V.P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar, Narsimha Rao, Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral to India's emergence as a nuclear weapon state, and the compulsions on them to ensure this, should be made known. The record clearly establishes that the Indian nuclear weapons programme had a much wider consensus than is generally believed. The Committee therefore recommends the publication of a White Paper on the Indian nuclear weapons programme. This will also bring out the stark facts of the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear capability with assistance from countries who tirelessly decry proliferation, and the threats posed to India through nuclear blackmail.

### **Media relations and information**

Kargil was the first war which Indian correspondents covered by going to the front in significant numbers. It was also the country's first television war and one in which the Indian Army had to handle the media right on the battlefield. This has been a learning experience for the Government, the Armed Forces and the media. Neither the Northern Army Command nor HQ 15 Corps nor the lower field formations had media cells which could cater to the requirements of the press corps. This reveals an obvious lacuna which must be plugged. The Army has decided to revive and upgrade its war correspondents' course at the College of Combat, Mhow. The media should avail of this opportunity so that there is a cadre of trained war correspondents at any time. Simultaneously, media relations and the techniques and implications of information war and perception management must form a distinct and important module at all levels of military training. It must also be recognised that the media has to be serviced at many levels – national, local and international. None is less important than the other.

While dealing with the information issue, the Committee would also like to draw attention to the fact that Indian security forces are deployed year round in very difficult and inhospitable terrain ranging from high mountains to dense forests and sandy deserts. The US Armed Forces usually operate dedicated radio and TV channels to entertain and inform their armed forces when deployed overseas. The Government should seriously consider similar dedicated facilities for the Indian Armed Forces. If such facilities had been available at the time of Kargil, some of the misleading reports and rumours that gained currency could have been effectively countered.

This Report brings out the vast gap between the actual policies pursued by the Government and developments on the ground on the one hand and popular perceptions derived from public pronouncements on the other. In a democracy, it is incumbent on the Government to reduce any such gap. While the country's nuclear programme must remain confidential, there was a failure on the part of successive Prime Ministers to educate the people on the realities of nuclear security confronting the country. In the case of Defence policy and insurgency situations, sufficient public information is not available. There is no single, comprehensive official publication containing details of the Kashmir question, the UN resolutions and why they could not be implemented, as well as of more recent developments in Kashmir through the years of proxy war, terrorism and ethnic cleansing together with Pakistan's involvement in all of these. The Government must review its information policy and develop structures and processes to keep the public informed on vital national issues.

It would appear that one of the major factors influencing Pakistan's aggressive behaviour in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 has been its self-image of martial superiority and a deliberately cultivated perception of an ineffectual Indian Army and a weak and vacillating Indian Government. Though Pakistan was discomfited in all the four military adventures it undertook, it has attempted to portray each of them as a narrowly-missed victory. Even the 1971 defeat is blamed on the Soviet Union. Developments in Afghanistan and its final denouement have been portrayed as projecting Pakistani military prowess in defeating the Soviet super-power. India has not

published authoritative histories of the 1965 and 1971 wars. It is necessary to publish authentic accounts of the 1965 and 1971 wars and to establish the facts. While this Report appends, with appropriate security deletions, the three Service Headquarters' presentations of Operation VIJAY, Operation SAFED SAGAR and Operation TALWAR, that were made before the Committee, we recommend that an authoritative account of this unique high altitude war be published at an early date. Further to these, communicating the scope, extent and history of India's nuclear weapons programme should be an essential part of the exercise of deterrence. The record needs to be set right, not through strident propaganda, but by a cold marshalling of the facts regarding contemporary events and past history.

### **Technology**

The longstanding controversy between the Services and the DRDO on drawing the line between "make" or "buy" resulted in the formulation of a new Procurement Policy in 1995. This liberalised the procedures for the import of equipment as against its indigenous development. However, this policy needs periodic review in the light of changing circumstances. Experience would suggest that such a review is presently overdue. One problem the DRDO faces is that the armed forces borrow unique features from weapons and equipment on offer from advanced military suppliers around the world and marry these in their "General Staff Requirements" to make "impossible" demands. There is an element of truth in this assertion but none can be faulted for desiring the best. A true partnership must be established between the Services and the DRDO to ensure that the latter gets full backing and funding from the Services and the former, in turn, get the indented equipment they require without undue delay.

The design and development of special materials as well as Defence stores and equipment often entails working at the frontiers of technology. It is therefore possible and desirable to harness national talent wherever it lies – in the Universities and IITs, and in the private and public sectors – and not only within the DRDO and designated Defence undertakings. Casting the net wider would



be advantageous and would ensure a greater degree of competition and technological spin-off into the civil sector. This would also facilitate Defence exports, the better utilisation of highly sophisticated industrial capacity and related manpower and enable Defence laboratories and Defence undertakings to concentrate on those areas which cannot be hived off to the civil sector, public or private, on grounds of high security or limited applicability of end use for civilian purposes. There is a whole gamut of issues here which merits consideration.

### **Civil Military Liaison**

The establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels, from the ranking Command HQ to the operational formations on the ground, Division, Brigade or Battalion, is most necessary to smoothen relationships during times of emergency and stress, like war and proxy war, and to ensure that there is no room for friction and alienation of the local population. Situations of no-war -no-peace call for norms and procedures that avoid delay and endless red tape. Relocating villages behind the Army's forward defence line in J&K can best be done through an initially limited experimental move and further action on the basis of policies evolved as a result of that learning experience. Likewise, steps should be taken to issue ID Cards to border villagers in certain vulnerable areas on a priority basis, pending its extension to other or all parts of the State. Such a policy would also be relevant in the North-East, Sikkim and part of West Bengal.

The Kargil Sector and other areas along the LOC have suffered loss and damage on account of war and shelling. A rehabilitation programme for Kargil must be put in place as a precursor to a longer term development package that includes the completion of by-pass roads for strategic movements between Zojila and Leh. This will render NH-1A an exclusively civilian highway and not a military target, skirting as it does a part of the LOC in this sector.

The dedication and valour of the Ladakh Scouts and J&K Light Infantry merits recognition through the raising of additional units of these regiments with a higher component of men from Kargil being inducted into the Ladakh Scouts.



### **Declaratory Policy for LOC**

More attention should be given to monitoring and analysing developments and trends in "Azad J&K" and the Northern Areas which are in ferment and whose fate and future cannot be divorced from any consideration of the Kashmir Question. Likewise, the Kashmiri diaspora overseas must be kept better informed about the situation in J&K and what happened in Kargil.

Misperceptions and ambiguities about the Siachen/AGPL sector need to be dispelled and the facts of "cartographic aggression" here made known. There is no warrant for departing from the logic of extending the LOC from NJ 9842 and "thence north to the glaciers" as set out in the delineation of the Ceasefire Line under the Karachi agreement of July 29, 1949 which was subsequently converted into the Line of Control by the Simla Agreement in 1992. This broadly upholds the current Actual Ground Position Line. The fallacy of showing the LOC as running northeast to the Karakoram Pass must be exposed.

The country must not fall into the trap of Siachenisation of the Kargil heights and similar unheld unpopulated "gaps" in the High Himalaya along the entire length of the Northern border. The proper response would be a declaratory policy that deliberate infringement of the sanctity of the LOC and wanton cross-border terrorism in furtherance of proxy war will meet with prompt retaliation in a manner, time and place of India's choosing. Pakistan and the world must know that India's defence of the integrity of its own territory, including that within its own side of the LOC, is not and cannot be held to be escalatory and that the aggressor and his victim cannot be bracketed and placed on par.

Such a declaratory policy must be backed with credible measures in J&K to win back alienated sections of the population, attend to genuine discontents, political and economic, and enable the victims of ethnic cleansing to return to their homes in the Valley or elsewhere in the State with security and honour. To this end, the Union and State Governments must jointly initiate a twin policy of reform and devolution to and within J&K and a dialogue

with Pakistan. India's commitment to maintaining the sanctity of the LOC/AGPL and the international endorsement of this position won during the Kargil crises has within it the seeds of a larger, long-term settlement that can bring enduring peace and tranquility to J&K and stable and cooperative Indo-Pakistan relations on the basis of the Simla-Lahore process within the framework of SAARC.

### Epilogue

The Committee's review brings out many lessons that the Armed Forces, Intelligence agencies, Parliament, Government, media and the nation as a whole have to learn. These have been set out in the preceding findings. These should stimulate introspection and reflection, leading to purposeful action. The Committee trusts that its Recommendations will be widely discussed and acted upon expeditiously so that the sacrifices made will not have been in vain. The best tribute to the dedication of those killed and wounded will be to ensure that "Kargils" of any description are never repeated.

There is both comfort and danger in clinging to any long established status quo. There will be many who suggest the most careful deliberation on the report. Procrastination has cost nations dear. Others will no doubt advocate incremental change. Half measures will not do; synergy will be lost. The Committee has after very wide interaction sign-posted directions along the path to peace, ensuring progress, development and stability of the nation. How exactly the country should proceed to refashion its Security-Intelligence-Development shield to meet the challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is for the Government, Parliament, and public opinion to determine. There is no turning away from that responsibility.

# Intelligence and Decision Making

LT COL M N GOPAKUMAR

**M**uch of the culpability for the recent happenings (circa May-July 99) has been attributed to "intelligence failure", the much flogged cliché for any and every malady. For the uninitiated to so allege is but natural, but when known luminaries join the bandwagon it is cause enough to take notice and place issues in perspective as 'Ignorance is the most excusable of all vices but the least pardonable of all virtues'. This article is an attempt to broaden the parameters of debate on title-related issues.

## Intelligence : Another Paradigm

Just as beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder, so is it with intelligence, which means many things to many people. Furthermore, just as it is with 'ghosts' or 'true love', so is it also with intelligence; everyone talks about them but very few have seen or experienced them. What is intelligence? Intelligence is both a process and a product. It is nothing but a cognitive manipulation and use of information. For a different perspective, let us draw a parallel between intelligence and petroleum products, even though different processes are involved; physical and chemical in converting crude oil to petroleum products, and cognitive processes in the case of conversion of information to intelligence.

Crude oil, while being converted to high grade fuel gives off various by-products, each of which is utility and function-specific to humans. So is the case with information which is converted to high grade intelligence. Information put through the process involving cognitive skills, transforms itself to varying grades of intelligence. Grades vary on account of the varying cognitive skills of those involved. As is the case with the different petroleum products, which

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are utility and function-specific, so are the varying grades of intelligence, in so far as their varying utilities, to different functionaries of a hierarchy.

### **Decision Making and Intelligence : Linkages**

What does intelligence do, or in other words what is its utility? Essentially, intelligence is an adjunct to another vegetative function viz., Decision Making. An incomplete list of the utilities of intelligence will read as:-

- Intelligence should by itself enable decision making.
- Intelligence should enhance and enlarge the quality and scope of an earlier decision, which was based entirely on consideration of all factors, other than intelligence.
- Intelligence should enable alteration, modification, revision or rescinding of an earlier decision.

Does a "chicken and egg" relationship exist between intelligence and decision making? The answer is an emphatic no. Just as all animate forms are not human, though all humans are animate, decision making in the absence of intelligence is possible and a must, whereas intelligence not assisting or leading to decision making is absolutely inconsequential and redundant.

Just as various engines which use the same fuel are differently graded in terms of their fuel-efficiency, so is the case with the decision makers in so far as their 'Int-utilitisation-capabilities' are concerned; it has to do with their cerebral faculties, acumen and experiences. Hence, the cliché 'Intelligence-failure', more often than not, attempts to conceal the inadequacies of the decision makers, in so far as their 'Int-utilitisation-capabilities' are concerned.

### **Decision Makers' Role**

Since intelligence synergises decision making, every decision maker creates, nurtures and sustains (at enormous costs) an elaborate infrastructure for procuring, processing and converting information to intelligence. Here is a very important facet of the

linkage, which deals with the aspect of initiating the information-to-intelligence process. There can be no two opinions on this issue, that it is incumbent on the decision maker to initiate the process by spelling out the broad framework within which the intelligence effort should be focussed, euphemistically referred to as the 'Intelligence Problem'. Over and above the 'Intelligence Problem', the decision maker also spells out the most critical input that he mandatorily requires, euphemised as the 'Essential Element of Intelligence' (EEI).

The decision makers defaulting in spheres such as not being dynamic and constantly reviewing their intelligence problems and EEI but leaving it to the intelligence fraternity to involve and formulate if for themselves, not monitoring the activities of the intelligence fraternity as to whether the latter are all the time focussed on the stated intelligence problem or not, and so on, are some of the malaise that cause the system to entropy. Among these, decision makers not being dynamic, not reviewing and accordingly not restating the EEI, causes the utmost damage.

### **Fault-Lines Intrinsic to the System**

With such a perspective concerning the accountability of the decision maker, let us attempt to analyse the functioning of the intelligence fraternity. They, instead of remaining focussed on the decision maker's needs, have a propensity to set the agenda for the latter, like the cart drawing the horse. This suits both in normal times, as it covers up their particular inadequacies; but get embarrassingly exposed in times of crisis, with attendant costs in terms of resources, time and prestige of all concerned.

Creation of fiefdoms, antagonisms (intra), working at cross purpose with all others engaged in similar activities, conjuring up of intelligence (basing it merely on intuition or impulse), shortcomings which accrue on account of weaknesses of the human flesh and spirit and so on, are some of the commonly perceived and debated afflictions of the intelligence fraternity; however, they are beyond the scope of this debate. Hence, what will be attempted to be seen in perspective will be the generally accepted norm, wherein the system relies entirely on the intelligence fraternity to make a net 'Estimate of the Situation'.

All intelligence agencies are conscious of the significant gaps in their knowledge, of their targets. This is so because, at any given time they know so much of what they need to know, that it is easy for them to know as to what they do not know. To make up for these voids, as also because of their inability to fill up these (due to inept and banal acquisition skills; another topic by itself), intelligence agencies have the natural tendency to underplay the difficulties and constraints of the adversary and at the same time magnify those of our own.

Hence an intelligence agency perhaps is the least suitable among all those involved to make a 'Net Estimate', which has to take into account a gamut of issues, including relative capabilities, and thereafter give out probable intentions of the adversary. Because of their intrinsic inadequacies in this domain, the advice of an intelligence agency always tends to be on the side of prudence, with the scope to 'wriggle' out and adopt a 'I had-told-you-did-I-not' stance, should things go awry at a later date.

### **Prospective Issues**

Just as life has to be lived forward but can only be understood backward, every crisis provides an opportunity for all concerned to pause and reflect upon involved issues. Ultimately, accountability is with the decision maker for a decision, either made or not made. Affairs of the contemporary world are too diverse and complex to be handled and decided upon by a single entity; be it an individual or an establishment. Herein is the need for 'Value Advice' of experts (visionaries who are committed, selfless, uninvolved yet observant and with an ability to comprehend as to what the kaleidoscopic change portend, like Chanakya). Based on such advice, the decision maker should spell out his concerns to all the organs of the system (including the intelligence fraternity) and thereafter ensure and oversee their orchestrated functioning.

Since all the 'bucks' stop with the decision maker, he or what he represents cannot afford to keep stepping on the same stone, for 'he who repeatedly steps on the same stone, deserves to fall and break his bones'.

## Himalayan Borders : Winsome Ways

MAJOR S T APPACHAVA (RETD)

It was most heartening to learn from press reports that the Government was planning to raise a unit of the Kargil Scouts, like the Ladakh Scouts, from the indigenous community of peasants, shepherds, mushroom and herb gatherers and Yak herders. The vocations of these get them to possess an intimate knowledge of their region – every rock and tree stump even when blinded by relentless blizzards – and make them hardy. Apart from this, these normally gentle children of the soil, recruited from their own regions, develop an astonishingly fierce motivation to defend their native mountains and their way of life from hostile incursions.

### Sparking Inner Fire

The mild Jaffna Tamil people of Sri Lanka proved this unquenchable inner fire that homeland and a distinct culture can ignite. The small Chenchu tribe of the upper Godavari jungles in Andhra Pradesh, long emaciated from malnutrition and malaria, led by Allurie Seetaram Raju, a mystic, believing in armed rebellion against foreign rule, in the early 1920s proved formidable even to regular forces, though ultimately crushed. They had nothing but their pitiful bows and arrows and a few muskets stolen from isolated police stations for the insurrection against British rule. Home-bred honey bees could be hornets when aroused, as the Bihari Santhal rebellion against the British East India company proved.

### Past Lessons

Going back into history, the British defence policy in India after the cataclysm of 1857 was based on two firm principles – a sledgehammer to smash an eggshell, i.e., to quell an uprising well before it evolved a cohesive organisation. Secondly, an empire-builder's wisdom, dictating that only diamond can cut diamond. The ever turbulent Afridis and Yusufzais of the Pakhtoon tribes of the Indian

North Western Frontier Province of the British Empire, at one time led in rebellion by the fanatic Faquir of Ipi, could never be beaten in the fastnesses of their native mountains, though armed only with native muskets (Jezails). The British finally countered such menace by raising levies of friendly tribesmen from the same craggy mountains, like the Gilgit Scouts, Tochi Scouts and the Zob Militia, trained and armed with nothing more than a rifle and a bandolier of ammunition. Their uniforms amounted to no more than their customary flowing garments, but of tough ordnance 'mazri' material, including sturdy Pathan type of sandals, with other ordnance equivalents for the savage winter. Incredibly, it was accepted that these untamed fighters elected their own subunit commanders. The Pir of Pagaro, leading a rebellion in the rugged mountains of Baluchistan in the middle 1930s, was defeated and hanged by the unique British policy of exploiting tribal supporters, besides regular forces.

### **Morale Factors**

It was again a distinct law of British North-Western Frontier (Mountain) warfare that there should be no let-up in intense counter-attacks to recover even one prisoner, one wounded soldier, or even a dead body, in the light of the atrocities committed by these savage mountaineers on captives. The early months of the 1948 hostilities saw this implemented.

### **Intelligence**

More important, the friendly tribal chieftains (Khans), then referred to as *Khasadars*, selected by experienced British political agents administering these frontier agencies, were officially paid liberal amounts of money to give timely information about unrest and hostile moves, besides their being in the first line of resistance till the regular forces arrived for shock attack at the focal point of militancy. These wild tribal levies, lured to support British forces, were specially organised to be commanded by one British officer, with one or two more Captains or Subalterns, all trained to fluency in Pashto — the Pakhtoon dialect, besides distinct tribal custom and tradition. They kept close contact with the "Jirgas" (clan meetings) of the tribal *Khasadars*, besides their own civil British political agent, ever intimate with the area of unrest through



caravans, traders and shepherds – all being their sources of constant intelligence information.

### **Winsome ways of Winning**

Dwelling further on remarkable British strategies of the Second World War – lessons bitterly learnt after the superbly jungle-trained Japanese forces burst through the thick Malaysian forests and attacking Singapore from the rear. Again, with the empire building genius of the British, anthropologists, missionaries and professors specialised in the primitive culture of jungle tribals of the tropical jungles of South East Asia, evolved ways of winning over even the savage Dayak head hunters of the jungles of Borneo. These primitive inhabitants of the Indonesian jungles had suffered much, and had a score to settle with the Japanese invaders, who had given short shrift to these primitive jungle people during their conquering onslaught. They were won over now by these specially trained British teams, with the additional lure of nourishing food, medicines, clothing and trinkets for the women. The Dayak tribals proved invaluable in helping British forces to track and destroy Japanese jungle patrols and assembly areas.

Briefly, Indian militia forces recruited from among natives of the snow-bound heights of Kargil, Ladakh and Leh, besides the Bhotia, Nagas and Mompahs of the North-East Frontiers, all lightly armed and trained in silencer-equipped telescopic rifles, grenades and wireless sets, communicating in their native dialects, would be matchless in defending their own homes, flocks and ancestral barley fields. Suitably motivated, they can be mustered as a permanent menace to Pakistan's infiltrators – to the skill and cunning to use telescopic sniper rifles to pick off the leaders guiding hostile groups. Briefly, home-grown dragon-seeds nurtured by generous incentives of clinics, primary and middle schools for education of their children, besides adult literacy of the mountain dwellers, to man their own village administration, can be a system that holds untold promise – a long-term essential policy! The pathway to such measures has already been blazed by Edmund Hillary of Everest fame, who has given a model of essential living facilities to develop the Sherpa community living at altitudes of over 12,000 ft, tending their Yak herds and barley fields.

It is no utopia for our government to think fast in terms of establishing high-altitude military colonies, dwelling in fibre-glass and aluminium hutments, from the levies and militias recruited from the indigenous people of Kargil, Drass, and Ladakh, who have served three to seven years in the territorial and paramilitary forces guarding these remote border areas and have been initially educated through the Army Education Corps upto the eighth standard – taught in their own dialect, by their own paid instructors, in the proven development methods of European missionaries of Himachal Pradesh. Dogras from the Kangra valley, Spiti and Lahaul – namely young volunteers from the Dogra Regiment and qualified instructors from displaced Kashmiri pundits would be an untold asset.

### **Army Initiating Pilot Projects**

The pioneer "missionaries", however, have to come from the Army – select volunteers between 19 and 22 years – hand-picked, every one of them, in spirit, blood and innate human steel fibre. The Kargil crisis has shown that India has no dearth for such volunteers, to be screened and trained for high-risk endeavours in the hostile and most inhospitable areas of the country's menacing borders. The famished peasants of Vietnam inspired by Ho-Chi-Minh, and the mild Tamil people of Jaffna in Sri Lanka, have set a pattern of unbeatable resistance to the tyranny of armed might that tries to quell the human spirit.

Pertinently, "Military Missionaries" needs more elaboration. Picked volunteers from the Army Veterinary Corps, the Military Farms, specialised on yak, mule and sheep breeding, to high altitude requirements would be fundamental to border military colonies, along with garrisons of Ski-Troops trained in mountain-skiing ensconced among them. The creme de la creme of "Military Missionaries" would be venturesome young Army Engineer volunteers, installing wind turbines by exploiting "wind tunnels" of the rugged terrain to supply constant electric power to colonists for comfortable living. The Army Medical Corps and Army Educational Corps teams, specialised to Hillary's high altitude fundamentals, can contribute to give the border inhabitants vibrant islands of special development to fight for in a spirit of eager belonging to the main-current of India – overcoming their desolation, hitherto.

Every country has a hidden potential of heroes and heroines who will dare anything to promote the well-being of their own loved ones and in that process risk and endure much to enhance the prestige and prosperity of their own country. The honey-bee and hornet potential is deep in every man and woman. America saw it vividly, as truck drivers, bank-clerks, university students and ordinary mothers turned out for the high-paid risk-laden national venture of building the "Alaska Pipe Line", daily battling sub-zero arctic conditions of labour. Pakistan and China got their men of mettle to build the "Great Karakoram Highway". Many perished in the challenge to do or die for their families and their country – volunteering and honour-bound!

#### **RESULTS OF THE USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION 1999**

##### **1. Group 'A' – Open to All Officers. "Surprise and Deception in Modern Warfare"**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| (a) Cdr Tony Chacko<br>DSSC, Wellington     | First Prize, Gold Medal, cash award of Rs. 5,000/-, certificate, and entry accepted for publication in the USI Journal. |
| (b) Cdr S Krishnamurthy<br>DSSC, Wellington | Second prize, cash award of Rs. 2,500/- and certificate.  |

##### **2. Group 'B' – Open to all Officers Upto the Rank of Major or Equivalent Ranks in the Navy and the Air Force With Not More Than Ten Years Service - "The NCC or Compulsory National Service for Two Years".**

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|---|--|
| (a) Lt Sunil D Dogra<br>Signals School, Kochi     | First Prize, Gold Medal, cash award of Rs. 5,000/-, certificate and entry accepted for publication in the USI Journal. |
| (b) Lt MC Aiyappa<br>16 Maratha LI.<br>C/o 56 APO | Second prize, cash award of Rs. 2,500/- and certificate.   |

## **Plebiscite a Dead Issue in Jammu and Kashmir**

**LT GEN M M LAKHERA, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)**

**J**ammu and Kashmir has been on and off the centre stage for the last 50 years. However, after Pokhran II, Pakistan and some other countries with vested interest in the subcontinent have renewed their efforts with vigour to project this area as one of the major danger points in the world. Even UN Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan has in his report released on the eve of the 53rd UN General Assembly listed Kashmir as one of the main issues world-wide which are causing concern. Demands for a plebiscite are being voiced in various quarters including some of the so-called Human Rights groups in India. Is there a case for plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir? Since human memory appears to be short, there is a need to go back in time and understand the Kashmir problem in the right perspective, so that the question of plebiscite can be answered.

Around 20 October 1947 tribals from Pakistan, actively aided and supported by the Pakistan Government, invaded Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). On 27 October 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, at his own request, signed the agreement of unconditional accession to the Indian Union. Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor-General of India, in his reply dated 27 October 1947 to the Maharaja, while accepting the latter's unconditional accession to the Indian Union stated that it is his government's wish that "as soon as law and order has been restored and her soil is cleared of invaders the question of accession should be settled by the people". Subsequently on 01 November 1947, Lord Mountbatten made an offer to M A Jinnah to resolve the Kashmir issue through the people's verdict. This offer was declined by Jinnah. On 01 January 1948 the Government of India took the issue of the invasion of its state of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan to the United Nations Security Council under Article 35 of the

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Lt Gen M M Lakhera, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) saw action in the 1965 and 1971 Wars in the State of Jammu and Kashmir Sector and was also actively involved in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir.

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UN Charter. Pakistan admitted before the UN Security Council to the entry of its troops and irregulars into J&K, which was described by the Council as a breach of international law. In February 1948, the Security Council established the UNCIP (United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan). The Commission was to look into the question of settling the dispute. On 13 August 1948 the UN passed the much cited resolution on Kashmir, which was immediately accepted by India. However, Pakistan only accepted this on 20 December 1948 after raising a number of objections. Part A-1 of this resolution states that "The Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State". Part B-1 of the same resolution states that "when the Commission shall notify the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani Nationals have withdrawn from the territory of J&K, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council and further that Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the state of J&K, the Government of India agrees to withdraw the bulk of its forces in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

Ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir became effective from 01 January 1949. On 05 January 1949 the UN passed a second resolution on Kashmir. Para 2 of this resolution stated that "a plebiscite will be held when it is found by the Commission that the ceasefire and the truce arrangements set forth in UN Resolution dated 13 August 1948 have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed." It further clarified that when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the state, the Commission will determine with the plebiscite administrator and in consultation with the Government of India the final disposal of Indian and State Armed Forces, after giving due regard to the security and freedom of the plebiscite.

Between 1951 and 1958, the Security Council appointed five representatives, three of whom were US citizens, to go into the question of implementation of the UN Resolution dated 13 August 1948, thus leading to a plebiscite. None of these five representatives could come to an agreement on the question of demilitarisation i.e., the very first prerequisite for a plebiscite. They were all of the opinion that a plebiscite would create more problems than it would solve. Their

various reports were accepted by the Security Council. Since 1958 no representative has been appointed by the UN to resolve this issue. The following points clearly emerge from the above. Firstly, the Maharaja of J&K had unconditionally acceded to the Indian Union. Secondly, Pakistan was an aggressor in J&K State, a fact it admitted to the UN Security Council. Thirdly, holding of plebiscite in the entire state of J&K was conditional upon Pakistan first withdrawing all its troops, including armed tribals and nationals from the state. Before holding the plebiscite, the UN representative in consultation with the Government of India was to decide the quantum of Indian and State Armed Forces that would remain in J&K to ensure security and freedom of the plebiscite.

Fourthly, by 1958 all UN representatives were unanimous in their views that there could be no agreement on demilitarisation and a plebiscite would create more problems than it would solve. Fifthly, the UN Security Council having accepted the UN representatives' various reports and not having appointed any representative since 1958, implies its agreement with the recommendations made by these representatives.

Thus it is clear that, as far as the UN was concerned, plebiscite was a dead issue in 1958 itself. As regards the assurance of the Indian Government on this subject is concerned, in 1952 the J&K State Government decided with the approval of the Government of India to convene a constituent assembly, whose members were elected by adult franchise. This assembly was specifically asked to debate and give its reasoned conclusion regarding the accession of the state to the Indian Union. On this the Assembly stated that "The State of J&K is and would be an integral part of the Union of India". This fact has been included in the J&K State Constitution, which was adopted by the assembly on 20 October 1956 and came into effect from 26 January 1957. Thus it is clear that the assurance given by Lord Mountbatten on behalf of the Government of India has also been fully met. What now remains to be done is to hold a plebiscite in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, after the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and its armed tribals and nationals from that part of Jammu and Kashmir.

Since 1958, India and Pakistan have fought two wars in 1965 and 1971 and are now fighting a proxy war for over a decade. Though at the end of both the wars the Indian Armed Forces had captured some chunks of Pakistan territory across the International Border as also liberated certain parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), yet for maintaining peace with its neighbour, India after the 1965 War signed the Tashkent agreement with Pakistan and pulled back its forces from captured and liberated areas. Similarly, after the 1971 War, when India was in a most commanding position where it not only helped Bangladesh to attain independence from Pakistan, but also held over 90,000 Pakistan Armed Forces personnel as prisoners of war, she signed the famous Simla Agreement with Pakistan on 02 July 1972. Para 4 of this agreement states : "In order to establish the process of establishing durable peace, both the governments agree that Indian and Pakistan forces shall be withdrawn to their respective side of the International Border. In J&K the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretation. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of this line".

It is evident that at every stage India has gone out of its way to extend the hand of peace and friendship to Pakistan. India has also ensured greater autonomy for the state of J&K than for any other state of the union. In spite of repeated attempts by Pakistan to create law and order problems in Kashmir, J&K has been mostly governed by an elected government except for certain periods of Governor's rule. It is another matter that because of rampant corruption and mal-administration present in the subcontinent, the full benefits of development have not reached the masses. Yet, it is a fact that conditions in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir are far better than in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

On the other hand, what is the record of Pakistan in Kashmir? There is hardly any autonomy to the local government in PoK, and most issues are controlled and directed from Islamabad. As regards the state of J&K, Pakistan since 1947 has repeatedly tried to annex it by force. However, their evil designs have always been negated by



the Indian Armed Forces with the support of the local population. They have now been waging a proxy war with mercenaries supported by them and trained and led by their ISI personnel. These mercenaries, in complete disregard of the local population and their customs, have indulged in rape and arson. They have damaged the very foundation of *Kashmiriyat* so dear to every Kashmiri. Today you would find hardly any children of well to do families of Kashmir studying in Kashmir. They have been forced to send their children away from the Valley. There is no wholehearted support for the mercenaries from the local population. How can Pakistan ever dream of assimilating this population in their midst?

Enough blood has been shed on both sides of the border over the Kashmir issue. It is futile on the part of Pakistan to continue harping on a dead UN resolution. They must now pick up the threads from the currently in force and binding Simla agreement and accept India's offer of not only resolving Kashmir but also other outstanding issues bilaterally. Should they fail to do this, they would only become a pawn in the international power game to be exploited by Western powers. How long are the people going to be fooled? For a bright future of the subcontinent let us forget the past and make a new beginning.

### Errata

USI Journal Vol CXXIX No 536, April-June 1999 Issue

Footnote to Article titled 'Counter Insurgency and Human Rights' by Cdr A N Sonsale on Page 212 be deleted.

The award of first prize to Cdr A N Sonsale has not been made.



## Pakistan : State, Polity and the ISI

K N DARUWALLA

**F**or countries which had shaken off the colonial yoke, state-building and nation-building was never going to be easy. This was more so with India and Pakistan because a country with over 5,000 years of civilisation was divided in two. Since Pakistan broke away, it was obviously going to have more problems.

Born out of a one-dimensional political philosophy and governed by either a feudal political elite supported by an equally feudal bureaucracy, or by a military whose officer cadres came mostly from the land-owning classes, the Pakistani State has had a rough time. Its political philosophy, if that is the word, began and ended with providing a sort of a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. Beyond herding them together into the north-west of the parent country, the architects of Pakistan did not give much thought to the kind of political dispensation they wished to live under. To an extent, the future was left to take care of itself.

The polity got distorted a bit at the very beginning when Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah decided to become Governor General rather than Prime Minister – an unusual step to take, if one wanted to run a democracy on the Westminster model. As a result, a sort of semi-despotic viceregal system got underway from the start. The Pakistani rulers over-estimated the cementing force of Islam, which could not bind together a people with varied and multiple ethnic roots. Even Quaid-e-Azam, the great leader, did not prove farsighted enough and was hooted in Dhaka when he forced Urdu as a national language on the East Bengalis. Oppressive political satraps got a free hand and the notorious Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan crushed the Khudai Khidmatgars, a socio-political organisation under Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, which had, over the years, tried to do away with notorious practices, like blood-feuds, amongst the Pathans. There was no dearth of such regional satraps later – Ghulam Mustafa Khan and Jam Sadiq Ali, to mention just two.

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There was little evidence of a general will for the formation of a nation-state, the first prerequisite for which is a national constitution. Hence it is not fair to blame General Ayub Khan entirely for the democratic void that overtook Pakistan just over a decade after its inception. The political rulers had not shown any special respect for democratic functioning in the first eleven years of the country's history, either.

Once the military took over, substantial tinkering with democracy started, with Ayub Khan ushering in the concept of "Basic Democracies", something which President Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh wanted to fervidly emulate later on. Tinkering with the Constitution became a well-established practice. The Eighth Amendment to Z A Bhutto's Constitution of 1973 was the latest manifestation of this syndrome.

Political parties were always on a weak wicket in Pakistan and were overshadowed and browbeaten by the more cultured, educated, despotic and arrogant bureaucracy. The strongholds of the Muslim League in undivided India were Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar, Bengal and parts of Assam. The party never had much strength in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh, Punjab and Baluchistan. The Muslim League had, in British India, confined its political activities to demanding separate electorates, safeguards for Muslims, a federal structure and regionally autonomous provinces. What could it achieve in the new scenario? Ironically, once Pakistan was formed, the Central Government directed its energies towards forming a unitary state and curbing regional autonomy. The irrelevance of the party to the Pakistani polity can be seen from the fact that in the first nine years of Pakistan's history, the Muslim League did not hold a single party convention.<sup>1</sup>

Only the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) with its populist manifestoes could rank as a party with a cadre and an ideology of its own. The resurrected Pakistan Muslim League under Nawaz Sharif was cobbled together by the intelligence agencies under instigation from the Army brass at General Headquarters (GHQ). They wanted an antidote to Benazir's PPP, armed as she was with Zulfikar Bhutto's legacy, before even thinking of a cosmetic electoral franchise.

If the Pakistani State established its primacy over civil society right from the start, the executive established its supremacy over the legislature and the judiciary. Legislatures became rubber stamps, while the Pakistan judiciary changed colour like a chameleon—accepting military putschists under the "Doctrine of Necessity"; accepting the dismissal of a Sindhi Prime Minister by the President but later rejecting the dismissal of a Punjabi Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, by the same President on similar charges of corruption and maladministration. Not that politicians, with their shenanigans, were of any great help in establishing the supremacy of law and, by implication, of the judiciary.

Throughout the last three decades political parties in the opposition shamelessly urged the military to intervene and take over the reins of power. One reason for this was that personal vendetta against political rivals was often on the priority list of prime ministerial incumbents. Each time Benazir was ousted, her husband, Asif Zardari (no angel himself), has been in jail. Military Chief Martial Law Administrators (CMLAs), Presidents and CEOs were no different either. If Nawaz Sharif sent his party goons to ransack the Supreme Court two years earlier, his 'successor' General Pervez Musharraf, as the Chief Executive of Pakistan, sacked 16 Supreme Court judges when they refused to take oath under the new military dispensation. Institutionalisation is a good yardstick for measuring political development. It would be unfair to say that institutions have collapsed in Pakistan. Institution-making as a constitutional, political and administrative imperative never really got off the ground in the country.

If one looks at the post Zia-ul-Haq period, the following glaring abuses come to mind.

- (a) The manner in which various Prime Ministers have been dismissed, starting with the dismissal of Mohammad Khan Junejo in 1988. These dismissals were not always on charges of corruption, nepotism and maladministration. Junejo was dismissed (10 April 1988) only because he wished to take action against those Generals who had sited the arms and ammunition dumps at the Ojhri Town. The dump blew up killing

hundreds of innocent people, and destroying a good part of the town. (US Ambassador Arnold Raphael was reported to have given to Junejo a complete inventory of the \$130 million worth of ammunition handed over by the CIA to the ISI.)

(b) After each dismissal, the Constitution was literally thrown overboard, because a 'caretaker' government, sanctified by no constitutional provision, took over the reins of governance in Pakistan. Once governments become unstable, kingmakers come to the fore. The ISI in Pakistan has at times played the role of one such kingmaker.

(c) Time after time opposition leaders have shown that they have no stake in a democratic government. They have urged and beseeched the Army to intervene and overthrow the elected government. Even Benazir who, like her father, has suffered so much at the hands of the Army, has urged the Army to intervene. In South Asia, this malaise is unique to Pakistan.

(d) The influence of the Islamicist parties has been disproportionate to their meagre vote banks. The Jamat-e-Islami (JEI), Jamiat-ulmae-Islam (JUI) and the Jamiat-ulmae-Pakistan (JUP) – political fronts of the Islamicist sections – have never got more than six seats in all (combined) in the National Assembly. Yet they manage to influence government policy and political trends. Whether it is the establishment of Sharia laws or Sharia Courts, or legislation on subjects like Ushr Zakaat or blasphemy, or not allowing Pakistan to join the Gulf War on behalf of Kuwait, it is these sections which are in the forefront. And the State obeys their diktats. Even the masses, whose emotions are easily aroused, follow them – whether it is in lambasting Nawaz Sharif for a "sell out" on Kargil, or in burning the US Embassy because an imposter of a Mehdi has taken over the holy Kaaba.

(e) Religious parties also act as proxies for the State of Pakistan. For instance, the madrasas established in Baluchistan and the NWFP by Fazlur Rehman, the leader of the JUI, have produced a horde of young so-called scholars (Tulaba), better known as the Taliban. They are serviced by the intelligence

agencies. The Jamat-e-Islami has participated in the fighting, both in Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir, on behalf of the government-sponsored Jihad.

(f) The Army lobby, consisting of Zia faithfuls, hated the PPP. Hence the military, and the ISI by implication, developed a vested interest in who was to govern the country. Which section or party had to be put down and which encouraged became the concern of the military rulers and of the ISI.

Under Zia-ul-Haq the military had taken on the extra role of becoming the custodian of the 'ideology' of Pakistan and Islam. That indeed was a heavy responsibility. As Catherine Chorley has stated in her book *Armies and the Art of Revolution*: "The position of the Army in almost any society is the pivot on which that society swings."<sup>2</sup> Under a military dictator like Zia-ul-Haq, with the Army firmly in the saddle, the combined intelligence directorate of the three Services started playing a major role in the running of the State.

The political ideology of the Pakistani State was based on survival. Where the only value is survival or security, the rise of a powerful intelligence structure is as inevitable as the unravelling of a tragedy in a Sophoclean play. An intelligence set-up with a single-minded mission and a belief, however mistaken, that it alone can safeguard the interests of the country, is a dangerous development. That such an agency can turn into an instrument of coercion, intrigue and oppression goes without saying.

The strength of such a set-up becomes more ominous in a society where ethnic rivalries are bitter. During Pakistan's history, ethnic conflicts became so fierce that East Pakistan broke away and liberated itself. Baluchistan was in a state of civil war during the seventies and Pakistan had to seek the help of the Shah of Iran to curb the Baluchis led by Ataullah Khan Mengal and Khairbaksh Mari. Sindh too became very restive and the struggle of the Mohajirs, later, has been bloody in the extreme. The solution to these ethnic problems in Pakistan was always a military one. (Accidents of history also played a part: for instance, the Pakhtoon problem disappeared with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the exodus

of Pakhtoon refugees into Pakistan). Democratic functioning obviously flounders where neither a plural polity nor a plural society are avowed aims of the nation-state. Pakistan was formed as a nation for Muslims only. Its politics suggested it had been formed for West Pakistan only and today some provincial minorities feel that Pakistan is for the Punjabi and the Pathan only.

### Role of Intelligence

Where the state is weak, where hierarchies are not fixed and institutional roles not always defined, or if defined not always implemented, where kitchen cabinets flourish, intelligence agencies start playing a bigger role. Kitchen cabinets flourish all over South Asia. But it is only in Pakistan that the intelligence has played the role of a state within the State. "...the growth of an unrepresentative and unaccountable state within the state has been a product of the Twentieth Century. Its growth was, paradoxically, actually aided by the unpopularity of security and policing agencies: forced by this into the lowest possible visibility, they learned to develop techniques of invisible influence and control."<sup>3</sup> The only difference one can have with Peter Gill is that, in Pakistan these agencies are very much visible; some chiefs of the ISI have pranced around like movie stars from Bollywood.

All over South Asia the following holds true about intelligence set-ups.

- (a) There is no statute laying down parameters under which intelligence agencies function. Thus these agencies often feel free to make their own functional or professional space.
- (b) Public knowledge of the working of intelligence organisations is close to zero. Hence myths abound and people are prepared to believe the worst about the intelligence agencies. (Witness the furore against intelligence agencies in India after the ending of the Emergency).
- (c) Where intelligence debacles occur, the multiplicity of the agencies helps to confuse the nation, as also the agency

inquiring into the intelligence failure. Apportionment of blame becomes difficult.

(d) In Pakistan, Prime Ministers/Presidents often used intelligence agencies as their fiefdoms, their personal bureaucratic or 'securocratic' preserves, or to put it crudely their own kennel of hounds.

### The Origins of the ISI

Since the state apparatus is all-powerful, and intelligence is one of the pillars of the Pakistani State, it is necessary to delve into the rise of various intelligence agencies in Pakistan. With Partition, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which the British had left behind, also got split into two, and Pakistan started with its own portion of the IB. It may be mentioned that during the last two decades of the Raj, the British inducted more Muslims into the CID/Special Branch of the provincial police and also into the IB. Hence the Pakistani IB was not too badly off. The Services formed their own Intelligence Directorates, and by 1948 the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) came into being with Maj Gen R Cawthorne as the head. The ISI was what it purported to be, a sort of a co-ordinating agency of the Army, Naval and Air Intelligence Directorates. Pakistan was fairly worried about its security, especially in view of the blood spilled during the Partition riots. Hence counter-intelligence (CI) was one of the main charters of the intelligence agencies. Apart from CI functions, the ISI was mainly responsible for military and external intelligence. Its first Pakistani Chief was Brig Shahid Hamid.

### The ISI under Ayub Khan

While under President Ayub Khan the ISI did not have a very large profile, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has an interesting story to relate in his book *If I am Assassinated*. Ayub Khan is said to have ticked off the ISI for its inability to provide "timely and correct intelligence" regarding the 1965 War with India. The DG ISI candidly stated "all these years we were not doing our real work, i.e., counter intelligence, because we were too busy chasing your domestic political opponents."



Mushahid Hussain and Akmal Hussain come up with a very revealing story about President Ayub Khan in their book *Pakistan: Problems of Governance*. They state: "In fact, one task entrusted by Ayub Khan to ISI during that period, which they commendably refused to do, was to 'eliminate' Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who was Ayub Khan's political opponent. The ISI reported back to Ayub Khan after thorough investigation that since Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan had no personal enmity, the crime, if committed, by an organ of the State, would probably be traced back."

### The ISI under Z A Bhutto

Z A Bhutto had strengthened the ISI, although he leaned mainly on the IB. It was the IB which faced his wrath if it handled his opponents with kid gloves. He would harangue the Director IB and insult him. It was he who formed an internal security wing within the ISI. This wing collected information about his opponents and even his own partymen.<sup>4</sup> He met his nemesis here. It is generally rumoured in Pakistan that it was the ISI Chief, Maj Gen Ghulam Gilani,<sup>5</sup> who caused Bhutto's downfall by tipping off General Zia-ul-Haq that the latter was about to be removed from his post as the Army Chief. This assertion of Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain in *Newsline* (October 1992) is far from proved though. (However, knowing Zia's proclivities towards Islamicist factions, his relationship with the JEI leader Maulana Tufail Ahmad and the fact that the JEI was a part of the Pakistan National Alliance which fought the 1977 elections against Bhutto, Zia's ouster may have been a possibility.)

Bhutto was even more autocratic than the military dictators he had replaced and, to start with, had kept the Martial Law intact, with himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. In his *Memoirs*, Lt Gen Gul Hassan Khan tells us of a meeting he had with President Bhutto (Gul Hassan was the Army Chief then). "He (Bhutto) had chalked out a plan whereby all army officers would be screened by the police or intelligence, and those with political leanings or connections would be kept under surveillance, so as to ensure that they did not indulge in anti-State activities. I retorted that I would never agree to it. All candidates on joining the Army were subjected to some form of screening, and that was sufficient. I did not wish



a police constable to control the destiny of my officers just because he was charged with opening dossiers on them."

### The Zia years

The ISI really rose to prominence during the years of Zia-ul-Haq. Zia was aware that the coup he had launched was punishable under Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution for treason. His main task was to stymie Bhutto's PPP and its youth wing, the People's Student Federation (PSF). (After all it was the same Z A Bhutto who had, with his demagoguery and his youth brigades, overthrown the well-entrenched Field Marshal Ayub Khan). Zia had a political agenda and a subversion agenda, but no political wherewithal to see them through. Thus the ISI received the trust of the President and the Pakistan IB was pushed into a background role, functioning as an adjunct to the ISI. The ISI chiefs during Zia's time, namely Lt Gen Ghulam Jilani Khan, and later Lt Gen Akhtar Abdur Rehman,<sup>6</sup> served Zia loyally, blatantly interfering in domestic politics. According to Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, Gen Gilani (who remained ISI chief for 7 years) later became Governor of Punjab where "he launched Nawaz Sharif into politics, grooming him into politics as an alternative leader to the PPP. The DIB receded into background while the ISI assumed a more prominent role." Incidentally, the military control over the Pakistan IB was further strengthened when General Zia-ul-Haq appointed Maj Gen Agha Nek Mohammad, a serving officer, as the Director, Intelligence Bureau (DIB).

In 1980, Lt Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman, an Artillery officer, "a cold, reserved personality, almost inscrutable, always secretive with no intimates except his family,"<sup>7</sup> took over as the Director General of the ISI. This coincided with the Afghan War when unlimited funds, arms and ammunition came the ISI's way through its bigger brother, the CIA. The funding of the Afghan operation was also tremendous, with both USA and Saudi Arabia pitching in.<sup>8</sup> Slowly, the ISI took over the policy-framing aspect in regard to Afghanistan, and later Jammu and Kashmir as well.

The rise of the ISI coincided with the Afghan and the Iranian crises of the late seventies. Pakistan became a sort of a proxy for US interests in the region. An organisation is a product of its times.

Since the rise of the ISI coincided with these earth-shaking regional developments, it inherited the following from its Afghan experience: (a) an Islamic legacy; (b) the insurgency-fuelling legacy (which, starting from Afghanistan, travelled to Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir); (c) the subversion legacy – sabotage, assassination of its leaders; and (d) the subversion of its own system.

Military regimes tend to think in terms of hierarchies. Three intelligence agencies could not run parallel to each other and the ISI was given the dominant role and a sort of paramountcy over the other two intelligence agencies, namely the IB and the Military Intelligence (MI) Directorate. Whether it was an internal political matter or the Afghan war, the ISI decided who the patriotic political forces in the country were and which ideological group in the Afghan war should be promoted. By now, the agency had so grown in size and strength that it was almost beyond recognition. To quote, "probably no third world intelligence agency had such a huge budget to oversee such vast political cum paramilitary operations on such a scale."<sup>9</sup>

Another indicator of the disproportionate importance given to the ISI is the public perception in regard to appointments of ISI Chiefs. On Javed Nasir's appointment, Najam Sethi wrote in the *Friday Times*, "Reliable sources in Islamabad describe the new move as a 'balancing act' for greater stability. They say it should shore up Mr Nawaz Sharif's future government, quieten Islamic critics of his foreign policies, dampen an increasingly emboldened political opposition and restrain the new Army Chief from encroaching on civil sources of power. That is quite credible." In most countries, such an analysis would sound incredible.

### Structure

Political intelligence gathering has been built into the functional structure of the ISI. Under the Director General are three Deputy Directors General, designated as DDG (Political), DDG (External) and DDG (Admn). It is the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) within the ISI (not to be confused with the IB) which has the largest manpower, accounting for over 50 per cent of the staff. Anti-terrorism, VIP security, labour, student and political parties fall within its purview.

The political component also implies political developments in India, the Far East, West Asia and countries which were formerly communist. The JIB also controls the posting and the functioning of Pakistani Defence Attaches abroad.

### **ISI as Political Broker**

During Zia's period, it is obvious that the ISI had a lot of work to do. He was unpopular with large sections of the people, and through some of his acts, like whipping dissenters and criminals, had made a lot of enemies. When he died in an air crash in 1988, the ISI Chief Lt Gen Abdur Rehman also died with him in the same plane. Maj Gen Hamid Gul was hurriedly made the ISI Chief, even as Lt Gen Aslam Beg took over as Army Chief. The GHQ decided that a civilian government was in order and elections were held. A right wing coalition of parties, the Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI), was cobbled together, mainly through the good offices of the ISI. (This would necessarily have meant the paying of large amounts of money to parties and individuals to combat the PPP). Hamid Gul has gone on record to state that the creation of the IJI was the idea of the GHQ, headed by Aslam Beg, rather than his own.<sup>10</sup> Otherwise, there could have been a question mark against the holding of an election itself. Hamid Gul is reported to have stated: "it was necessary to create a countervailing force to the PPP, otherwise democracy could not have been restored."<sup>11</sup> While the IJI lost in the National Assembly, it managed to come to power in Punjab with Nawaz Sharif as Chief Minister.

A viable opposition had to be stitched together, for after all, for ten long years the Army and the nation had been fed with vituperative propaganda against the Pakistan People's Party of Bhutto. But they were the ones with a cadre, a political ideology of sorts and the departed leader's halo of 'martyrdom'. The Army had to retreat from the political arena. But that did not necessarily mean that it would give up the levers of power. "The return to the barracks did not mean that the structures of control and manipulation were dismantled. Among the few surviving members of Zia's clique, Maj Gen Hamid Gul crucially influenced the role that the Army defined for itself in the post-1988 period" (Maleeha Lodhi). After Benazir won the elections, she was kept waiting in the wings, cooling her heels, for

close to a month, while an agreement was hammered out between her and the Army brass. It was the ISI that brokered the agreement. It is generally believed that among the terms agreed upon were that the Afghan policy would remain the same, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan would not be disturbed, and there would be no interference with the Army in regard to postings, retirements, etc.

If the ISI and its Chief could cobble together an entire opposition party and later help the same leader (Nawaz Sharif), who was then the Chief Minister of Punjab, to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the power of the ISI and the extent of its interference in the polity of Pakistan can well be imagined.

### **ISI as Government-Wrecker**

Unhappy with Benazir and mistrustful of the Pakistan People's Party, the ISI played a major role in its efforts to destabilise her government. The efforts of the ISI became so obstreperous that the PPP decided to launch what it called "Operation Midnight Jackals". The entire episode is bizarre, except that the PPP had voluminous tapes to back its story. One of the PPP Members of the National Assembly (MNAs), Mohammed Arif Awan, played the role of decoy with the ISI officers who were trying to inveigle PPP MNAs to vote against the government on the eve of a no-confidence motion against Benazir. The dramatis personae in this episode consist of Brig Imtiaz Ahmed, formerly the DDG of the ISI and later the Director Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan, Major Mohammed Amir also from the ISI, and two PPP MNAs Arif Awan and Rashid Bhatti.

The four met at the house of Malik Mumtaz in Westridge Road, Rawalpindi. Malik Mumtaz, a double agent, pretended to facilitate the meeting but the Intelligence Bureau had placed video cameras and microphones in his house. A series of meetings took place from 28 September to 6 October 1989. It was reported in the Press that even Nawaz Sharif, then Chief Minister of Punjab, would have gone to Mumtaz's house but refrained from doing so, acting on a tip off from an IJI MNA Zahid Sarfraz. Incidentally, the amount of money

offered to the two MNAs by Brig Imtiaz and Major Amir was Rs 50 lakhs. On 10 August 1992, PPP MNA and Central Secretary Information, PPP, Salman Taseer, held a press conference and distributed transcripts of the audio tapes. (See Appendix).

In no other country in South Asia do intelligence agencies tinker with the political process so blatantly. The entire operation of Brig Imtiaz Ahmad and Major Amir stinks. Page after page of the tape transcript has been blanked out by the PPP because either the language was filthy or state secrets were revealed. Even if one looks at it as an intelligence operation, it was handled in a most shoddy manner. There was no professional finesse whatsoever. In this episode, the ISI comes out almost totally as a 'Dirty Tricks Department' rather than as a competent intelligence agency.

The State of Pakistan also comes out as one in which functional norms are conspicuous by their absence. Earlier, Brig Imtiaz Ahmad was removed by Benazir from the ISI in March 1989, upon which Nawaz Sharif, then Punjab Chief Minister, had appointed him as Additional Chief Secretary Punjab. Brig Imtiaz and Major Amir were sacked by General Aslam Beg from the Army on the complaint of the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. That did not prevent Nawaz Sharif from taking both of them under his wing when he came back to power. Brig Imtiaz Ahmad was made Director of the Intelligence Bureau, while Major Amir was made Director Immigration. It is no secret that with the flood of Pakistani labour moving to the Gulf, Amir's post was a most lucrative one, as has been openly stated in the PPP hand-out. One quote from the hand-out rings very true: "It is particularly unfortunate that such a character [Brig Imtiaz Ahmad] is the head of the Intelligence in Pakistan, who clearly sees his role more so as a servant of Nawaz Sharif rather than a government official with a key position and responsibility for the security of Pakistan. The sooner that these dark shadow [sic] criminals, leftovers from Gen Zia days, are thrown out of the system, the sooner the body politics (sic) of Pakistan will be cleaned."

Pakistani political observers claim that their agencies brought off intelligence scoops as well. Mushahid Hussain and Akmal

Hussain claim in their book *Pakistan: Problems of Governance* that the conversations between Benazir and Rajiv Gandhi during the latter's visit there were "monitored" (read 'taped'). The conversations showed "that she (Benazir) had certain views on the army's role in the past, that she had expressed in private to her Indian counterpart, which were at variance with her public professions." To cut the circumlocutions out, what the authors mean is that she spoke disparagingly of the Army which was breathing down her neck. If Mushahid Hussain – a diehard Nawaz Sharif follower – is to be trusted, then the above incident shows how the ISI prided on its own PM.<sup>12</sup> According to the authors, this was one of the instances which made the President and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) decide upon the dismissal of Benazir.

### ISI as a Wrecker of Parties

The Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), the political party launched by Altaf Hussain on behalf of the Muslims who migrated mostly from UP and Bihar, came in conflict not only with the Government of Sindh but also with Islamabad. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI), which had once held sway over Karachi, found its Islamic appeal waning and its flock gathering around the MQM banner. General Zia-ul-Haq had used the intelligence services to arm the Islami Jamaat-e-Tulaba (IJT), the youth wing of the JEI, to checkmate the People's Student Federation (PSF), the youth wing of Bhutto's PPP. So the MQM had a readymade supply of arms. Its grouses were many and it took on not only the Sindh Government and the police but even the Army. It was reported to have torture chambers of its own in Karachi and tortured a Major to death. It also organised strikes at the Karachi Steel Mill run by the Army. The Army and government decided to cause a split within its ranks and a splinter group, MQM (Haqiqi), was formed, consisting of gun-toting hotheads like Badr Iqbal. The two MQMs fell at each other's throat with a homicidal frenzy rarely seen anywhere. But the violence spiralled out of control, sometimes directed against the police, sometimes against the Pathans or Sindhis, and very often turning into a Shia-Sunni bloodbath. The splitting of the MQM became a political and law-and-order disaster.

### The PM and the Intelligence Chiefs

The personal bonds between Intelligence Chiefs and the Prime Ministers in Pakistan need detailed treatment. The tenures of the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, as also the heads of the ISI, are given in Chart 'A' and Chart 'B' below.

#### PRIME MINISTERS OF PAKISTAN (Since 02 12 1988)

- |    |                        |   |
|----|------------------------|---|
| 1. | Benazir Bhutto         | 02 12 1988 to 06 08 1990                      |
| 2. | Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi   | 06 08 1990 to 06 11 1990<br>(caretaker)       |
| 3. | Mohammad Nawaz Sharif  | 06 11 1990 to 18 07 1993                      |
| 4. | Mir Balakh Sher Mazari | 18 07 1993 to 26 05 1993<br>(caretaker)       |
| 5. | Mohammad Nawaz Sharif  | 26 05 1993 to 18 07 1993<br>(restored)        |
| 6. | Moeen-ud-Din Qureshi   | 18 07 1993 to 19 10 1993<br>(caretaker)       |
| 7. | Benazir Bhutto         | 19 10 1993 to 05 11 1996                      |
| 8. | Malik Meraj Khalid     | 05 11 1996 to 17 02 1997<br>(caretaker)       |
| 9. | Mohammad Nawaz Sharif  | 17 02 1997 to 12 10 1999<br>(12 October Coup) |

#### HEADS OF ISI

- |    |                 |                 |
|----|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1. | Brig Riaz Khan  | under Ayub Khan |
| 2. | Brig Mohd Hayat | under Ayub Khan |

- |     |                                  |   |
|-----|----------------------------------|---|
| 3.  | Maj Gen Akbar                    | under Ayub Khan   |
| 4.  | Lt Gen Ghulam Gilani             | under Yahya Khan,<br>Z A Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq          |
| 5.  | Lt Gen Akhtar Abdur Rehman       | under Zia till March 1987                               |
| 6.  | Lt Gen Hamid Gul                 | March 1987 to May 1989                                  |
| 7.  | Lt Gen Shamsur Rahman<br>Khallue | May 1989 to August 1990                                 |
| 8.  | Maj Gen Assad Durrani            | August 1990 to March 1992                               |
| 9.  | Lt Gen Javed Nasir               | March 1992 to May 1993                                  |
| 10. | Lt Gen Javed Ashraf              | May 1993 to August 1995                                 |
| 11. | Lt Gen Nasim Rana                | August 1995 to October 1998                             |
| 12. | Lt Gen Ziauddin Abbassi          | October 1998 to 12 October<br>1999                      |
| 13. | Lt Gen Jamshed Gulzar            | - Acting Chief<br>12 October 1999 to<br>20 October 1999 |
| 14. | Lt Gen Mehmood Ahmed             | - since 20 October 1999                                 |

Since the resurrection of democracy after the Zia years (now again throttled by General Pervez Musharraf) starting with 02 12 1988, when Benazir Bhutto was sworn in, ISI and IB Chiefs have been changed almost with each new dispensation.

The Army's control over the IB, with the appointment of Maj Gen Agha Nek Mohammad, a serving officer, has already been referred to. Prime Minister Junejo later replaced Nek Mohammad by Aslam Hayat, a police officer, as DIB. The Intelligence Bureau had suffered considerable neglect in terms of service, funding and orientation under Zia. The IB grew in stature under Junejo.



During her first tenure, Benazir replaced both the IB and the ISI Chiefs. Noor Elahi Khan Leghari replaced Malik Aslam Hayat as the DIB while Maj Gen Kallue (Retd) replaced Lt Gen Hameed Gul at the ISI. Noor Leghari is a relative of Benazir's then party colleague, Farooq Ahmed Leghari, who was later to become the President of Pakistan. Even under Noor Leghari, the IB was effectively controlled by a school friend of Benazir's husband Asif Zardari. He was a retired Major called Massod Sharif. Benazir appointed Lt Gen Shamsur Rehman Kallue (Retd) as the ISI Chief in place of Lt Gen Hameed Gul. General Aslam Beg was not happy with this move. The Army Chief reassigned many of the political activities of the ISI to the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Retired generals do not normally succeed in military, quasi-military or military intelligence outfits. Moreover, the ISI has a strong subculture which rejects foreign bodies. The solidly entrenched military interests did not let Kallue function and Lt Gen Hameed Gul still pulled the strings from Multan, where he was Corps Commander. Maj Gen Kallue could not save Benazir from the presidential dismissal. According to a story which went round in those days, Benazir had to send an emissary to the US Ambassador asking him whether President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was actually about to dismiss her government! The ISI was not of much help to her.

The Interim Government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (a perennial Prime Minister-in-waiting) replaced the DG ISI with Maj Gen Assad Durrani, who was the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. It also brought in Zafar Iqbal Rathore, a police officer, in place of Noor Leghari, as Director Intelligence Bureau.

When Nawaz Sharif took over as PM on 6 November 1990, Assad Durrani was promoted in the same assignment (DG ISI) as Lt General within less than a fortnight (on 19 November 1990), thereby restoring the 'prestige' of the organisation. (Benazir had appointed a 'mere' Maj Gen as DG, and this had been seen as an attempt to downscale the ISI.)

During the run-up to the election, while he served under the Interim Government, and even earlier when he was with the MI, Durrani was supposed to have helped the IJI opposition parties to

combine against Benazir.<sup>13</sup> But he was considered an Aslam Beg man,<sup>14</sup> and after Beg retired as Army Chief on 16 August 1991, Durrani's days were numbered, and in March 1992 he was shifted and replaced by Lt Gen Javed Nasir from the Corps of Engineers.

It was Javed Nasir who openly involved the Pakistan ISI with terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and brought Pakistan close to being branded as a terrorist state. On American pressure he was later prematurely retired and replaced by Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi, who was formerly Director General Military Intelligence.

### **Equations between Chief of the Army Staff and the ISI**

The Army brass has generally looked upon the ISI with a certain amount of uneasiness and contempt. The analogy may not be fully accurate, but the equation between the two reminds one of the way the German Army viewed the SS under Himler during the Third Reich.

While the ISI did come squarely under the control of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), and the DG ISI was normally appointed with his consent, there have been quite a few hiccups in the past. Sometimes Prime Ministers have waited for the COAS to retire before they changed the ISI Chief as in the case of Assad Durrani's shift after Aslam Beg's retirement. Durrani was also supposed to have a very keen rivalry with Brig Imtiaz Ahmad, who by then had become the DIB and was the right-hand-man of Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif chose Javed Nasir, a bearded Tablighi, as the ISI Chief — almost from nowhere after considerable procedural contretemps. It is reported that the name of Javed Nasir did not find place in the panel of names given to the PM by the Army Chief. As stated by Ayaz Amir (in his article "The Unlikely Spymaster," *The Herald*, March 1992): "But the question still remains; how did the prime minister or his suspicious coterie choose him from amongst a host of other generals? Part of the answer may lie in his origins. Like the Prime Minister, he is a Kashmiri, a Khawaja to be precise, from Samanabad, Lahore. More importantly perhaps, he is also a relation through marriage of Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmad on whose political advice the Prime Minister seems to rely so much."

Hamid Gul had somehow angered the Army Chief, General Asif Nawaz Janjua. Even after he was shifted and became Corps Commander Multan, he seemed to be directing the Afghan policy. Asif Janjua had him transferred to the Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila. Only a Brigadier earlier occupied this post and hence the assignment was considered downright insulting. Hamid Gul considered himself as one of the Army's "leading intellectuals and visionaries" (Idris Bakhtiar) and harboured unreal dreams about pan-Islamism.<sup>15</sup> When Hamid Gul did not take charge on the given day, he was retired from the Army, despite being favoured by the Prime Minister. It may be mentioned that when the Afghan Mujahideen overran Kabul, Hamid Gul was the sole representative of the Pakistan Government in Kabul.

General Asif Nawaz Janjua died of a heart attack while working on a treadmill. However, he had pretty poor relations with the Director IB, Brig Imtiaz Ahmad. Later it was made out by his widow Nuzhat Janjua, at the instigation of people opposed to Nawaz Sharif, that he had been poisoned, possibly by the machinations of the intelligence agencies. In fact his death was sought to be made one of the reasons for which President Ghulam Ishaq Khan sacked the Nawaz Sharif government. While the death was obviously natural, it is typical of the no-holds-barred politics of Pakistan that for a few days it was in the political spotlight.

The clearest evidence of ISI intrigue and the kind of trouble it can get the government into is revealed by the role of the ambitious Lt Gen Ziauddin, the DG ISI, who landed himself and his Prime Minister in the kind of soup they are in now. It was clear from the tapes published of the conversation between the Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf from Beijing and his DGS in Islamabad that the entire clandestine operation in Kargil was being handled by the Army and not the ISI. Later, the ISI coup against its own Army Chief boomeranged. As things turned out, Ziauddin could hardly remain the COAS for an hour on that fateful day, 12 October. It would be logical to conclude that the PM would not have sacked Musharraf the way he did, had Ziauddin not convinced him of his ability to see the whole operation through. The way it was dealt with, the announcement of Musharraf's removal coinciding with

the time that the plane carrying him took off from Colombo, not allowing the aircraft to land at Karachi, smacks of a typical ISI intrigue that has landed its chief in jail, along with the PM.

The way the Corps Commanders rallied behind their Chief of Army Staff against the ISI usurper would only prove the point about the scant regard that the Army brass has for its own "elite" intelligence outfit. This botched operation will be a lesson for DGs ISI not to try conclusions with the COAS again.

### **Reverse Indoctrination**

The ISI's interlock with Islamic parties and Mujahideen groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan has resulted in "reverse indoctrination". It is the ISI which is today almost as fanatic as any of the Islamic groups it has backed. The ISI's links with the banned Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), now conveniently renamed Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Taliban and the Islamicist factions of the Mujahideen, have over the years influenced its own employees. Pakistan's failure to respond positively to USA's request for the arrest of Osama bin Laden perhaps stems from this reverse indoctrination that has afflicted the ISI.

The Army and the country have had to face the music at times because of this interlock. Maj Gen Zahirul Islam Abbasi, Director General of Infantry, along with Brigadier Mustansir Billa and others were arrested on 26 September 1995 for plotting a coup against the government and the Army brass. Abbasi had been caught for espionage in Delhi and declared persona non grata earlier. As a Military Attache he was obviously posted here in consultation with the ISI. It is reported that Brig Imtiaz, when he was bragging about the ISI's achievements to the PPP MNAs during "Operation Midnight Jackals", boasted that through Abbasi ISI had managed to get all the Top Secret documents of India's *Brasstacks* exercise. The same Abbasi wanted to bring in an "Islamic Coup" in Pakistan and to eliminate both the President and the PM as also most of the Army brass. The civilians involved with the conspirators belonged to the fundamentalist Sipah-e-Sahaba. Abbasi had contacts with Harkat-ul-Ansar. After the coup he intended to take over as the COAS and "Ameer-al-Momineen".

## Conclusion

When people talk in terms of the power structure in Pakistan, they mention the troika – the President, Prime Minister and the COAS. Any debate on the issue that merely identifies with these institutions would over-simplify matters. The President in any case has been reduced to a titular head after the removal of the controversial Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which empowered him to dismiss the government and dissolve the National Assembly. The triarchy that has emerged in Pakistan over the years consists of the civil state with its institutions, the Military (of which the ISI is a formidable part) and the Islamicist state within the state, with its control over mosque pulpits, madrasas, its jehadi militias and its hold over the imaginations of some sections of the poor and the lower middle class.

The ISI's interlock with the Islamicists (resulting in a kind of reverse indoctrination) needs to be factored in when discussing its uneasy placement in the Pakistan polity. Its role as an interlocutor, a sort of a facilitator of a dialogue between the armed forces and the politicians as also the Islamicists, needs to be taken note of, apart from its role as an intelligence-gathering and policy-enforcing arm of the defence forces.

In a country where the balance is so heavily tilted in favour of the military, when pitched against civilian institutions, where the armed forces are so involved in, and feel responsible for, running the country, an organisation like the ISI is necessary. From time to time it also becomes the executive arm for safeguarding and enforcing the "ideology" of the establishment: jihads in Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir and tie-ups with fanatic parties in such operations.

The ISI is almost a corollary to the self-belief of the military that no one else (and certainly not the politicians) can run the country better than them. Like the military, of which it is a part, the ISI is not hamstrung by any constitutional niceties circumscribing its role and hence is the right instrument for the ambitious army brass. When Prime Ministers tried to use the ISI as a sort of a private militia of

informers and hatchet men, they normally got a rap on their knuckles from the GHQ.

The ISI has no hesitation in interfering with the political process. It has worked in the past to overthrow civilian governments and, given half a chance, will be willing to do so again. Its higher echelons are pretty high-flying. Its members are not afraid of "exposure", unlike the Indian Research and Analysis Wing whose members would blush if photographed, and whose devotion to the cause of a low profile is so intense that sometimes they land up with no profile.

The ISI has had its ups and downs. Presently it is experiencing one of its most dismal lows, with its former DG in jail and some of its functions taken over by the Directorate of Military Intelligence. But whenever it experiences its "highs", there is a risk of the ISI turning into a tentacle of the Pakistani military octopus, with its grip – now loose, now firm – round the throat of the polity.

#### End Notes

1. P C Mathur, "Political Parties in South Asia," *South Asian Studies*, 1967.
2. Catherine Chorley, *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973 reprint), p.243.
3. Peter Gill, *Policing Politics : Security, Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State* (London, Frank Cass, 1994), p.77.
4. Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, "Pakistan's Invisible Government," *Newsline* October 1992, p.45 : "Dissatisfied with the DIB, Bhutto set up the ISI's internal wing in the mid-seventies. Given his obsession with collecting all kinds of information about his opponents and his own party men, Bhutto geared up both the agencies for dirty tactics that involved keeping dossiers on anybody and everybody. As a former colleague recalls: "Even his ministers' phones and offices were bugged, and their personal lives monitored, since Bhutto trusted no one and relished replaying tapes in front of those who had fallen from grace."

5. It is generally thought that Maj Gen Gilani was the one who contacted politicians and brought the ISI in touch with the political leadership of that era.
6. Officers in the ISI were not too happy on his posting to the ISI. (He was Adjutant General, earlier). Brig Syed A I Tirmazi says in his book *Profiles of Intelligence* (self-published) : "His (Abdur Rehman's) reputation of being a hard task-master, a sadist and a yes-man, travelled faster than him."
7. Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, "Pakistan's Invisible Government," *Newsline*, October 1992, p.26
8. *ibid.*, p.27 : As Brigadier (Retd) Mohammad Yusuf, formerly of the ISI has been quoted as saying, "For every dollar given by the CIA, another was added by Saudi Arabia. The combined funds, running into several hundred million dollars a year, were transferred by the CIA to special accounts in Pakistan under the ISI's control."
9. Idris Bakhtiar and Zaffar Abbas, "Conspiracies Unlimited," *The Herald*, August 1994.
10. Idris Bakhtiar, "Retired Hurt", *The Herald*, February 1992 : "According to Hamid Gul, the creation of the alliance of various right-wing parties on the eve of the 1988 elections was not his idea – the implication being that it was Mirza Aslam Beg and the other generals who floated the idea, which Gul simply executed. Nevertheless, Gul still believes that had the IJI not been formed, power would never have been transferred to Benazir Bhutto in 1998."
11. Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 28.
12. Mushahid Hussain and Akmal Hussain, *Pakistan : Problems of Governance* (Konark, 1993), p.97.
13. Ayaz Amir, "The Unlikely Spymaster," *The Herald*, March 1992, pp.43-44. "The MI under Durrani had played no small role in

paving the way for Ms Bhutto's downfall. The Prime Minister's (Nawaz Sharif's) coterie suspected Durrani of wanting to do the same thing to them."

14. *ibid.* "Asad Durrani was always considered Aslam Beg's man."
15. Idris Bakhtiar, "Retired Hurt," *The Herald*, February 1992 : "Also dashed were his (Hamid Gul's) dreams – the dream of pan-Islamism and the dream of formulating an effective role for Pakistan in the new global situation arising out of the recent emergence of independent Muslim states in Central Asia."



## Appendix

**PRESS CONFERENCE BY  
SALMAN TASEER  
CENTRAL SECRETARY INFORMATION  
PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY  
SUBJECT : HORSE TRADING BY THE IJI  
10 AUGUST 1992**

There have been unsubstantiated allegations of horse trading against the Peoples Party. Nawaz Sharif in a public meeting recently reiterated this allegation. In the recent Supreme Court Judgement it was made a basis of dismissal of the PPP government. We on the other hand have definite recorded proof of horse trading by a clique of government officers and minister Malik Naeem of the IJI under the instructions of Nawaz Sharif who were deliberately subverting the democratically elected government of Pakistan which under Article 6 of the 1973 constitution constitute treason. We will send a transcript of these tapes to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and of course "deaf, dumb and blind" President to place on the record the talks.

A. A key role was played by the Head of the Intelligence Bureau Brigadier Imtiaz and epitomises the fascist clique that the dictator General Zia collected around him and passed on to Nawaz Sharif. Brigadier Imtiaz specialises in "dirty tricks" and anti-democratic moves, one of which was the so called AZO circus in Shah Bandar in which so called terrorists equipped with identity cards and letter heads were conveniently apprehended on the high seas. Before this Brigadier Imtiaz orchestrated the Singapore Airlines hijacking together with Jam Sadiq Ali.

B. I am producing the text of secret tapes of an operation called "Midnight Jackals" which took place in October 1989 and was conducted by the ISI at that time. Here Major Amir and Brigadier Imtiaz as officers of the Pakistan Army in the ISI are directly involved in the infamous no confidence moves against the Pakistan Peoples Party government. As a result of operation "Midnight Jackals" Brigadier Imtiaz was set up by two PPP MNAs Arif Awan and Rashid

Bhatti together with Senator Gulsher Khan and Malik Mumtaz. As a result of "Midnight Jackals" Brigadier Imtiaz was given his marching orders from the Pakistan Army although he should have been court-martialled and tried for treason as he was by bribery and corruption trying to subvert the elected government of Pakistan.

C. I am listing below just some of the highlights of these tapes from which it is clear to see what kind of man has been placed by Nawaz Sharif to head the Intelligence Operations of the IJI regime. Incidentally when Brigadier Imtiaz was removed by the Pakistan Army he was immediately re-employed by his mentor Nawaz Sharif as head of the Special Branch of the Punjab Police with the mandate to organise it along the line of the ISI and for which a special fund of Rs 450 million was sanctioned from the Punjab Budget to finance the Brigadier and his dirty tricks.

1. As is clear right from the beginning under the direct instructions of Nawaz Sharif Brigadier Imtiaz is conducting a horse trading operation to try and buy PPP members of the Assembly. On page two they are clearly discussing and making offers.
2. A number of other Government officers were involved in this operation including Major Amer from the ISI who was dismissed with Brigadier Imtiaz also re-employed by Nawaz Sharif. In addition to this was DIG Rawalpindi Shahid Hussain. Major Amer has now been rewarded with the lucrative role of Director Emigration, where illegal Visa rackets are managed. On the orders of Nawaz Sharif he has been sabotaging the clean-up operation in Sindh by not publishing an exit control list thus allowing dacoits, criminals and murderers to escape from the country.
3. It is clear from their language the contempt with which they hold civilians and members of the legislature. On Page five they narrate how Junejo was "sent home". They also refer to politics as a business.
4. On page seven they talk in a deprecating manner about the elected Prime Minister of Pakistan Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto

as well as letting out highly sensitive information about supposed views of the then COAS Mirza Aslam Beg. Subsequently Ch. Nisar has further elaborated on the role of General Mirza Aslam beg and the MQM.

5. On page ten they talk of how they had reached agreement with the FATA MNAs from which it is clear how these operatives of the intelligence services were conspiring against the Peoples Party government.
6. On page nine he tells how Jam Sadiq Ali stayed at the Ashoka Hotel in Delhi under a Hindu name and conspired with RAW. Having known this he was made Chief Minister of Sindh.
7. Page thirteen, fourteen and fifteen have been left out because of the sensitive nature of the discussion: but one thing is clear from these pages that by this loose talk they can be tried for disclosing national secrets.
8. Throughout the tapes this clique uses filthy language and vile insinuations about various politicians and civil servants like General Babar, S K Mahmood, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, Rao Rashid, etc, which is indicative of the gutter level of their minds.
9. On page 25 they refer to Malik Naeem the present Minister of Commerce as the person to whom they will take the MNAs to finalise the deal and refer throughout the tapes to Malik Naeem.
10. Pages 33 and 34 have been left out too because of the sensitive nature of the Brigadier's disclosures. What is clear is that this man cannot be trusted with state secrets and has repeatedly violated the Official Secrets Act. He is a dangerous loud mouth who should have nothing to do with national security.
11. On page 35 they talk in an insulting tone about their army superior and head of the ISI General Kallue.
12. Page 36 has been left out because of the sensitive nature of the disclosures.

13. Page 56 has been left out because of the filthy language used.
14. On page 67, 68 and 69 details of bribes and pay-offs are discussed.
15. Pages 74 to 76 are recordings of the detailed involvement of Malik Naeem in the horse trading and the direct involvement of Nawaz Sharif in the pay-offs.
16. Page 100 again the direct complicity of Nawaz Sharif is evident from the conversation of Malik Naeem.

The summary of these tapes besides highlighting the callous horse trading operation conducted by the present head of the IB Brigadier Imtiaz who as a serving army officer violated the Official Secrets Act and knowingly under the direct instructions of Nawaz Sharif tried to undermine the democratically elected government of Pakistan by horse trading and bribery. It is particularly unfortunate that such a character is the head of intelligence in Pakistan who clearly sees his role more as a servant of Nawaz Sharif rather than a government official with a key position and responsible for the security of Pakistan. The sooner these dark, shadowy criminals left over from the General Zia days are thrown out of the system the sooner the body politics (sic) of Pakistan will be cleaned.

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## Lessons from Low-Intensity Conflicts

MAJOR MAROOF RAZA (RETD)

**M**emories of the recent conflict in Kargil are still fresh in our minds. And many military experts argue that the Kargil experience cannot be counted amongst the several other low-intensity conflicts that the Indian Army has had to face, in the last few decades, because, by most yardsticks the fighting on the Line of Control was like any other conventional war in the mountains. But there was a difference. This conflict also had many ingredients of a classic low-intensity conflict. Firstly, Indian troops were fighting a combination of Pakistani regulars and irregulars that included Afghan and other mercenaries. Secondly, the battles were localised to the Kargil sector, as low-intensity conflicts often are. Thirdly, the intruders were being sustained - till as long as they were able to hold out - by external support from the Pakistani Army, as is the case with other militant groups in Jammu & Kashmir. And finally, it can be argued, that if the infiltration had remained unchecked and uncontested for some time the intrusions would have allowed Pakistan to successfully extend the reach of its lost rebellion in the Valley, into Ladakh.

At Kargil, India's Army fought against several odds. Lack of good equipment and a shortage of ammunition were only too glaring to be ignored. This was a result of several years of neglect, with defence budgets often being the first to be slashed to make up for fiscal deficits. The fact that our Army still delivered the goods, despite these odds, does speak volumes of the grit and determination of our troops and officers, who are amongst the best in the world.

In fact, since the 1980's, the Indian Army was repeatedly reminded of the consequences of allowing events to slide out of control - as was the case in Punjab in 1984 and in Kashmir in 1990

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- leading eventually to full blown insurgencies in both cases. But a lesson of the Kargil experience is that decisive action is a must, if we are to turn the tide from what might appear to be - on the face of it - a hopeless situation. And it also re-affirmed the view that the nature of localised and limited conflicts in South Asia have often restricted the military aspects largely to ground forces, i.e., the Army. This has been the experience in J&K, Sri Lanka and the North East. But as the phenomenon of Low-Intensity Conflicts is here to stay, it necessitates an analysis of the military issues of future concern to our Armed Forces.

The experience of war, especially the shortcoming of any army, have historically led to reassessments in strategic thinking. The military disaster inflicted upon India by the Chinese attack in October 1962 had led to precisely such an exercise in Indian defence planning and strategy. Defence expenditure was more than doubled (from 2.1 per cent of GNP in 1961-62 to 4.5 per cent in 1964-65); new military acquisitions were made; the Army was expanded from 500,000 to 825,000; and fresh guidelines were laid regarding civil-military relations for future wars. The results were there to see by 1971, when the Indian Army's '*blitzkrieg strategy*' during the liberation of Bangladesh put to rest any lingering doubts about its capabilities.<sup>1</sup>

India's military debacle in 1962 also led Nehru to put aside his earlier determination to prevent the 'militarisation of India'. Nehru feared that this would compromise his efforts to limit defence spending and India's policy of non-alignment.<sup>2</sup> That was four decades ago.

In many ways, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war could be regarded as the watershed in South Asia's security. India emerged as the dominant regional power. The Indian Army experienced four conventional wars between 1947 and 1971 - three between India and Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, and one between India and China in 1962.

In the next two decades - from 1972 till date - the Indian Army has battled Sikh militants in Punjab, Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka, separatists in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and militant groups in the North East India and now a full-fledged Pakistani-led attack

by infiltration in Kargil and its adjoining areas of the LoC. In all these commitments, except Kargil, the Indian military performance has been far from spectacular due to the absence of a clear politico-military doctrine to address the phenomenon of low-intensity conflicts. Briefly put, low-intensity conflicts are asymmetrically ambiguous politico-military wars of attrition that are protracted, localised and often pitting regular soldiers against bands of irregulars.

Thus, there is clearly a need for the Indian leadership to indulge in a fundamental exercise in strategic thinking. To look into the future, we need to analyse the past - to bring out conceptual, strategic, organisational and tactical conclusions for the future.

### Conceptual

The proliferation of low-intensity conflicts the world over has prompted some commentators to talk about a new dimension being introduced into 'modern warfare'. Three separate factors are considered responsible for this rise in low-intensity conflicts. First, the changing attitude of people towards authority. Second, increased literacy has led to the exploitation of the media by the separatists to fan discontent amongst the people. Third, the limitations imposed by nuclear weapons on conventional war.<sup>3</sup> The former two were present in varying degrees in all of South Asia's conflicts - such as in India's North East, the Punjab and India's Sri Lanka intervention. The latter was prominent in Jammu and Kashmir.

History appears to be today at a turning point, and the rise in low-intensity conflicts seems to carry a strong message for the future. For nuclear powers, the temptation to escalate a conventional war past the nuclear threshold by using a *fait accompli* (as the US did against Japan in 1945) will always remain. For non-nuclear regional foes, a conventional war would internationalise their dispute (once the UN becomes involved), and cause diplomatic pressures with a disruption of trade - all in all, an avoidable prospect. For secessionists, low-intensity conflicts are the only viable means of opposition.

To sum up, as Martin van Creveld says in his book *On Future War*, "if no nuclear holocaust takes place, then conventional war



appears to be in the final stages of abolishing itself; if one does take place, then it will already have abolished itself".<sup>4</sup>

As we enter the last year of this century, parts of the world (such as South Asia) are experiencing considerable instability and beginning to go up in flames. The industrialised world remains, as yet, largely isolated from the effects of such prolonged wars of attrition. But to assume that it shall always remain isolated from the contagious effects of such warfare would be premature. The flames of the (former) Yugoslavian republics could easily spill over into other European states. What seems to be a minor conflict to the industrialised world often involves national survival for a developing country - a breaking away of Jammu and Kashmir from the Indian Union could lead to a total fragmentation of India and certainly at a very heavy cost. No wonder the stunning array of legislations the Indian Government uses against its separatists, often comes under what the developed world calls 'Human Rights' abuses, but seems perfectly legitimate for Indians threatened by Balkanisation.

The single most important demand that any political leadership must meet is to provide its citizens with protection against the expanding torrent of violence and conflict. Many nations are grappling with terrorists and guerrillas who have little respect, if any, for the ethics and laws of armed conflict. Article 44 of the Additional Protocols (of 1977) to the Geneva Conventions have provided the specifications under which terrorists and guerrillas could be engaged in combat by regular troops - "they can only be fired upon when they carry weapons openly and appear to be preparing to launch an attack"<sup>5</sup> - a highly unlikely prospect. These regulations give considerable advantage to the irregulars, while placing regular armies at an immense disadvantage. There is thus an urgent need for governments to shed their hidebound attitudes towards modern conflicts by applying politico-legal devices to frustrate violent actions by militants.<sup>6</sup> To expect conventional armies to fight unconventionally, without the traditional advantages enjoyed by a superior force, could cause immense resentment amongst soldiers and lead to an integrity crisis even in well disciplined armies. The Indian experiences highlight this resentment amongst soldiers to fight with 'an arm tied to their backs'.



As the Clausewitzian trinitarian structures - of government, people and the armies - stand divided by the centrifugal forces of our times, the traditional principles of war as we know them, would remain largely unaltered. It is their application that requires a fresh doctrinal approach today. In Richard Simpkin's words : "Given free rein, surprise is a matchless combat multiplier. Revolutionary warfare exploits it to carry the principle of economy of force to lengths unimaginable to the conventional military mind .... Irregular operations of every kind constitute the most likely form of future armed conflict; they should be understood and acknowledged for what they are - a way of war!"<sup>7</sup>

### Strategic

Classical strategy, as understood by the prophets of war, was the product of specific circumstances, formulating the 'art of using battles to achieve the objectives of war'. A whole series of actors and concepts, earlier taken for granted - such as objectives, fronts, bases - cannot now be easily applied in low-intensity conflicts. In 'a war without fronts', strategy appears to be caught between the possible use of nuclear weapons at one end, and low-intensity conflicts at the other end of the spectrum.<sup>8</sup>

Firstly, there is an urgent requirement for an Indian strategic nuclear doctrine which is absent apparently on the misplaced assumption that ambiguity will prevent an arms race! In fact, what could avert a limitless arms race is the deterrence provided by strategic transparency on nuclear issues. In their own interest - and that of the world - India and Pakistan need to openly declare what their nuclear arsenals are intended for, when deterrence might fail, and adopt an explicit nuclear policy. Both should adopt a 'no first use policy'; lay down doctrines to prevent a nuclear war by miscalculation; create a politico-military chain of command to authorise retaliation, if deterrence fails; and, create safety and control measures to prevent loss, accidents and the unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup> Strategic nuclear transparency would provide an excellent deterrent against the possibility of low-intensity conflicts escalating to unmanageable levels between India and Pakistan - such as over the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Besides, as nuclear

weapons are an excellent financial bargain, compared to the vast amounts spent on conventional forces - this should provide India an added incentive to adopt a clear nuclear armed status.

Secondly, India needs to focus her security policies more coherently on the strategic threat being posed to her integrity by low-intensity conflicts in the region. The sporadic politico-military actions being undertaken presently are only 'fire-fighting' measures. Adopting a fresh doctrine towards modern conflicts would have a threefold strategic value. One, a clear military doctrine would train and equip the Indian Army to deal efficiently with low-intensity warfare - as a way of war. Such operational commitments would lead to the regular Army's shrinking in size and adopting a somewhat more militia like posture to fight the revolutionaries as a modern counter-revolutionary force.<sup>10</sup> Two, this would lead to a less aggressive Indian military posture, send positive signals to adversaries and pave the way for dialogue to decrease force build up between India, Pakistan and China. Three, a decrease in the deployment of forces in the region cannot but be of benefit to India and Pakistan who are stretching their economic resources in a conventional arms race. A continental defence with the current kind of *inter se balance*, but at a much lower level, is what the future requires.

Thirdly, the Indian weakness in intelligence gathering and processing is substantial. The Kargil fiasco is proof of that. Manoj Joshi, a reputed Indian defence analyst, has harshly but accurately summed it up to state that,

"while (India's) tactical intelligence on Pakistan is passable, it is poor in relation to China. Beyond those countries, it is a clean slate. All the problems facing Indian intelligence, such as poor conceptualisation, inadequate leadership and low *esprit de corps*, were manifest in the Sri Lankan operation which, in one sense, had to be undertaken precisely because of poor intelligence work. More than anything, one of the lessons of Sri Lanka was that India cannot afford to continue to allow its military intelligence to remain in a strait-jacket. Unfortunately the political masters have been happiest using or misusing the intelligence agencies against their political opponents in a manner that would be considered not just scandalous but treasonable in most democratic countries".<sup>11</sup>

Finally, the strategic consequences of low-intensity operations need a serious appraisal. For instance, take the Punjab crisis of 1983-84. First, it shook the integrity of India's Armed Forces, and gave India the taste of its first post-independence military mutiny. Second, the alienation of the Sikhs has caused the Armed Forces to alter their war plans based on earlier strategic assumptions (of an accommodative civil populace in this border state).<sup>12</sup> The intervention in Sri Lanka, apart from exposing the limitations of India's strategic reach, also created considerable bitterness and alienation in the ranks of the Indian military - 1155 Indian soldiers died in Sri Lanka (compared to 1047 while liberating Bangladesh in 1971), but there was little to show at the end of a hard and ambiguous campaign. Worse still, the 'Intervention' was treated at home with indifference and criticism.<sup>13</sup> The strategic consequences of the Jammu and Kashmir imbroglio are threefold. First, the military found it frustrating to contain an 'internationalised' insurgency that got negative press coverage at home and abroad. Second is a possible escalation of the present low-intensity commitment into a conventional war with a nuclear overtone. Third, the breaking away of the Jammu and Kashmir could lead to the Balkanisation of India.

Hans Delbruck, the military historian, had highlighted in his works an offensive factor - '*Niederwerfungs Strategie*', as the strategy to exhaust the opposition.<sup>14</sup> These objectives need to be exploited by the Indian Army which remains wedded to the traditional notion of 'proper soldiering' - implying the preparation for the last war as opposed to future wars. The Indian Army, like all other traditionally conventional armies, needs to urgently undertake sweeping organisational changes to apply Delbruck's strategy in the future.

### Organisational

At the root of the problem lies the fact that the qualities required for undertaking low-intensity operations are distinctly different from those of conventional warfare. A soldier is traditionally trained and conditioned to be tough, courageous and aggressive. This aspect explains the hesitation on the part of traditional forces in adapting to the demands of low-intensity operations. The insurgents, on the other hand, are quick to exploit large scale military operations by

clever propaganda - despite the direct and honest efforts by soldiers to restore order - by portraying such operations, in Kitson's words, "as the ridiculous blunderings of a herd of elephants".<sup>15</sup>

The first organisational requirement is that of a doctrinal realignment, which would require the fresh definition of a military role in national security. It will obviously be hard for the officers and soldiers to put aside the cumulative effects of centuries of conditioning - and adjust their attitudes to the new doctrines that would be imparted.

The Indian Army had created a Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare (CIJW) School in the North-East to serve as a repository of expertise in handling the North-East insurgencies. It now has Corps Battle Schools in Jammu and Kashmir. Whereas the regional school on low-intensity operations would focus on the peculiarities of the 'troubled' areas, (language, customs and special traits of insurgents), the central school should be tasked to undertake policy studies and perspective planning for such future conflicts.<sup>16</sup> Such measures are required to assist the Indian Army to adopt a profound new look to the changing nature of warfare.

A second and related requirement is for the creation of specific military formations for the future. Modern conflicts would require small specialist cadres for the most challenging roles as well as larger forces to undertake full-scale operations. The specialist elite commando type units are required to carry out the so-called 'dirty jobs' - airborne operations, sabotage, demolitions, intelligence gathering, and counter-intelligence - all of which seem to be right down the line of activities undertaken by India's commando units. It is the aspect regarding larger forces to undertake full-scale (divisional level) operations that requires special attention. Indian Army divisions that were initially launched into Operations *Blue Star* (in Punjab) and *Pawan* (in Sri Lanka) had all the experience and credentials of first-rate conventional infantry divisions. However, their performance in low-intensity operations left much to be desired.

Low-intensity operations require army divisions that are relatively lightly armed, 'soldier powered' (implying a much higher 'tooth to tail' ratio), with tactical mobility, adequate fire power, and

tough training that lays emphasis on initiative, total self-reliance, and improvisation. In short, what the Americans call the Light Infantry Division (LID). These divisions would be without the traditional armour or artillery support, but instead equipped with mortars, shoulder fired missiles, automatic rifles (such as the M-16 or the AK-47), hi-tech vision devices, enhanced mobility with permanently affiliated helicopters and light armoured transport<sup>17</sup> - a division trained and equipped to meet the insurgents on more than equal terms. These formations (divisions) would require permanently affiliated units, trained and doctored to undertake low-intensity operations as their primary role (as against the conventional external threat being the primary role). Additionally, the misnomer of assuming that the special forces could substitute for the LIDs and vice-versa should be guarded against. They should in fact compliment each other. Above all, the presence of such formations (divisions) would save the Indian Army the blundering *ad-hocism* in deploying forces that was often the case in operations in the Punjab and Sri Lanka.

A third essential requirement for low-intensity operations is an effective intelligence organisation, vital for the efficiency of any army. With the on going employment of the Indian Army in such operations, it has become essential to acquire information that could be divided into 'political' intelligence and 'operational' intelligence. Political intelligence is required from the earliest stages once 'disturbances' begin through the conduct of operations, and until well after the operational stage is over. Operational intelligence begins just prior to the decision to deploy the military for low-intensity operations and ceases with the defeat of the insurgents. The distinction between the two is subtle and needs to be understood. As a rule, however, a single organisation charged with the responsibility for all intelligence activities is a must.<sup>18</sup> One, it saves the confusion that a plethora of intelligence agencies create, and the other is that a single body can be made accountable for operational flaws. The danger of intelligence agencies becoming a law unto themselves can be guarded against by placing responsible heads at various levels.

The shortcomings of 'intelligence' during the operations in the Punjab and Sri Lanka can be attributed to numerous factors. First, the complacency of the Indian leadership in ignoring whatever

information was known even through the news media, and a refusal to make logical deductions from them. Take the events prior to the Army's assault on the Golden Temple in 1984. It was known well in advance that the Sikh militants had fortified the Temple complex under the guidance of Shubeg Singh, a former Indian Major General of some repute as a guerrilla force commander. The matter was ignored, and at a serious cost. The other is the case of the initial Indian operations in Sri Lanka. Despite being aware of a trained 5,000 strong cadre of Tamil insurgents, the Indian Peace-Keeping Force of only about 6,000 was initially pitted in a series of suicidal battles against the Tamil insurgents. Second, despite the presence of a vast variety of dubious intelligence agencies in India, the political shots were largely called by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) - India's Secret Service. In each of India's low-intensity operational commitments, the performance of civilian intelligence agencies has been at best mediocre. Their lack of accountability and field work has often been the greatest source of confusion during military operations.<sup>19</sup>

The military intelligence set-up itself in India has been kept to the minimum possible. Perhaps, this is due to the civilian fear of the dominating status that military intelligence agencies often acquire in Third World states (such as the Inter Service Intelligence in Pakistan). This has in turn led to an excessive military reliance on civilian agencies. Also, the strong apolitical tradition of the Indian Army has led to intelligence activities being limited to operational issues.

The operational 'intelligence' requirements of the Indian Army in counter-insurgency may be summed up as follows. One, there is a need to relate the 'aim' of intelligence gathering to the 'aim' of the campaign. These need to be spelt out by the commanders. Two, a need to use special forces more effectively for intelligence acquisition. Three, every piece of information is relevant (regardless of its time of arrival) as it forms the canvas of a larger and clearer picture. Four, there is a need for hi-tech surveillance systems (at unit levels) to gain information about militants. Five, often it is the militant commanders who are 'all-important', and thus they should be made intelligence targets. Six, a need for a humane attitude by

the military towards the civilians while collecting information. Seven, intelligence is a vital function of command and should never be ignored.<sup>20</sup> India's military 'intelligence' needs expansion and a fresh perspective.

A related - but often poorly handled - area is of 'psychological operations'. This requires a planned and coordinated organisational effort to undermine secessionist propaganda and media sensationalism.

One final organisational issue is the need for the military to 'Conscientiously Object' to any and every (often frivolous) 'civil-aid' tasks assigned to the Army.<sup>21</sup> This is a tough proposition, could lead to gross insubordination under trying conditions, and will thus find little favour in politico-military circles. However, had the military leadership exercised this option during the Punjab crisis, the Sikhs wouldn't have been alienated; there would have been no post 'Blue Star' mutiny; and none of the ghastly riots and massacres that followed Mrs Gandhi's assassination. As the Army is ordered into action for serious escalation in domestic violence, a need for a fresh equation in civil-military relations at all levels is essential.

### **Tactical**

An extensive study of Western Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict,<sup>22</sup> has concluded that the British, French and Israeli Armies have adapted effectively to the conditions of low-intensity conflicts, and four major points stand out in this regard.

"First, the ability of these armies to learn from their experiences and to adapt accordingly. Second, each of these armies placed considerable emphasis upon small-unit leadership, intelligence, surprise and mobility - in other words, upon those very assets normally associated only with their insurgent opponents. Third, each concentrated certain roles and skills within specialised units, which then served as repositories of expertise that could be shared with the rest of the army. Finally each of these armies were



aware of the political context in which their military operations were being conducted".<sup>23</sup>

The Indian military operations in retrospect bring out precisely these tactical shortcomings, specially so at the initial stage of each campaign. However, "after having offered a considerable number of lives to the enemy", the Indian Army too adapted effectively in each operational theatre. The two most significant forms of modern land warfare, "manoeuvre warfare and revolutionary warfare", in Richard Simpkin's view, "both derive from Sun Tzu".<sup>24</sup> Although irregular forces have used war to train for war, established armies however cannot do so. They adopt a doctrine and a certain 'type-set' to put the doctrine into effect. The requirement for the Indian Army to adopt a low-intensity operations doctrine has already been highlighted earlier, and correspondingly the need for specialised formations (LIDs) to be equipped for modern low-intensity warfare. This brings us to the 'type-set' or models for the training of such specialised forces.

Simpkin's view, that there are fundamentally two different philosophies of training, seems accurate enough. The British (who laid the foundation for the modern Indian Army) have two such 'type-set' models for training. One is "*Gungho-ism*" and the other "*Hahnism*". The former, 'Gungho-ism', often dehumanises a man, motivating and rebuilding him in a specific image - epitomised by the special forces (such as the Paras, Marines, Rangers, etc.). The latter, 'Hahnism' (named after Kurt Hahn, the founder of Salem, Gordonstoun and their offshoots), was an approach injected by Prince Philip into the Royal Navy (when he served with it). It caught the British Army's imagination about "the importance of remnants on the nuclear battlefield". In essence, 'Hahnism' does not dehumanise an individual, but his character is fostered in a discreetly controlled environment, encouraging individual initiative and team spirit. The end result - "mature personalities who are mentally alert, physically tough, resilient, determined to make the most of themselves, and happy to work within an accepted discipline".<sup>25</sup> Ideally speaking, 'Gungho-ism' applies to the special forces in the West, as much as it does in India. 'Hahnism' could certainly form the basis for the training of a modern force to deal with future low-intensity conflicts.



A general tactical criteria for armies to operate effectively in modern conflicts would include the following aspects. First, the need for awareness of the political context in which military operations are undertaken. This would require greater 'fusion' between civil and military authorities and requires the highest standards of discipline in the use of force. Second, a need for flexibility - in attitude, tactics and standard operating procedures. Third, good junior leadership and the highest standards of basic military skills are essential to deal with prolonged, stressful and debilitating operational conditions characterised by low-intensity conflicts. Fourth, mobility by helicopters, light armoured vehicles and above all by feet on ground (the hallmark of tough infantry soldiers). Finally, the need for first-rate 'intelligence' down to the units. Only this can help an army to locate, anticipate, and pre-empt the enemy by exploiting the principle of surprise to the enemy's disadvantage.<sup>26</sup>

Except for the first and the last aspect - an awareness of the political context of operations, and the need for first-rate 'intelligence' at unit level - the Indian Army's operations were conducted within the tactical criterias stated above. However, it is certainly no exaggeration to state that the future looks far from accommodative to the interests of conventional armies.

### **On the Future**

The spectrum of low-intensity conflicts represents the most probable form of future armed conflict. Take the case of former Yugoslavia where warfare has returned with all the ferocity that 20<sup>th</sup> Century conventional fire power can offer. It is an ambiguous war with the lines between nations and states being blurred. The end of the Cold War has shown that even a continent as affluent as Europe faces the threat of a 'tribal war' of regions and peoples - not of nation-states. The fragmented states of Yugoslavia have been destroyed to preserve the 'interests' of certain warring factions. As the western powers deliberate over a military intervention to halt the destruction in the Balkans, they are conscious about the damage in human lives that an intervening UN force would suffer and the debate that would ensue in their liberal democracies. Yugoslavia's conflict offers the perfect example of the strategic dilemmas that future wars will present, i.e., how to inflict a decisive blow at a

specific time and place, balanced with the need to surprise a specific enemy.

If we go by the evidence of conflicts the world over for the past half a century, then low-intensity conflicts dominate over high-intensity manoeuvre warfare between large forces. Revolutionaries motivated politically or religiously - or by both - will stretch first class armies to their limits of endurance. The politico-military leadership would need to adopt a two phased strategy to counter such fanatical revolutionaries. In phase one, a campaign to win the 'hearts and minds' of the alienated civilians with a simultaneous undercover operation by special forces to strike at the revolutionary leadership or the main arms cache. In phase two, as large scale low-intensity operations are launched, the military will need to fight with similar tactics as the revolutionaries, supported by a preponderance of a governmental psychological war effort. Undercover patrols and quasi-guerrilla groups supported by quick reaction heliborne forces<sup>27</sup> would appear politically mind-boggling today - but seems the most viable option for future wars.

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# Insurgencies in the North East

## PART I

LT GEN V K NAYAR, PVSM, SM (RETD)

**M**odernisation in the socio-political fields has created a conflict situation between past values and systems and the forces of modernisation as the process has not been harmonised. This is due to the failure to appreciate the diverse social, cultural, ethnic and economic perspectives of the people of the constituent states of the North East. We have also failed to recognise the in-built constraints of the tribal societies in the hill states, where trust and credibility play a major part in acceptance of outsiders and are essential for assimilation into the national mainstream. Alienation of the people is essentially due to lack of realisation of the peculiar historical, social and cultural factors of each area with the common effect of isolation. The various facets of this isolation vary from area to area; of this, physical isolation impinges on the minds of the people the most. The situation is accentuated by the influx of foreigners, giving rise to ethnic parochialism and the question of identity comes to the forefront. The identity crisis is fermented by the fear of cultural submergence and economic and social security.

The contemporary period has been marked by deteriorating political ethos, degradation of institutional structure and parochial exploitation of ethnic identities and sentiment of nationalism and subnationalism, which have led to instability and bad governance. Insurgent factions have been used in the power game, which has provided them unlimited opportunity to gain financial and other resources at the cost of the people. Financial mismanagement is of the highest order; there is no ethos of systematic utilisation of funds meant for specific purposes and there is no monitoring. Denial of opportunity to entrepreneurs in the hill states has resulted in *benami* contractors operating on behalf of locals, mostly people in power and their relatives. In a nutshell, political and administrative permissiveness and corruption is eating into the society and feeding insurgency.

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## REVIEW

The Naga Insurgency since 1956 can be justifiably called the 'mother' of insurgencies in the North East, although each one of these has its own indigenous and distinct character. Thus, though the Naga Insurgency has remained the dominant factor, it has not been able to forge a totally cohesive and co-ordinated response amongst the insurgent groups in the North East. Though this has blunted the overall impact of insurgencies, it has also created serious management problems due to such fragmentation. The commonality lies in their stance of some form of self-determination and autonomy without a binding ideology. Therefore, the co-ordination and co-operation has to be examined in more a tactical sense than a strategic one.

The insurgencies since their inception in the fifties have been influenced by the twin factors of politico-social developments and geo-strategic changes in the areas adjoining the North East. Both these aspects, in turn, have been influenced by the historical experience of the people of the area and contemporary developments after independence. The underground leadership (particularly the Nagas) have been able to grasp the significance of these and exploit the situation to their advantage. The Indian state, on the other hand, reacted to situations piecemeal as these arose without a long-term policy. Since the late seventies the Government's reaction to insurgencies has been essentially guided by electoral-political expediencies and left the management of insurgencies to the ignorant bureaucracy and intelligence agencies.

### Naga Insurgency

The contemporary period from 1975 onwards is of special significance due to the events of the imposition of the Emergency, the Shillong Accord and changes in Bangladesh due to Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rehman's assassination. On imposition of President's rule in the wake of the Emergency in 1975, a combination of Army pressure and negotiations brought about the Shillong Accord. The negotiations before the Accord failed to establish wider contacts with the Naga insurgents and resulted in the segment of Naga

insurgents away in China (later NSCN, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland) to reject it. This divided the Naga society along tribal lines and raised the issue of loyalty and collaboration, which is the foundation of the Naga tribal tradition and ethos. The seventies saw the centre of gravity of the insurgents shift to the East, with China and the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) as the main resource support base, resulting in activation of the Eastern border and adjoining areas in Nagaland and Manipur.

The changes in Bangladesh after Sheikh Mujib's assassination were gradual and fermented only by 1985, which created a conducive environment once again for a shift to the West for camps and sanctuaries in Bangladesh. This coincides with peace efforts of Reverends Longri Ao and Ychingwang Konyak, its failure and further division of the NSCN into the Isaac Muivah and Khaplang factions in 1988. The split further complicated the Naga situation. Internecine war between these two groups has taken more lives in the last decade and further fragmented the Naga society. While the divide may suit the Security Forces (SF) tactically, partisan handling has made peace more difficult. The period since the late eighties is marked with increasing overground politics getting mixed with fractious developments in the rival NSCN groups. These go beyond the limits of human and tribal affiliations of the past; the game is purely political and power-oriented. The nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, contractors and underground factions is well-established. The SF have a situation where the main culprits are either in the Government or have its protection, and the target is restricted to the lower rank and file of the insurgents. You cannot fight insurgency only at the ground level, when its main supporters and powerful elements behind it are left free to perpetuate it and provide it life-support.

The character of the Naga Insurgency has changed over the past decade. No longer the guerrilla contemplates a life in the jungle hide-outs; the scene of action has shifted to population centres and towns. In the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis was on mass mobilisation and guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run. The support base of the insurgents has undergone a qualitative and quantitative change. On the one hand,

people want peace and tranquility and look forward to the benefits of development; on the other hand, they want to exploit all issues to gain maximum benefits. Without a support base, not only their survival but the very meaning of their existence may be lost. Therefore, their covert presence must not only be effective but sophisticated. The emphasis has shifted to exploitation of ethnic bonds to influence events, whether these be political, economic, social or cultural. Insurgents have influenced elections in Manipur and Nagaland, where they have links not only with politicians but also with administrators and the elite in other spheres.

At the tactical level, the growing potential of NSCN (IM), the most potent of the North East insurgent groups, is of special interest. NSCN (IM), in collaboration with its sympathisers, has been exploiting the sentiment of Naga identity and interest, particularly in Manipur and Naga inhabited areas in Assam, to expand its area of influence, in which a combination of misconstrued Naga sentiment, threat and Kuki baiting has been effectively employed. The partisan attitude of the present Government in Nagaland in favour of the Khaplang faction is having its own reaction and is acting as a boost for NSCN (IM). NSCN (IM) has reliable contacts for arms procurement in Thailand and other South East Asian countries. It has also well-established links for transportation of arms and material to camps in Bangladesh. NSCN (IM) participation in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in July 1993 in Vienna and subsequent participation in the Indigenous Peoples Forum has given them openings to international forums and avenues for support. They have established offices in Nepal, Hong Kong and some European capitals, in addition to Bangladesh and Pakistan.

The cease-fire since August 1997 with the NSCN (IM), unilaterally extended in November 1998 to NSCN (K), and negotiations for peace has made little headway; the inter-group rivalries continue along with the attendant violence. The very idea of negotiations without a clear-cut aim and mandate is unlikely to succeed. It will only result in the extension of NSCN (IM) influence and military hold in Manipur and Nagaland and provide greater propaganda for *Nagalin* (Unification).

## Assam

The Assam Accord itself was faulty, hastily put together out of compulsion to call a halt to the All Assam Students Union (AASU) agitation. The Accord generated a sense of helplessness and fear in the minds of the religious and linguistic minorities. Minorities, badly let down by the Congress, sought security in a separate political set-up. The birth of the United Minorities Front (UMF) in 1985 with majority Muslim representation and a few Bangalee Hindu representatives marked a turning point in Assam politics. It started the polarisation along ethnic, religious and linguistic, as well as Assamese and non-Assamese, lines.

The trends set during the period 1985-90 coinciding with the tenure of the first Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) Government were to distort both the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the political ethos of the AGP. The guerrilla war shifted from villages and jungles to the tea estates and towns, where lakhs were offered to buy peace and the ULFA war chest swelled. To camouflage its acts of extortion, killings and kidnappings, ULFA combined these with social reforms and village development programmes. The AGP Government members got involved in financial and moral scandals and the lavish style of their leaders resulted in the loss of popular support. But worst of all was tolerance of ULFA, which resulted in it infiltrating every organ of the state – political, administrative and police. The return of Hiteswar Saikia to power after the 1991 elections and the offer of amnesty led to escalation of violence and breakdown of law and order. The crackdown under *Op Rhino* in September 1991 resulted in large-scale capture of ULFA cadres and its middle level leadership was seriously damaged. Only the top leadership located in Bangladesh survived. ULFA's links with KIA, NSCN and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the existence of camps in Bangladesh were confirmed. The surrender of about 4,000 youth and their rehabilitation as Surrendered ULFA (SULFA) resulted in a natural rift. While continuing their efforts of sporadic violence and recruitment, the ULFA cadres underwent training and revised their strategy. It was essentially based on the realisation that with a major turnover in the cadre, closer supervision was required without the top leadership



getting involved. Their presence must be potent and cover the whole of Assam, particularly the population centres. This, coupled with the fact that the political scene had changed in Bangladesh in 1996, resulted in ULFA establishing new camps in Manas Reserve Forest and the jungles of South Bhutan. The period 1994 to 1996 was well-utilised by ULFA to rejuvenate its cadres and re-establish itself. They had marginalised the State and its apparatus by increased terror and violence. The death of Saikia before the election in 1996 resulted in the diminishing of Congress' fortunes, and a wiser Mohanta, by electoral manipulation, wooed Muslims and returned to power in alliance with five more non-Congress parties. After initial hesitation, Mohanta agreed to the establishment of the unified command and to deal with ULFA and the Bodo militancy firmly. However, the political divisions in Assam, minorities on the agitational path and exploitation of the issue of immigrants will keep the pot boiling and help ULFA retain its relevance with one or other section of the Assamese society. The initiatives for a solution have to come from the Assamese themselves.

The situation in Assam is further confused and made environmentally violence-prone due to the emergence of a number of minority insurgent groups to guard their respective community interests. The Bengal Tiger Force (BTF), the Gorkha Tiger Force (GTF), the All Assam Adivasi Suraksha Samiti (AASS); Muslim fundamentalist organisations like the Muslim Security Force (MSF), the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), all have ISI support. With 40 lakh illegal Bangladeshi Muslims in Assam, the task of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is hardly difficult. Assam has an Islamic militancy in the making.

### **Bodos**

The perception that the tribals of the plains of Assam, the bulk of whom are Bodos and Mishings, have a separate and distinct identity of their own and are the first sons of the soil is ancient and deep-rooted amongst the Bodos. The Bodos ruled the entire plains of Assam, North Bengal, parts of present-day Bangladesh and Tripura before the Ahoms, and their influence continued in certain

parts till the annexation of Assam by the British in 1826 consequent to the Yandabo Treaty. They had sought recognition as a separate identity even under the British. They feel that the efforts of the leadership in Assam during the past has been to perpetuate conditions whereby Bodos will gradually become extinct to the advantage of the Assamese. The problem is mainly related to the preservation of their areas and identity.

They have been denied benefits of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Schedules of the Constitution covering all other tribes. The failure of the Plain Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) to make headway in their demand for Udyachal disillusioned the tribals. The failure of the AGP Government to honour Clause 10 of the Assam Accord, which said that the existing laws will be reinforced to prevent illegal occupation of tribal land and eviction of those in illegal occupation of tribal land, further disillusioned the Bodos. The All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) under Upen Brahma raised the demand for the division of Assam, with the Northern half for tribals and Southern half for Assamese. By November 1988, ABSU changed their stance and concretised their demands into three main ones; a separate state with Union Territory status North of the Brahmaputra River; creating district councils in compact areas South of the Brahmaputra River; and the creation of a regional council for Bodos, Rengma and non-Karbi tribes within the Karbi-Anglong Autonomous District Council, as plains tribals in the area did not enjoy safeguards like other tribes in the council.

The militancy started in 1988; the movement initially targeted local Assamese government institutions, buildings and property to which the Assam Police reacted with brutality. After the death of Upen Brahma in 1990, the movement grew its militant and secessionist tendencies and forged links with ULFA, NSCN and Bodo Security Force (BSF). A series of tripartite talks and expert committee reports resulted in the grant of maximum autonomy just short of a separate state. The recommendations were rejected by ABSU and Bodo Peoples Action Committee (BPAC) due to the non-inclusion of 4,443 villages in nine districts of the Bodoland map. The bipartite agreement was signed between the President of ABSU Sugwai Bwasumatri and the Assam Government. But the

Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) area remained not only undefined but undemarcated. The BPAC and Bodoland Volunteer Force (BVC), the militant wing of ABSU, united to form the Bodoland Peoples Party (BPP). The BSF denounced the Accord.

The years following the Accord have seen large-scale kidnapping, arson, looting, bundhs and targeting of minority community, mostly immigrant Muslims, and ethnic killings against Bengali-speaking Hindu settlers. Since the AGP Government assumed power in 1996, the conflict between Bodos and Santhals resulted in over 100 killed and over 2 lakhs rendered homeless. The newly formed Progressive Democratic Front (PDF), a front for the BSF, masterminded the ethnic killings. The Bodo militancy acquired new dimensions by bomb explosions aboard the Brahmaputra Mail, killing 35 people in 1996; the ethnic killings, sabotage and factional killings between Bodos due to rivalry between BPP and PDF. The main area of concern is the violence due to ethnic conflict, the rift between the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Bodoland Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) and the growing nexus between BLTF and Bengal Tiger Force (BTF) and that between NDFB and ULFA.

The Bodo militancy is the outcome of Assamese chauvinism and the lack of vision of their leaders. Insensitiveness of the AGP and the Congress Government's tacit abetment for political gains are equally responsible. The Bodoland Accord was flawed like the Assam Accord, due to the non-delimitation of the area and exclusion of the 10 km forest belt along the Bhutan border. Autonomous Councils established in Garo, Khasi Jaintia, Tripura and in Darjeeling (Gorka Land Council) already have such control. Floating the lure of autonomy without defining its geographical, political and financial parameters is only seeking temporary respite.

In the overall context, the Assam situation is a mixture of growing grim realities. The weak political leadership lacks vision, which has marred government functioning and the administration is in total disarray. The references in the militancy field are confined only to identified threats from ULFA and Bodo militants. The growing militant stance of ethnic groups due to genuinely perceived threats

to their community and the rise of Muslim fundamentalist militant organisations with outside support requires a more wholesome and cohesive response to the situation.

### **Manipur**

The complexion of the Naga Insurgency in Manipur is essentially that of Nagaland with total NSCN (IM) orientation and it is part of the same. Meitei Insurgency has its origin in the revivalism of the old Meitei religion, fanning of anti-Mayang (outsider) feeling and Pan Mongoloid sentiment. This was encouraged by antagonism against privileges given to tribals, rampant corruption and unemployment. The problem was further accentuated by issues like language and the presence of a monolithic society which, though cultured, educated and proficient in arts and music, was lorded over by what they considered as uneducated hill tribals.

The genesis of Meitei Insurgency lies in the deep hurt that Meitei psyche suffered due to the manner of the merger of the state with the Indian Union. The Imphal Valley with its predominantly Hindu population was closer to the mainland. After a period of time, Meiteis found that tribals around them due to special privileges were fast benefiting whereas they missed out on most economic benefits. Gradually, they started feeling that they have gained nothing by associating with the Indian Union. As a result, they not only started developing separatist tendencies but a campaign of disassociation with the Hindu religion and revivalism of their old senamahai culture also took place. Corrupt administration, both civil and political, and mounting unemployment of the better educated Meitei, provided further ground for communist-inspired insurgent groups. The problem was further accentuated by issues like language and a monolithic society. In this environment, the close nature of the society proved most conducive for insurgency. Its nature and complexion are totally urban from political, social and cultural aspects, with an agricultural society and a feudal structure.

The Naga and Meitei insurgencies in Manipur and Nagaland have survived due to politician-insurgent nexus and all economic and developmental activities are throttled to feed the insurgency

industry. The nexus has grown since the mid-eighties and is now fully established. I realised that unless this nexus is broken and its effect minimised, fighting insurgency only at the ground level in the law and order field will only be ignoring the major dimensions of the malaise. I decided to expose it and fight it. It created a situation, but I stuck to my ground and the Government finally accepted it.

Nowhere in the North East is the ethnic divide more pronounced than in Manipur. The Naga-Meitei divide has sharpened due to the government's negotiations with NSCN (IM). The Naga-Kuki conflict has attained violent proportions. The recent Kuki-Paite violence in Churachandpur area was doused with great difficulty and there are simmerings of Kuki-Meitei differences and confrontation. In most of these confrontations, the ethnic insurgent groups have taken advantage of the situation or precipitated it into violent conflicts.

### **Tripura**

The tribal population of Tripura which was 93 per cent in 1947 has been reduced to a minority of 28.5 per cent of its 2.06 million population today. The changing demographic balance, economic pressure and awareness resulted in tribal resentment, which grew as the influx of Bengali immigrants for one reason or the other continued. The formation of the Tripura Upjati Juba Samiti (TUJS) and its failure to gain its objectives of Autonomous Tribal District Council under the Sixth Schedule, reconstitution of Tribal Reserve Areas earlier created by the Maharaja and restoration of alienated tribal land to non-tribals under the TLR and LR Act 1960 was the start of the militancy. This coincided with the defeat of the communists in the 1967 elections, whose leaders Nirpen Chakraborty and the late Dasarath Deb had taken up their cause politically. This saw the first phase of insurgency, which was supported by the Mizo National Front (MNF) and the East Pakistan Government.

The period after the 1988 Accord with the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) is marked by certain identifiable trends. First of all is the fact that along with periodic surrenders the militancy

continues, with factional fights between the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). The insurgency scenario has got politicised or the political scenario has got militant as ATTF has links with CPI (M) and NLFT enjoys Congress patronage. With NLFT having forged links with NSCN (IM) and ATTF with ULFA and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the scenario, similar to the one in Nagaland and Manipur, is emerging.

A closer examination of the contemporary insurgency in Tripura clearly indicates that the earlier demand of the TNV to secede from India was not born out of ideology, but was an expression of tribal discontent. The root cause is alienation of tribal land. The militancy is not the outcome of any secessionist demand, but due to deep sectarian feeling of tribal versus non-tribal. As the peoples' problems grow, militant groups exploit their anger to indulge in violence and sectarian planks, with political backing or manipulation between CPI (M) and Congress. The open border with Bangladesh and limited access to the rest of the country provide militancy the conducive geographical environment to survive, which is helped by easy availability of arms to the North East from the open markets of South East Asia and the benevolence of Bangladesh.

We also need to recognise that while at the political level the TUJS represents tribal opinion and sentiment, by itself it does not exercise major influence. Its political alliance has only limited electoral value. If anything, the party is a stumbling block to a political solution of the insurgency, as a political solution will always go in favour of the ruling party and deprive TUJS of its importance (1988 Accord). In essence, the current insurgency in Tripura is a politico-social struggle based on tribal deprivation, which has been totally politicised in the last decade after the 1988 Accord.

(To be concluded)

# Surprise and Deception in Modern Warfare

CDR TONY CHACKO

## INTRODUCTION

**S**urprise and deception have always been important ingredients of warfare. Their importance even during the pre-Christian era is evident from the statements of Sun Tzu who said "Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected... All warfare is based on deception."<sup>1</sup>

Surprise and deception have had a decisive influence on the outcome of numerous wars and battles, where their use was instrumental in turning many near defeats into victories. The side more adept at applying these concepts in a timely and clever manner has invariably found victory. It is a measure of its vital importance that military commanders and analysts through the ages have considered surprise as an essential element of victory. Its applicability as a principal factor in war is accepted universally. Surprise is, therefore, one of those principles of war common to the military doctrines of every major military power in the world.

Deception is an important element of surprise. Effective deception can cause the adversary to violate the two fundamental principles of war viz, concentration of forces and the economy of force. This is achieved by making the adversary waste his resources either by spreading or splitting forces to reduce the strength at the decisive point of attack and tie up considerable forces at the wrong place at the crucial time. The deception plan 'Fortitude' in *Operation Overlord* carried out by the Allied forces

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<sup>1</sup> Sun Tzu, *Art of War* (London : Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.133, 66.

Edited text of the essay which won the First Prize in Group A of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1999.

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during their amphibious landings at Normandy is such an example. Deception can also cause the enemy to divert attention from critical to trivial areas of interest, reduce his readiness, and increase his confusion.

### **Relevance in Modern Warfare**

There is a common perception among many experts that modern means of surveillance, along with developments in information technology, have made the concept of surprise in future wars difficult, if not impossible. However, it must be remembered that surveillance merely provides data, and the technical progress made in intelligence gathering has not made interpretation any easier nor reduced the possibilities for deception and disinformation. Also, while progress in surveillance has indeed amounted to a 'transparency revolution', other technological advances have actually made surprise easier to achieve. The increased range of modern missiles and aircraft coupled with stealth technology makes it possible to deliver a deep, highly accurate blow without warning.

Wars in the foreseeable future are likely to be short and intense and, therefore, favour the side which makes early gains in the opening phase of the conflict. Surprise makes way for achieving such initial gains. Also, the improved surveillance and intelligence gathering capability brought about by modern developments in the fields of surveillance and information technology now enable the adversary to discern the likely intentions and force deployment much more comprehensively and accurately than ever before. Under such conditions, the element of surprise aided by deception will be critical, as the events during the Gulf War in 1991 indicated.

## **SURPRISE**

### **Objective of Surprise**

Surprise is an action or a series of actions, which are sudden in occurrence, forceful in thrust and completely unanticipated to achieve a decisive outcome. It is one of the most important principles of war, necessitating the selection of proper timing and



the mode and manner of military action, so as to strike when the enemy is least prepared and thus also paralysing his will to mount any kind of organised resistance. It is achieved by confusing the enemy of own intentions and by concealing the preparations and intentions for war. It also calls for applying new methods, tactics and strikes unfamiliar to the enemy. Surprise is, therefore, one factor that induces maximum unpredictability in battle.

### **Levels of Application**

Surprise may be utilised at three different levels of military operation, namely strategic, operational and tactical, depending upon the specific situation as well as on the type and scale of objectives and results desired from the surprise attack.

**Strategic Level.** This level is the broadest possible application, which involves the concealment of the intention to launch an offensive and/or its timing. This can only be achieved through large-scale deceptive actions, concealment of forces and installations, and misinforming the enemy. Israel's pre-emptive attack on Egypt in 1967 and Argentina's capture of the Falklands Islands are examples of achieving national objective through strategic surprise.

**Operational Level.** This includes measures undertaken at the theatre level or throughout the course of a large-scale operation and includes denial to enemy reconnaissance information regarding operative formations, choice of direction and timing of the main strike, etc. This also includes the application of new methods for conducting operations and new means of attack capable of influencing the overall outcome. The use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) by Israel in Bekka Valley, Lebanon, in 1982 is such an example.

**Tactical Level.** This is the lowest level of application, which includes concealment of own forces prior to attack, skillful exploitation of terrain, weather and time for launching the attack, and unexpected use of tactics and weapons of all types.

### **Effect of Surprise on Enemy**

**Psychological Effect.** In addition to its dual offensive and

defensive roles, surprise also has a major psychological component. It disrupts the enemy's inner equilibrium, which leads to the inability to react quickly and effectively to a threatening danger. This could lead to the following :-

- (a) Loss of time caused by confusion which may, in turn, allow sufficient time to complete the specific mission.
- (b) Disorganisation causing illogical and chaotic actions by the enemy.
- (c) Mental strain and exhaustion.
- (d) A sense of fear, which in a large group of forces may develop into panic.
- (e) Degradation of troop morale.

**Loss of Initiative.** Surprise can also neutralise or take away the initiative since its effect imposes a position of weakness.

## DECEPTION

### Objective of Deception

Deception is a conscious and deliberate effort to mislead an adversary by subtle misrepresentation of reality to gain a competitive advantage. It seeks to create in the adversary a state of mind, which will be conducive to exploitation by the deceiver. The objective of military deception is two-fold. One, to misdirect or mislead enemy's attention causing him to concentrate his forces in the wrong place. Second, to make the opponent squander his resources on non-existent targets and in making incorrect decisions. Deception during war should be seen as a necessary activity because it acts as a force multiplier and magnifies the strength of the deceiver. It is an art that seeks to intrude on the psychology of the opponent and makes him think or act in the manner required by the deceiving agent.

## The Structure of Deception

Deception is the distortion of perceived reality and is done by changing the pattern of distinguishing characteristics of the object detected by the sensors of the adversary. The purpose of deception is to profess the false in the face of the real. Every deception operation is comprised of only two basic parts namely, dissimulation and simulation. Both these are always present together in any single act of deception.

**Dissimulation.** Dissimulation is hiding the real and its task is to conceal or obscure the truth. Operationally, dissimulation is done by hiding one or more of the characteristics that make up the distinctive pattern of a real thing. Dissimulation includes masking, repackaging and dazzling.<sup>2</sup> The use of electronic jamming to mask a strike by aircraft, warships disguised as merchant ships, are examples of dissimulation.

**Simulation.** Simulation is showing the false and is done by showing one or more characteristics that comprise the distinctive pattern of a false thing. Its task is to pretend, portray or profess an intended lie. Mimicking, inventing and decoying are three basic procedures to carry out simulation.<sup>3</sup> The creation of rubber tanks, canvas aircraft, dummy warships and dummy radio traffic are all examples of simulation.

## Levels of Application

Like surprise, deception too can be applied at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

**Strategic Level.** Deception at this level will include a broad range of measures for clandestinely concealing the preparations of strategic operations and campaigns, as well as for disorienting the enemy with regard to the actual intentions of own forces. It is also at this level that deceptive measures known as disinformation through media and by electronic means are likely to be orchestrated.

**Operational Level.** Deception at this level is used to conceal the preparation for major operations and should form an essential part of the operational plan.

<sup>2</sup> Barton Whaley, "Towards a General Theory of Deception," in John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, ed., *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise* (London: Frank Cass, 1982), p.182.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*, p.183

**Tactical Level.** Deception at this level involves plans to conceal the preparations, location and the movement of own tactical formations. It may be independent of, or supportive of, the operational deception plan.

### **Requirements of Deception**

For any deception plan to succeed, creativity and originality are a must. In addition, the following basic requirements must be adhered to :-

- (a) The deception plan should have a clearly defined aim, which supports the real operational plan.
- (b) The control of the plan should always be exercised at the highest level, to prevent unco-ordinated lower level plans that can compromise each other and also the main plan by revealing anomalies.
- (c) The preparation and execution must be thorough, for which sufficient resources and time must be allocated to ensure credibility.
- (d) The credibility of the deception plan is paramount. It must be a plausible alternative to the real one and must unfold in a logical and realistic fashion, feeding such information the enemy would expect to see without arousing suspicion.
- (e) It is important to feed as many of the enemy's intelligence collection sources as possible with minor inconsistencies and ambiguities. Timing is also important as the enemy intelligence must be given enough time to collect and interpret the false information but not enough for detailed analysis.
- (f) Flexibility in execution is a vital attribute to deception. Enemy reactions, both predicted and unforeseen, must dictate the unfolding of the plan and radical modifications to the plan may become necessary.
- (g) Security is vital for the success of the deception plan.

## MEASURES TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE AND DECEPTION

### Factors to be Considered

The value of surprise and deception in modern warfare has paradoxically increased with the advent of high resolution electronic sensor devices used on reconnaissance aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and satellites. During the Gulf War in 1991, the Allied forces used these platforms extensively to obtain information about Iraq's Order of Battle (ORBAT), deployment pattern, the location of air defence systems, *Scud* launcher platforms, and command and control centres. The wars in future are likely to be short and intense and, therefore, the following factors need to be considered while planning surprise and deception measures :-

- (a) Zero or negligible warning period.
- (b) High dependence on C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup> network for information exchange.
- (c) Extensive use of electromagnetic spectrum.
- (d) Possible use of tactical nuclear weapons.
- (e) Increased range with greater accuracy and lethality of conventional weapons.
- (f) Better and near real time surveillance capability to provide up-to-date information of enemy's movements, making the element of surprise difficult.

### Measures to be Taken

The various measures that are required to be taken against adversaries to achieve surprise and deception, as also those required to be adopted to prevent becoming a victim to such use by the enemy, are grouped under the following :-

- (a) Active and Passive Measures.
- (b) Organisational and Administrative Measures.

## ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MEASURES

### Electronic Deception

Obtaining intelligence about adversaries through Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is routine activity, which is undertaken during peacetime and especially during major exercises. While the need to protect our ORBAT from the adversaries is critical, it is also possible to mislead the enemy of our ORBAT, deployment pattern and intentions through electronic deception. Future wars will witness extensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and the side which can control this spectrum will obviously be in a position to dictate the terms. Electronic deception will therefore play an important role and can be used to degrade the enemy's C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup> system and air defence systems to achieve surprise by simulation, distortion and manipulation. However, before attempting to undertake this, it is important to gather the capabilities of enemy sensors and their procedures. Also, this deception should be undertaken by specially trained operators with specialised electronic equipment. During the Gulf War, the electromagnetic spectrum was used extensively to deceive Iraq's military commanders at both strategic and tactical levels. Electronic deceptions were used to degrade Iraq's surveillance systems, to depict forces in areas where they did not exist and to deceive hostile missiles. Electronic deception can therefore be used to deceive the enemy by targeting the following:-

- (a) Air defence systems, by generating false targets while undertaking strikes by aircraft.
- (b) C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup> network to mislead and to disrupt information exchange.

### Disruption of Information Infrastructure

**Vulnerability of Computers to Virus.** Today, amongst the armed forces of most nations, there is an increasing thrust towards computerisation and networking of computer systems. Computers are being used in a big way in operating linkages with radars, air defence systems, communications, command and control

networks, and satellites. They are, however, vulnerable to attacks by virus and it is possible for a computer expert or a hacker to gain access to such networks to inject viruses such as 'Melissa' and 'Chernobyl' to destroy information bases or to ruin their hard disks and software. Examples of such usage include :-

(a) **Time Bomb.** When planes of Allied forces commenced bombing operations on Iraq during the Gulf War in January 1991, the Iraqi Army HQs found that its communication networks with the field networks had stopped working. It was suspected to be caused by a malicious software introduced by the US called 'Time Bomb', a type of virus that remains dormant and activates itself or is activated from outside at a pre-fixed time.<sup>4</sup>

(b) **Trojan Horse.** In August 1995, when the Australian Navy commissioned new software produced by a US company, the computer transferred some of the electronic files to the HQs of the parent company in the US. It was suspected to be caused by another malicious software called 'Trojan Horse', which carries out clandestine tasks programmed by the producer without the knowledge of the user.<sup>5</sup>

**Targeting Enemy Data Network.** Data networks are vulnerable to the twin threats of theft of classified data by external elements and the distortion and obliteration of sensitive data through malicious software without the knowledge of the user. Such distortion forces the user to take wrong decisions on the basis of incorrect data and also makes essential data unavailable in times of need and in emergencies such as war. With the amount of software expertise available within the country, it would be possible to disrupt the computer network of adversaries with careful planning and execution.

**Protection of Information.** To prevent hacking of data, there is a need to take various countermeasures. These could include:-

(a) Use of coding and decoding devices for sensitive data. Secrecy devices protected the Allied force C<sup>3</sup>I infrastructure during the Gulf War.

<sup>4</sup>B Raman, "Data Protection and Information Security," *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. 126, January-March 1996, p.77.

<sup>5</sup>ibid.

- (b) Frequent changing of codes.
- (c) Avoid dependence on telephones in case of Local Area Networks (LANs).
- (d) Avoid direct dial-in arrangements in case of Wide Area Networks (WANs).
- (e) Prevent introduction of malicious software by denying unauthorised access to the computer and have standby arrangements if the system is damaged or have backup data.
- (f) Develop technology or tools such as 'Digital Microbe', which provide protection against any type of intrusion or removal of data.

### Stealth and Concealment

Stealth is an important aspect in achieving surprise in today's warfare, despite rapid advances in electronic surveillance. Advances in stealth technology have made it possible to reduce the signature of a ship or aircraft, so as to make it extremely difficult to detect by electronic sensors. These include reduction of radar cross-section (RCS), infrared signature, magnetic signatures, hydro-acoustic signature, visual signatures, laser cross-section, electrical signatures, hydrodynamic pressures and so on. While stealth is natural for submarines because their very survivability depends on that, a surface ship today is extremely vulnerable to attack by sea-skimming missiles. To improve their survivability and lethality, it is essential to incorporate stealth features to such platforms. The *La Fayette* class frigates of the French Navy and the *Visby* class corvettes under production for the Swedish Navy are examples of multi-mission capable stealth ships. During the Gulf War, the United States used their stealth aircraft *F-117A* effectively for bombing targets without being detected by Iraqi sensors. In future war, stealth will play an important role in the concealment of various platforms, which in turn will increase their effectiveness. While incorporation of stealth features to various weapons platforms will be prohibitively expensive, it is still considered essential to have these features to the following platforms :-

- (a) Surface warships.



- (b) All reconnaissance aircraft.
- (c) Strategic strike aircraft.

### **Reconnaissance and Surveillance**

**Countering Surveillance.** By knowing the exact timings of satellite passes and reconnaissance flights, it is possible to undertake movements of own forces without being detected. To some extent, this movement can also be planned under the cover of darkness or under heavy cloud cover. The preparation for the Pokhran II is a classic example.

**Surveillance for Preventing Surprise.** Surprise to a large extent can be minimised by proper and effective use of modern surveillance methods. A constant ORBAT, deployment patterns, tactics, Vulnerable Areas and Vulnerable Points (VAs/VPs), air defence sites, and command and control centres need to be ascertained. Besides this, surveillance is also required along the Line of Control (LoC) to monitor movement of enemy troops, where it may not be possible to physically deploy own troops throughout the year. The following surveillance measures are therefore required to be instituted, in addition to the existing measures :-

- (a) By satellites with data link facilities to ground stations for real time transfer of data.
- (b) By RPVs/UAVs.
- (c) By reconnaissance aircraft with stealth features, and equipped with suitable sensors.

### **Analysis of Crypto Systems**

The security of crypto systems is vital to keep the plans and operations under cover. It is therefore important to use suitable high-grade crypto systems, whose codes cannot be broken by analysis even with the aid of high power computers. This would require development of secure crypto systems. At the same time, there is a need to monitor the crypto systems of adversaries, the analysis of which could provide valuable data of their intentions by which suitable countermeasures can be taken.

### **Uses of Decoys and Dummies**

Decoys can be used to either replicate or simulate actual equipment or platform such as an aircraft, ship or a tank with the aim of deceiving the enemy. The Iraqis during the Gulf War set up decoy *Scud* launchers, employed mock tanks, airplane bunkers and artillery pieces made of plywood, aluminium and rubber. Such decoys are relatively cheap and not very capital intensive. Decoys also need to be made or designed in such a way that they appear natural for an enemy surveillance system including satellite surveillance. For example, a missile system decoy could have electric heating panels to simulate thermal patterns generated by the equipment being simulated. To meet the requirements of surprise and deception during war, there is a need to procure or manufacture various decoys and simulators. Once acquired, the decoys can be part of the inventory of field formations so that they can be used during the exercises.

### **Use of Electronic Media for Disinformation**

In any future conflict, the electronic media including television and Internet will play an increasing role as a medium for conveying information to a target audience. This media can therefore be suitably 'spin doctored' to convey such messages as would have the desired impact on the target audience. Thus, media can be used extensively for disinformation with the aim of deceiving and surprising the enemy and also to lower his morale. During the Gulf War, the CNN Channel was extensively used for this purpose and it is believed that during the six weeks of the war, more people watched television per day than at any time in history. During the recent Kargil crisis, India and Pakistan banned the transmission of PTV and foreign TV channels, respectively, to counter such effects by this media.

### **Second Strike Capability**

With China and Pakistan possessing nuclear capability, the use of nuclear weapons in future wars cannot be ruled out. A pre-emptive strike with nuclear weapons could achieve the necessary surprise to cripple the ability of a country to strike back with nuclear weapons. In such a scenario, where the reaction time is zero or minimal, there is a need to have second strike capability. This would mean having Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) technology to threaten predetermined targets of the adversary.

## ORGANISATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

### Intelligence Organisation

**Need for Strong Intelligence.** A strong intelligence network is critical for achieving surprise as well as to avoid being a victim of surprise. One of the ways of achieving surprise is to strike at the weak spots of the enemy. To know these points or to acquire this information, it is essential to have an efficient intelligence system. Strong intelligence is also needed for providing warning about threats to national security. The hard secret intelligence obtained about adversaries through human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical intelligence (TECHINT) has the greatest value in preventing surprises. It must also be remembered that intelligence is now a highly specialised field requiring personnel who are motivated and well-trained professionals in their areas of operations.

**Co-ordination Between Intelligence Agencies.** The intelligence system is not merely for collection of data but also for interpretation and dissemination of that information to all concerned agencies. There is also a need for analysis of HUMINT and TECHINT obtained for assessing their implications in the short and long terms. Co-ordination between different intelligence agencies such as the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing and those of the Armed Forces is a must to meet the following :-

- (a) To avoid undertaking separate operations for achieving the same result.
- (b) To prevent transgression of charters of each agency.
- (c) To benefit from each other's operational experience and assets.
- (d) For better exchange of information to avoid having armed forces operating at a disadvantage. The IPKF operations in Sri Lanka and the more recent Kargil operations are such examples.

**Integration between Military and Political Intelligence.**

Better integration between military and political intelligence is a must, as evaluation of military situations cannot be made in a political vacuum and vice versa. Most cases of strategic surprise indicate a lack of co-ordination between political-diplomatic activities and military activity on the part of the victim. To ensure close co-ordination between the intelligence agencies, the following are essential :-

- (a) Have common database and computer network in fields of military intelligence and other related fields.
- (b) Sharing officers with expertise in different fields.
- (c) Regular exchange of information by way of meetings or through network.

**Counter-Intelligence.** It is of vital importance that sensitive departments and organisations are not penetrated by the intelligence agencies of adversaries. The techniques of monitoring telecommunications through satellites have advanced to such an extent that today it may be possible to monitor all international calls and also to analyse them. The need to protect the C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup> network against penetration by enemy is paramount. It is, therefore, important to have a strong counter-intelligence network for threat analysis to protect critical areas of interest.

**Training**

Training of officers to enable them to understand and plan various surprise and deception measures in exercises as well as in real war situations is perhaps one of the more important aspects. The objective of the training would be to encourage the officers to think differently rather than along predictable lines, to take calculated risks and to use the element of unpredictability in war. Towards this, the following need to be implemented :-

- (a) The use of surprise and deception measures in all exercises and war games.
- (b) Inclusion of this subject in the basic training curriculum and also in subsequent mid-level courses for officers.

## **Doctrine**

For surprise and deception to be effective, it will require much greater skill in highly technical areas as well as detailed and systematic preparations such as practising these in war games and in actual exercises. Greater efforts for the preparation of deception plans will have to be made in peacetime so that they will be available if war breaks out. Therefore, there is a need to have a classified doctrine on surprise and deception tactics, with specific details regarding deception target, disinformation methodology, simulation and dissimulation methods, the deployment pattern of decoys, etc.

## **Deception Cell**

Elaborate planning and preparations are needed to achieve surprise in future wars and this cannot depend merely on the initiative of individual commanders. To co-ordinate the planning and execution of deception measures, there is a need to establish a deception cell at Service/Command Headquarters levels and also in field formations. This cell will have to interact closely with operational and intelligence directorates for integration of deception plans with the overall plan prepared.

## **CONCLUSION**

To surprise or deceive successfully may become more difficult, certainly much more complicated, in the future. In a world of specialised reconnaissance aircraft, intelligence satellites with high resolution photographic equipment and a variety of other sensors, and AWACS aircraft that can trace any movements on air, sea, or land at distances upto 300 miles or more, surprise and deception will not come easy. To these factors, we can add the contribution of high-powered computers for crypto analysis and the fact that everyone monitors his opponents' radio, telephone and cable communications. Future deceptions will primarily require the work of electronic and computer experts. Inevitably, deception will become less of an art and more a science, particularly at the execution level. Modern deception will require much greater skills

in highly technical areas, as well as detailed and systematic preparations such as practising in war games and in actual exercise programmes. Greater efforts for the preparation of deception plans will have to be made in peacetime so that they will be available if war breaks out.

The element of surprise in war in the past meant tactical surprise, which demanded superior leadership. However, the element of surprise in modern times has been transformed into a function of technological surprise. Today, the employment of a hitherto unknown technology could provide the crucial weight required to swing the tactical balance in the possessor's favour. Likewise weapons, Electronic Warfare (EW), communications, command and control are a function of technology. Superior technology has become an essential ingredient of success in war.

The effect of surprise is decisive and, therefore, it should be given its due importance in war. As Merglen said, "In war it is the unexpected that triumphs. And yet in preparing for war, the unexpected is never given its proper weight."<sup>6</sup> He also said that "uncertainty is the essence of war, surprise its rule."<sup>7</sup> Clausewitz wrote that "surprise plays a much larger part in strategy than in tactics, it is the most powerful element of victory."<sup>8</sup>

Surprise and deception in war will continue to be force multipliers if used imaginatively. When all other elements of combat power are roughly equal, surprise will further amplify the strength of the side which applies it, or alternatively allow it to use its force more economically. The German blitzkrieg that swept through Western Europe during World War II, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the Korean War and the Arab-Israeli Wars are all past examples of the application of this very potent force multiplier. Iraq, notwithstanding its defeat, demonstrated that despite the technological superiority at the disposal of coalition forces, deception is possible if the battlefield environment is understood and suitable deception measures adopted. The Allied forces, despite their overbearing superiority over Iraq, used various surprise and

<sup>6</sup> Albert Merglen, *Surprise Warfare* (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1968), p.11.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p.202.

<sup>8</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *Principles of War* (London, 1943), p.39.

deception measures including disrupting Iraq's command, control and communication networks to minimise their losses and to make their attacks more effective. David Dilks perhaps rightly sums up its relevance when he said: "It would exaggerate to say the resources are stretched and the tasks many, when the forces are evenly matched successful deception by itself enables wars to be won. But it is precisely when and the issue trembles in the balance, that successful deception matters most."<sup>9</sup>

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## The Doctrinal Challenge

MAJOR ALI AHMED

**T**wo important documents have been released recently for the security community to digest, and for the lay person to apprise himself/herself about the relatively opaque field of security. Both together fulfill a long felt need of transparency and articulation of Indian strategic thought. The first is the draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine (dIND) of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), and the second the Army publication – Fundamentals, Doctrine and Concepts – by its think tank, the Army Training Command (ARTRAC).

While the otherwise welcome dIND did encounter a controversial reception, the Army doctrine, though unclassified, has kept a low profile. Even though the Army doctrine preceded the dIND by a year, it did give out an institutional position on the nuclear question that was later echoed in the dIND. Whereas the dIND has rightly been discussed threadbare, it has not been read in relation to pre-existing Service doctrines, such as that of the Air Force and the Army. This owes largely to the independent origins of all three. Therefore, despite such doctrinal effusion, there is only incomplete evidence of doctrinal clarity. In short, the present doctrinal challenge is to attain the same.

The requirement of such evolution is to instill and enable jointness; to provide unambiguous guidance for decision makers; to iron out institutional conflict; and to inform the citizenry of the good health of the security system. But by far the most important reason for taking these as a start-point, rather than an end-product, is to convey an unmistakable message to potential adversaries. Since deterrence is now the mainstay of Indian security intent, its credibility is bolstered by definitive communication. Towards this end the doctrinal challenge needs now to be met.

Both the doctrines are unanimous on the need to acquire a

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nuclear deterrent. To both, the deterrent is with respect to nuclear use by a prospective opponent, and not necessarily to deter war itself. Both advocate a minimum credible nuclear capability based on a triad of delivery systems. Both are cognisant of the political utility of nuclear weapons. However, when mated, there emerges a conundrum that has thus far escaped comment of analysts. This article highlights a specific problem area at the junction of the dIND and the Army doctrine with respect to nuclear use.

### **The Problem**

Specifically, the nuclear conundrum will have origin in enemy (read Pakistani) reaction to operationalisation of the Army doctrine. The Army doctrine postulates a pro-active, aggressive, and offensive strategy in pursuit of decisive victory on enemy territory. Should we assume Pakistan as an adversary, it would imply threatening of Pakistani vital areas directly and comprehensively. This would be to capitalise on the Pakistani vulnerability of lack of depth, and our own conventional superiority. Such a doctrine, coupled with Air Force efforts as dictated by its own doctrine, can only eventuate in a nuclear response from Pakistan under the logic of 'last resort'; 'use it or lose it'; or of 'nothing to lose'.

This gives rise to three problems. One is the lowering of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan in the hope of deterring such a conventional thrust. Second is the pre-emptive employment of its nuclear capability by Pakistan in order to negate the launch of the Indian offensive. Last is the usage of the nuclear weapons on military targets in own territory in order to redress the conventional imbalance. This may take the form of a shot-across-the-bow or the 'greenfield' option. Of these, the last will be legally and morally justifiable; the second is less so but is not entirely unreasonable; and the first is certainly unexceptionable. In short, we have handed Pakistan a fair case for retrospective justification of nuclear use.

The nuclear conundrum is however of a higher order. In the face of such Pakistani action, we will be required to make good on our dIND declaration of intent of unleashing 'unacceptable damage' on receipt of a nuclear attack. We have also included a nuclear attack on our Forces as trigger. In such straits as outlined, India

will not be able to make good on its promise. In effect, the threat lacks credibility not only for the absence of justification, but also because we will be self-deterred from escalating. In technical jargon, Pakistan will enjoy escalation dominance. It will enable conflict termination on favourable terms for Pakistan, as international pressure will then be both swift and sure.

The conundrum, therefore, is in our inability to distinguish between 'first strike' and 'first use'. Whereas 'unacceptable damage' in return for 'first strike' is credible, against 'first use' it is less so. Causing 'unacceptable damage' is comprehensible only if the enemy is denied like satisfaction in revenge. This can only be through an attempt at a successful 'first strike' against the enemy's 'first use'. There being no guarantee of 'success', 'unacceptable damage' to own assets is not unlikely. It is this that makes Pakistani 'first use' viable, while denying the same status to our formulation. By no means is there a certainty of 'first use' being as a 'first strike'. Indeed, the contrary is likely to be true.

This explains Pakistani reservations on our 'no first use' offer, besides the fact that their interpretation of deterrence is wider than ours. For them it is to deter war itself, and not merely an opponent's use of nuclear weapons. For us, it is to deter nuclear use, since, as the Army doctrine indicates, our superiority convinces us of continued utility of the military as a political instrument.

In summary of the argument made thus far, it may be said that our doctrinal efforts have in one fell swoop negated both our conventional and nuclear advantage. Military action, at the conventional level, would invite Pakistani nuclear response. However, Pakistani nuclear use, by no means, implies a carte blanche for our nuclear forces. The conundrum, therefore, will arise when Pakistan takes ample care in nuclear targeting so as to constrict our nuclear options. The point is that having caused 'unacceptable damage' is no consolation for ending up as a recipient of the same.

### **The Solution**

The need clearly is to move beyond independent, institutionally espoused, doctrines. It is not solely the task of the NSC, with its

own dIND being but one more doctrine in need of integration. Given the lacunae dwelt on already, two aspects, in terms of the direction of evolution, need highlighting. With regard to the Army doctrine, it is to rethink the *sine qua non* of the political utility of military force. In so far as the dIND goes, it is to repeat history in moving beyond the hint of 'massive retaliation' in it, in favour of 'flexible response'.

First let's take the Army and its doctrine. Its professional concern of furnishing and delivering on the extreme option of high intensity conventional conflict in pursuit of a political objective needs to be diluted. Even if nuclearisation of a conflict is taken as a 'last resort', and there is no guarantee of this being so, a quest for 'decisive victory' may be counter-productive. Thus the 'go for it' 'once and for all' thinking in the Army has to be resensitised to the Clausewitz thesis. Nuclearisation compels Limited War. From the Army's push to call the nuclear bluff of Pakistan during the Kargil crisis, it is not certain whether the qualitative change weaponisation begets has been registered. Reliance on in-conflict deterrence is not a sane option for a government to take.

The second prescriptive feature is with regard to the dIND threat of 'unacceptable damage'. While there are other problems with this draft, informed by economics and the perception-misperception theory, here only the aspect of 'the nuclear conundrum' is discussed.

Once our Forces have been stalled by the nuclear card within Pakistan, the scenario will be one of heightened pressure. This will spring not only from the Army, unwilling to fight from a position of disadvantage, but also from the mob. Taking the conflict to its logical conclusion will be both a tempting and a daunting proposition. We will have been denied the justification for inflicting 'unacceptable damage'. Given that 'unacceptable damage' would be in a setting when the Armies are toe-to-toe, possibly in high density population areas, the legal, moral, and military viability of the same would have become questionable. Thus, there is a need to move beyond the avatar of 'massive retaliation', that the dIND has proposed.

Massive Retaliation was in place when the superiority of the US over the USSR was unassailable. After the scare of the missile-gap in the late fifties, evolution towards the 'flexible response'

formulation of McNamara took place. It would appear India needs to make the transition quicker. Such a step does not detract from the other plank in our doctrine - that of 'no first use'. In short, the doctrine need not be verbally bellicose as now but be unmistakable about our being released from our 'no first use' commitment in the face of a nuclear attack. Since our intent of causing 'unacceptable damage' in return is credible only in case our population centres and nuclear-industrial concentrations are hit, inclusion of military forces as targets that will invite such response makes it less credible. Since response should be proportionate and discriminatory, a progressively punitive response through target prioritisation needs to be done.

Therefore, our manner of utilising our nuclear capability would need to be situation-specific, so as to best serve our national interest involved in those straits. The ambiguity beyond this formulation, in terms of contingency planning, itself contributes to deterrence. In this direction must the draft evolve in order to get state imprimatur.

### Conclusion

The doctrinal dialectic thus far has had this trajectory: in order to keep the LIC within sub-tolerance threshold, India requires a viable conventional capability; in order to redress the conventional imbalance, Pakistan deems it requires a nuclear deterrent; in order to prevent operational employment of the Pakistani nuclear capability, the dIND posits 'unacceptable damage'. Having seen its credibility as suspect, it is imperative that we move beyond it.

This can only be possible when the doctrines are integrated. The present versions are only a 'take-off' point and, in that limited sense, serve a purpose. Given that they are of institutional origin, any evolution may witness institutional conflict. Here political attention and input will be necessary in taking further formulation beyond the bureaucratic confines of the NSC, into the realm of parliament, the strategic community and the public - as indeed befits a democratic polity.

# The Muslim World and Globalisation

## PART I

LT GEN ERIC A VAS, PVSM (RETD)

**M**uslims make up one-sixth of the world's population. They form the majority population in more than 30 countries. They form 20 per cent of the Indian population. For these reasons alone no major government, and least of all India's, can afford to ignore the world of Islam. Many cliches about Muslims and their political beliefs are repeated endlessly by some observers, but virtually none, including the favourite one that Muslims refuse to accept any distinction between the realm of religion and the realm of politics, stands up to historical reflection. Muslims reside in a world of independent states, and these states are composed of groups with competing domestic and international interests, as well as cultural diversity.

The aim of this paper is to examine how Islam, as practiced in a global environment, varies widely by social class, regions and political systems when responding to globalisation.

### MISCONCEPTIONS AND REALITIES

The world community of Muslims [the *ummah*] is an abstraction, not a cohesive political force. The overwhelming majority of Muslims do not support or join Islamist movements and do not favour any single interpretation of Islam and its dictates. When any world power is palpably insensitive to the suffering of Muslims, a momentary consensus can be catalysed. But episodes where global outrage comes to the surface are rare, because Muslim states are often divided among themselves.

Islam was a dynamic force for social change in the 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Centuries. Thereafter, for various reasons, the Muslim wave lost its impetus. In 1899, Qasim Amin, an Egyptian writer, published a seminal treatise blaming his society's backwardness on its oppression of women. Hundred years later, we find that in a majority

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of Muslim societies discriminatory laws continue to bolster patriarchal attitudes and hold women back from political, professional and personal advancement. Those who attempt social reforms are accused by fundamentalists of bowing to Western notions of femininity. However, female education is slowly improving throughout the Muslim world and changes are taking place.

The revolution in Iran has captured the imagination of a large number of Muslims, and has revived the idea of Islam as a resurgent force. This has also become an *idée fixe* of some Western foreign policy establishments. However, Iran represents the Shiite faction of Islam, which historically has always opposed the Sunni orthodox followers of Islam. Anyway, we are too near events and should guard against exaggerating the significance of the Iranian Revolution or predicting the emergence of another coherent Islamic political wave.

Like any other state, Muslim majority countries display three distinct but interrelated levels of politics: at the domestic, inter-state and international levels. Each of these merits discussion. At the domestic level, like other regions of the world, Muslim majority states are seeing a rising level of popular dissatisfaction. Domestic pressures result in political parties often exploiting Islam to maintain the consent of the governed. Political parties, which call themselves Islamists, adopt radical tactics with a greater emphasis on Islamic symbolism in the hope of winning popular support. They claim that "Islam is the only solution" to the ills plaguing their societies. Although this may prove to be a debatable proposition on examination, many Muslims prefer the untested promises of the Islamists to the demonstrated failures of the ruling party.

Presently, there is disagreement in the Muslim world on the wisdom of permitting Islamists to enter the political system. The debate centres around the basic question in democratic theory: is it possible to create a democracy without democrats? Those who oppose the Islamists argue that there is a cultural precondition for democracy, including individualism, civility and willingness to compromise in the interest of harmony, and that Islamists lack these basic essential qualifications. Islamists should therefore be



kept out since they seek to subvert democracy and impose a fundamentalist-type dictatorship. It is claimed that it is impossible to organise a society where secular and religious rules can live side by side. It is a choice between one or the other. An analogy is made with communism and capitalism. Both these systems cannot exist together in one country, so whenever one is in control it tries to suppress the other. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Algeria, challenges from reform-minded Islamist opposition movements are treated with suspicion and in some cases repressed.

Others claim that an opportunity to share power will moderate the views of the fundamentalists. They argue that democracy is a problem-solving system, and that democrats evolve over time as people become habituated to the rules of the game. Historical evidence suggests that when Islamist movements have been permitted to function within the rules of the game, they adhere to them and are no less democratic than any other human society. In Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and Yemen, Islamist parties are accepted as legitimate participants in the political system.

At the state-to-state level, political pragmatism often overrules idealistic Islamic rhetoric. Iran provided a good example of this. In 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emphasised that interests of the state precede the interests of Islam. Thereafter, Iran has tilted dramatically towards Christian Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan, even though the Azeri people are, like the Iranians, almost entirely Shiite Muslims. This reflects Iran's interest in curtailing any irredentist ambitions on the part of Azerbaijan towards the contiguous Azeri regions of Iran, which is far more compelling than the ideal of solidarity among Muslims. We can expect that the foreign policies of Muslim states will be influenced more by geopolitics than by Islamic values.

At the international level, an idea that once dominated the political consciousness of all Arabs was the hope of pan-Arabism, which postulated the existence of a single Arab Nation behind the facade of a multiplicity of sovereign states. At the height of its influence, under the charismatic leadership of President Nasser of Egypt, the rallying cry "one Arab Nation with an immortal mission"



attracted wide Arab support. Pan-Arabism made individual Arab regimes look like petty nations headed by selfish rulers who resisted the sweeping mission of Arabism because they were sustained by outside powers who feared the one idea that could resurrect the classical age of Arabs. But by the mid-1960s, pan-Arabism was on the defensive. By the end of the 1970s, it no longer attracted the support of the Arabs. Today, the concept of several independent Arab nations prevails.

A pan-Islamic movement has never prospered because relations between some of the key players are invariably strained. Former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's fantasy of a global Islamic alliance quickly became a target for derision in Turkey. Today, such forums as the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) reveal the complexity of the Muslim world. When representatives of Muslim states meet periodically, diffused Islamic themes are proclaimed by Sunnis, Shias, reformers, moderates, revolutionaries and hard-line extremists. All, however, condemn any form of terrorism.

Five avowedly "Islamic states" now exist. Of these, Saudi Arabia is a close ally of the US and a major consumer of US arms exports; Pakistan has been an anti-communist ally of the US during the Cold War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Iran and Sudan have proclaimed radical objectives. Afghanistan is dominated by the Taliban, a fundamentalist militia group. Each of these five countries has, at times, demonstrated missionary zeal for exporting its distinctive Islamic model of governance. These efforts sometimes pose a challenge to their neighbours, and American and Western interests.

### THE SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBALISATION

Satellite communications, personal computers and the Internet have created an international technological community. The spread of this net is being accelerated each month. The entire Industrial Revolution enhanced productivity by a factor of about a hundred, but the Microelectronic Revolution has already enhanced productivity in information-based technology by a factor of more than a million

— and the end is not yet in sight. Globalisation implies industrialisation, the spread of knowledge, commerce, individual communications through electronic mail (e-mail), trade and an unprecedented exchange of cultural values (food, dress and language). Not everyone finds the prospect of globalisation appealing. Anti-technologists make a compelling case for the damage and dangers that have accompanied industrialisation. Their arguments are subtle and carefully developed and they gather quite a following among intellectuals, anarchists, violent extremists, environmentalists and humanists. Their appeal somewhat resembles the Gandhian approach to industrialisation. Persuasive expositions are made of the psychological alienation, social dislocation and environmental injury done to a country by the spread of technology. They further argue that an industrial society undermines individualism, freedom and democracy because modern technology and globalisation results in a unified system in which all parts are dependent on one another. Unfortunately the solution proposed by anti-technologists to give up the pursuit of technology and revert to simple living is just not feasible, because technological change, like any other evolutionary change, cannot be ignored or prevented.

Some recommend that governments should get rid of the "bad" parts of technology and retain only the "good" parts. A little reflection will tell us that this is rarely possible. "Take modern medicine for example. Progress in medical science depends on progress in chemistry, physics, biology, computer science and other fields. Advanced medical treatments require expensive, high-tech equipment that can be made available only by a technologically progressive, economically rich society. Clearly you can't have much progress in medicine without the whole technological system and every thing that goes with it."

The material gains of technology and globalisation are obvious: economic advantage, the shaping of material resources to meet many desired needs, the extension of our life spans, improvements in health and so on. It is these material gains that seduce societies down the path of globalisation. Few realise that apart from visible material gains, the primary though less apparent gain is opportunity to expand human personalities, extend learning and advance the

ability to create and understand knowledge as a spiritual quest – an essential step for the survival of the species. Perceptive anti-technologists recognise this dilemma.

Pro-technologists accept that the advance of technology is not automatically beneficial and mankind may some day ultimately regret its technological path. But they argue that although the risks are real, since the accelerated growth of technology is unavoidable, one might as well make a virtue of necessity, face the risks and benefit from the potential gains. Wise political leaders must ensure that technology is adopted in a phased and controlled manner, so that psychological alienation, social dislocation and environmental damage is kept to a minimum, and so that the spiritual gains rather than the material gains are kept at the forefront of political planning.

### A CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS

The United States of America dominates the world's business, commerce and communications. Its economy is the world's most successful. Its military might is second to none. America's industrialised position as the leading global power results in the spread of its economic and cultural values, and makes it a key factor in the process of globalisation. Many non-governmental organisations from industrialised nations oppose globalisation. This was evident during the meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in November 1999 where the US was trying to gain support for a new global trade policy. There were militant demonstrations on the streets of Seattle by an unusual coalition of trade unions, greens, anarchists, anti-technologists and even consumer groups with a single clear aim: to derail the talks and disrupt global governance. The protesters said that WTO's rules advance big companies' global ambitions at the expense of jobs and the environment. They also attacked the WTO for being secretive and unaccountable. The demonstrators sincerely believed that they were on the side of the poor, and against multinationals, international conglomerates, exploitation and pollution.

Seattle represented a high point of globalisation in general and free trade in particular. Those in favour of globalisation reminded

the delegates that the economic benefits of globalisation, which the world has enjoyed in recent years, cannot be taken for granted. Technology and globalisation cannot be avoided and must therefore be nurtured wisely, so that it leads to greater prosperity and becomes a means to improve working conditions and the environment. During formal meetings, India urged that the WTO confine its deliberations to trade issues and avoid the linkage of human rights and labour laws which are better dealt with by specialised UN agencies that are structured to debate such matters. Though no consensus could be achieved, the summit has provoked a rational debate on globalisation. The airing of differences has bred a sense of international responsibility towards the lesser industrialised nations, and has prepared the ground for the next WTO meet at Geneva.

All admitted that globalisation was unavoidable. The gains, which it brings of greater openness, faster growth, cheaper exports, new technologies, and the spur of foreign competition can create losers who naturally dislike the change. Shutting off parts of the world from free trade is no answer to this problem. The concerns of the disadvantaged should not be dismissed but should be alleviated by compassionate planning. Delegates have come to realise that globalisation must embrace a vision of a world in which hunger, poverty and economic exploitation are eradicated. India, which for four decades had pursued policies of anti-globalisation in order to protect its growing industrial base, has now begun to embrace globalisation.

However, many continue to fear the process of globalisation. Protesters are to be found in every country throughout the world. This paper will confine itself to the Muslim world where many envy American power and at the same time fear it. This offers an irresistible temptation for some Muslim politicians to mobilise anti-Western [American] support whenever they face a crisis. Thus in 1998, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, when faced with the collapse of the Malaysian economy, assailed American influence in the International Monetary Fund [IMF]. He also blamed the greed of Western financiers and asserted that their manipulations of the currency market was the root cause of Malaysia's ills.

Many Muslim leaders aspire to surmount the economic and social difficulties that afflict their societies by adopting a twin approach: firstly attempting to insulate themselves from economic globalisation and Western culture, and secondly searching for an Islamic solution. (This is very much like Hindu extremists seeking a swadeshi solution to India's economic problems.) Hassan Hanafi, a distinguished Egyptian Islamic scholar, described globalisation as the "new colonialism." He accepts that globalisation and modernisation have their benefits, but he is committed to sustaining the uniqueness of his society. This is in marked contrast to China's attitude of an overwhelming national desire to modernise and reform its economy. Thus, at the international level, friendship with the US becomes a primary Chinese foreign policy goal in order to facilitate technological transfers. At the domestic level, there is an overwhelming passion among teenagers to learn the Roman script, English, and become computer literate.

The problem facing any developing country is how to reap the benefits of science, technology and globalisation without disrupting the social fabric or undermining the country's values on the altar of free market capitalism. There is no single Islamic solution to this dilemma any more than there is a Hindu or Christian answer. The process of evolution and change cannot be avoided. Good leadership can ensure that the process is not too painful by helping a society to modernise wisely.

American officials take pains to emphasise that the US Government does not view Islam in adversarial terms, except when Muslims engage in terrorism or seek to undermine US peace objectives. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the US is frequently viewed by a wide cross-section of Muslims with scepticism if not enmity. The popular Turkish Islamist writer Mustapha Ozel has written extensively on the theme of the Islamic world as a great culture. Ozel is unabashed in his view of the US as an adversary of Islam. Harvard University professor Samuel P Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations* depicts the Muslim world as a growing behemoth, destined to clash with the West. This view is not supported by US foreign policy makers and has been strenuously repudiated by President Bill Clinton who in a public

speech to the Jordanian Parliament in 1994 said that "there are those who insist that.....there are impassable religious and other obstacles to harmony; that our beliefs and our cultures must somehow eventually clash...America refuses to accept that our civilizations must collide." Nevertheless, Huntington's idea of an Islamic front persists in many Western minds. The Secretary General of NATO accepted that thesis in the mid-1990s when he pointed to the Islamic challenge as the major threat confronting the West [NATO].

Few Muslim governments qualify as democracies. Given the declared US policy of promoting the development of democracy, Washington is often silent on the question of democracy in the Muslim world, especially in West Asia. This leads many to accuse the US of double standards when it comes to protecting their oil interests. US human rights policy intersects with the promotion of democracy. Few Muslim governments enjoy favourable assessments of their observance of human rights. Muslim reformers accuse the US of not wanting to promote human rights out of fear of eroding the legitimacy of states that are friendly to the US. They claim that this was exemplified by the impact of President Jimmy Carter's advocacy of human rights on the Shah of Iran. However, the example of the fall of the Shah should not be seen in simplistic terms since this regime was weakened on many different fronts, not the least being a general deterioration in the Iranian economy and the Shah's unfortunate tendency of surrounding himself with sycophants.

Having briefly discussed some of the myths and realities prevailing in the Muslim world, the dilemma leaders face in dealing with the pressures of modernisation and globalisation, and the reason why some Muslim states fear the rise of Islamist groups, it will be interesting to examine how all these factors influence the domestic politics and inter-state relations in key Muslim states. This is best done region-wise.

### **WEST AND CENTRAL ASIA**

No Muslim state is viewed with more suspicion in American policy circles than the Islamic Republic of Iran. Despite continued

US attempts to contain its influence and restrain its power, Iran has not only maintained a flourishing trade with Europe, India and Japan, but has also normalised its diplomatic ties with most states in the Persian Gulf region. Although it no longer stalks its intellectual adversaries and political opponents around the globe, and plots their murder, it supports the Hezbollah's war of resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. It expresses enmity for Israel and condemns the US-sponsored peace process in West Asia.

Hatred for the US government has been the cornerstone of the Iranian Revolution. Rightly or wrongly, many Iranians believe that US hostility towards Iran stems from America's unwillingness to accept Islam as the central premise of the Iranian Republic. The presidential victory of Mohammed Khatami in 1997 represents a new phase in the political evolution of Iran. It has opened up scope for dialogue with the US. Khatami, in an interview with CNN in early 1998, called for interaction with American teachers, athletes, artists and intellectuals. However, any progress towards better US-Iranian relations will have a low priority on Khatami's foreign policy agenda as long as his domestic reforms continue to be fiercely resisted by hardliners.

To the north of Iran lie the five land-locked Muslim states of Central Asia, which are rich in natural resources. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan has emerged as the dominant state in the region. It hopes to retain its secular character in the face of intrusions by fundamentalist groups based in Afghanistan. Iran is keen that Central Asia remains a stable region and becomes its major trading partner. It has begun constructing railway and oil pipelines from its northern borders with Central Asia to its southern port cities. These long-term plans can some day alter the economic balance of power in the Gulf region.

To the east of Iran lies Afghanistan. Over two-thirds of the country has been occupied by the Pakistan-backed Taliban militia, including Kabul. This Pushtun-speaking group of fundamentalists is being opposed by northern non-Pushtun speaking Afghan groups. The Taliban Government has been recognised only by Saudi Arabia,



Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. Iran brands the extremist conduct of the Taliban as "un-Islamic". India backs UN efforts to arrange an agreement that will facilitate the formation of an all-party government in Kabul and put an end to hostilities. Meanwhile, Taliban-occupied areas of Afghanistan have become a haven for a variety of Islamic terrorist groups. The UN and the US have imposed sanctions on the Taliban for failing to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial for terrorist attacks against US embassies in Saudi Arabia and Kenya. The US would welcome a stable Afghanistan so that it could become an outlet for the rich resources of Central Asia through Pakistan.

Iran and its western neighbour, Iraq, recently fought a long and inconclusive war. This was followed by Iraq's disastrous occupation of Kuwait. After defeating Iraq, the UN imposed sanctions on it. Iraq continues to be subjected to air attacks by US war planes whenever it violates the no-flying zones to the north and south of Baghdad. Reports of infant mortality rates and general misery in Iraq because of the sanctions are only sporadically reflected in the US media, but are constantly reported in the Muslim world. US officials argue that the sanctions, placed by the UN Security Council, persist because of Saddam Hussein's obstructionism of UN resolutions. Many do not accept this argument. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has said the US will not permit the lifting of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein rules in Baghdad. This deepens cynicism about the purpose of sanctions against Iraq.

Underlying the suspicion of America's motives is a wide perception that the West, exemplified by the US, applies double standards when the rights of Muslims are threatened. Few Muslims are willing to admit that the sustained US-led NATO air bombardment of Christian Serbia in support of the rights of Muslim Kosovars reflects US [Western] even-handedness. No matter how uneasy the Muslim world may be about the plight of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, conflicting political views have left it without a clear unified opinion on Kosovo. Libya and Iraq, who have been at the receiving end of US bombing raids, were quick to condemn NATO. Egypt and Jordan have made a gesture of support for NATO's



action in Kosovo. Syria criticised the strikes as lacking UN Security Council endorsement. Yasser Arafat confined himself to saying that he hoped that NATO's actions would yield a positive result, but Palestinian students demonstrated against Yugoslavia. Saudi Arabia condemned Serbia's actions in Kosovo as "a criminal matter" about which the world should not remain silent. Iran reacted cautiously and expressed deep regret over the human catastrophe and the tyranny on Kosovo Muslims.

### AFRICA

Egypt is one of the states friendly to the US. In December 1995, President Hosni Mubarak's government made a mockery of free elections by permitting opposition candidates to win a mere 14 of the 456 parliamentary seats. The election evoked no more than a diplomatic "frown" from the US, to which the Egyptian Government paid no notice.

In October 1999, after his 18-year rule, the President carried out a wide-ranging shuffle. He appointed one of his longer-serving ministers, Atef Obeid, as Prime Minister. Obeid named a 33-member cabinet, a third of whose members are new to government. (Some of the outgoing members had been functioning longer than Mr Mubarak himself.) A number of presidentially appointed posts from provincial governorships to chairmanships of state agencies also changed hands. The President has issued a series of stern policy directives to the new appointees, demanding stricter standards of honesty, greater openness and more concern for the poor. The new prime minister, while accepting the job, declared that he intends to allow ministers the freedom to pursue their own goals. He also spoke of cultivating second- and third-tier officials for future leadership, something that Egypt's hyper-hierarchical administrative structure has historically rejected. Mr Obeid says that he intends to accelerate the process of economic reform and privatise industries such as telecommunications and banking.

The Islamist Left has described the shake-up as "an IMF-sponsored coup d'etat". Most Egyptians do not agree with this leftist view, but many feel that these changes are irrelevant. The

case of the new ministers, mostly grey-suited technocrats in their 60s, looks little different from previous teams. Moreover, however well-intended the changes may be, the fact that the public at large had so little part in making it has begun to rankle.

In Sudan, there has been a long-standing dispute between the northern (Muslim) ruling government and the southern (Christian) rebels over the question of power-sharing. Ten years ago, at the height of the civil war between the North and South's rebel Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), a military coup deposed Sadiq el Mahdi, leader of the then ruling Umma Party, and brought the National Islamic Front (NIF) to power. Omar Hassan Al-Bashir took over as President. The deposed Umma Party and other Muslim dissidents joined the SPLA to form a National Democratic Alliance. Over the years, Hassan Turabi, an Islamic philosopher, emerged as the strongman and head of the ruling NIF with the proclaimed aim of creating an Islamic State. Repression by the NIF has failed to break the loyalty of most Sudanese to the old established sectarian parties, notably the Umma Party, or regional and ethnic groupings.

Although the SPLA claims to be fighting for a unified secular democratic Sudan, a majority of its members are separatists at heart. El Mahdi and his colleagues consider secularism akin to atheism. This has created a rift in the NDA. Madeleine Albright has reaffirmed US backing for a unified secular democratic Sudan. In early 1999, President Bashir signalled the government's readiness to talk to the SPLA. Two peace initiatives, one involving Libya and Egypt, and the other a US-backed forum of East African states, got under way to end the conflict. At the same time, Turabi met Sadiq el Mahdi in a bid to wean some of the Muslim conservatives from the NDA to the government's side. He believed that if el Mahdi and other Muslim leaders aligned with the NIF it would isolate the SPLA, which would then have to sue for peace. In fact, an Islamic coalition would probably strengthen separatist sentiment in the south.

Meanwhile, there were signs of increasing friction between the President and Turabi who was planning to introduce

constitutional amendments to curb the president's powers. On 13 December, President Al-Bashir declared a state of emergency for three months. He dissolved parliament in a move to thwart legislation that would have reduced his powers. He said that the election authority would set a date for a new national assembly election. If a fair election is held, it is estimated that the NIF would not get much more than 5 per cent of the vote, which is what it had won at the last multi-party contest in 1986. Whatever the outcome of the elections, it is evident that the Sudanese Army and the rebel SPLA are both exhausted by a war that has dragged on for more than 16 years. There is general agreement that neither side can win outright. There appears to be no alternative to settling differences, accepting pluralism and forming a secular government if the unity of Sudan is to be preserved.

Nigeria, like Sudan, consists of a predominantly Muslim north and a more pluralistic but largely Christian south. The massacre of thousands of Christian Igbos in northern Nigeria in 1966 was one of the factors that led to the Biafran Civil War. President Obusgun Obasanjo who came to office under a new constitution after more than 15 years of military rule is an enthusiastic born-again Christian of the Yoruba tribe.

Zamfara is a rural and obscure state in northern Nigeria. Its capital, Gusau, has a small Christian population composed of Igbo and Yoruba migrants from the South who live peacefully in an overwhelmingly Muslim state. In September 1999, the newly elected Governor of Zamfara, Ahmed Sani, dropped a bombshell by announcing the introduction of Islamic law [*sharia*]. He said that he intends to enforce this law strictly, as in Saudi Arabia, which means that thieves could have their hands amputated and people caught drinking could be flogged. He argues that this will reduce crime and restore morality to a corrupt and wayward society. He says that Zamfara's Christians will not be affected as they remain under the jurisdiction of the existing legal code.

*Sharia* courts were slated to go into operation in January 2000 to allow time for judges to be trained in Saudi Arabia. But, even before, the new policies began to have an effect. It became

impossible to buy alcohol in Gusau. Boys and girls are soon to be educated in separate schools, and men and women began to travel in separate buses. Mr Sani has said that only men with beards will be awarded government contracts. Christians across Nigeria have reacted with outrage at Sani's declarations. Some say, "The *sharia* will surely affect us, because we are a part of the state." Others, less tactfully, say, "How can we allow this nonsense at the dawn of a new millennium?" Muslim leaders have either welcomed the change or chosen to remain silent. A prominent northern politician said, "People can't openly oppose this thing. If you do, you will open yourself to the accusation that you are un-Islamic."

Mr Sani is on uncertain legal grounds. The Nigerian Constitution does have a provision for the introduction of *sharia* but restricts its authority to family law, such as divorce and inheritance. The Governor argues that the fundamental right to freedom of worship, which is in the constitution, justifies the introduction of Islamic law and that "without it, Islam has no value." Ironically, the most prominent dissenting voice from the North has been that of Nigeria's outspoken Islamic radical, Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zak Zaky, a Shia Muslim. He believes in a theocratic state, but draws inspiration from the Iranian model. He derides Sani's attempts to justify his actions within the terms of the existing legal framework. President Obasanjo has decided to say nothing in public for the present. Any public condemnation of Islamic law would inflame passions. Moreover, quite apart from the religious aspect, many would feel he is favouring his own Yoruba people at the expense of Nigeria's other ethnic groups.

(To be concluded)

# The Role of the United Nations in the Changing World Order

## PART II

RAMESH THAKUR

### Reforms

UN operations are conducted essentially within the framework of a Charter signed almost half a century ago. The time is long overdue to consider substantial reforms which would realign the organisation with present-day realities. Of the major UN organs, the Council reflects the anticipated power realities of 1945, the Assembly can be wordy, tedious and ineffective, and the Secretariat is — or at least was — demoralised and dogged by outdated personnel and management practices. Patronage ruled, quality suffered.

#### *Security Council*

The Security Council bears the chief responsibility for maintaining international peace and is the only body with the power to make binding decisions for all member-states. But it remains a prisoner of the past in its permanent membership. This needs addressing for three reasons. Firstly in terms of the logic of permanent membership: international stratification is never rigid, and states are upwardly and downwardly mobile. A static permanent membership of the Security Council will undermine the logic of the status, thereby diminish the authority of the organisation and breed resentment in the claimants to the ranks of the great powers.

Second, it is unfortunate that the permanent membership is co-terminous with the five nuclear-weapons powers of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The possession of nuclear weapons

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does not automatically confer the status of great power. India, Pakistan and Israel are de facto nuclear-weapons states, but not permanent members of the Security Council. The severance of the link between possession of nuclear weapons and permanent membership of the Security Council could be reinforced by admitting a non-nuclear-weapon state, for example Japan, as a permanent member. And the break would be completed if one of the present permanent members renounced nuclear weapons, since all of them have preached to India and Pakistan that nuclear weapons confer neither security nor prestige.

Third, the Security Council is no longer representative even of the changed numbers and character of UN membership. At inception, there were 51 UN members and 11 Security Council members. Today there are 185 UN members but only 15 Security Council members: an increase of 262 and 36 percent respectively. Moreover, the overwhelming bulk of the new members have come from the developing world, which now finds itself quite under-represented at the high table of UN decision making in the Security Council.

Defenders of the status quo might respond that the Security Council is organised on the principles of responsibility and capacity, not representativeness. The principle of equitable geographical representation has sometimes been brought into disrepute by the manner and extent of its application. Yet the principle is essential to the philosophy of the organisation and adds to its legitimacy. Britain, France and Germany could not all be permanent members of the Security Council: Europe would be grossly over-represented, Asia under-represented, Africa and Latin America not represented at all. The world community may have to address the question of the unit of UN membership. Perhaps regional organisations like the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) could be given permanent membership of the Security Council instead of three European and no African states. An alternative would be to create a third tier of permanent but veto-less Security Council membership for countries like Brazil, India and Nigeria. Or the prohibition on immediate re-election could be lifted. Whatever formula is adopted, the challenge will be to combine the efficiency

and representational arguments: membership of the Council must reflect current global power relationships but not be so large as to make it an unwieldy executive body.

With regard to the wide range of action permitted to and possible for the Security Council after the Cold War, one of the most important measures was Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 (the Gulf ceasefire resolution). It sought to impose binding and unilaterally defined restrictions on Iraq after the Gulf War, and was testimony to the Council's ambitions as the guarantor of international peace and security. Equally, however, the US-UK air strikes against Iraq in December 1998, with the public disagreements between the five permanent members of the Security Council, followed by the allegations in the New Year that the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) may have facilitated US espionage against the Iraqi regime, mark a low tide in the affairs of the Security Council since the end of the Cold War.

#### *Secretariat and Secretary-General*

The UN Secretary-General — and only he — is the embodiment of the international interest and the custodian of the world's conscience. The discretionary authority vested in the Secretary-General by Article 99 linked the chief executive of the organisation constitutionally and symbolically to the central ideal of the United Nations. The failure of the principal political organs to function as originally envisaged placed a disproportionate burden on the shoulders of the Secretary-General. As a result the office became one with little power but considerable influence. The chief executive of the organisation came to symbolise as well as represent the United Nations as the embodiment of the international community and the custodian of the world's conscience. In turn this enhanced the importance of the qualities required of Secretaries-General: integrity, independence of mind and the ability and willingness to set the collective interest of the United Nations above the partisan interests of member-states. The Secretary-General is expected to provide intellectual leadership, managerial ability, negotiating skill and, in an age of mass communications, the ability to establish a rapport with an international audience. He or she



must know when to take the initiative in order to force an issue and when to maintain a tactful silence; when courage is required and when discretion is advised; and when commitment to the UN vision must be balanced by a sense of proportion and humour.

The process of selecting Secretaries-General has been haphazard and ad hoc. The General Assembly appoints a Secretary-General on the advice of the Security Council; 'appointment' supposedly stresses the administrative, while 'election' would have suggested a more clearly political role. The Council vote is subject to veto by a permanent member. This immediately changes the thrust from selecting someone who commands the widest following to someone who is least unacceptable to the major powers. The permanent members do not look with favour on activist candidates for fear of too vigorous a scrutiny of their own actions in world affairs. Undue deference to the major powers by a Secretary-General is reinforced if the incumbent should be interested in re-election. Even other governments would not generally wish a Secretary-General to oppose them publicly. As US Ambassador Max Finger put it, member-states want 'excellence within the parameters of political reality' of their Secretary-General.<sup>5</sup>

The people would probably prefer excellence within the parameters of human reality. One former Secretary-General was said to be proof against every occasion of the larger kind. Another was reputed to be so self-effacing that he would not make waves even if he fell out of a boat. The Secretary-General is the chief symbol of international authority, advocate of law and rights, general manager of the global agenda and a focal point in setting the direction of world affairs. Some of the built-in disadvantages of the office can be overcome by altering the term from five to seven years, making it non-renewable and systematising the practice of choosing a successor by establishing a search group composed of a cross-section of Security Council members. The procedure could also be exempted from the veto. Parochial considerations will always shape the choice of a Secretary-General. But political calculations should not dominate the process of selecting someone for the only truly representative office of the world.

The contemporary international system is required to cope



with problems which are global and deeply interconnected: ecological degradation, international drug trafficking, AIDS and the international trade in arms. In order to avoid becoming irrelevant to contemporary needs and to the demands being placed on it, the organisation needs to strengthen its institutional capacity to manage the global commons.

### *Peacekeeping*

Peacekeeping is one of the most visible of UN activities. Yet its nature has been changing with a more political orientation and a more comprehensive range of responsibilities in recent years. In the absence of a clear Charter basis to peacekeeping, there is a temptation to characterise the Security Council's power to organise peacekeeping operations as inherent, implied, general or assumed. The most important codification of current practice would be to enact a new clause giving constitutional sanction to UN peacekeeping. The advantages of UN peacekeeping are the organisation's accumulated experience and its proven structures for establishing and managing such operations. But there is room for improvement. Each peacekeeping venture has to be started from scratch and each faces a cash-flow problem.

The United Nations was designed to cope with interstate war. Repelling or reversing a clearcut cross-border aggression of one state by another, such as of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, is one of the few 'bottom lines' in international affairs. Founded on the principle of national sovereignty, the UN is ill-equipped to cope with civil conflict.<sup>6</sup> Yet the disputes clamouring for UN attention, such as in Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia are almost all domestic.

'Second generation' operations have expanded the roles of peacekeeping to include humanitarian assistance and electoral supervision. These require more military personnel, civilian police and technical experts. But humanitarian, electioneering and enforcement measures by the UN face distinctive difficulties in civil wars. Most civil conflicts have deep historical roots and are characterised by broad and mutual suspicions based on past

traumatic experiences. UN intervention in sectarian strife must accordingly acknowledge the prospect of an indefinite commitment. To be effective in a peacekeeping role, the UN must negotiate with all significant sectarian leaders. But in doing so, the UN endows them with a degree of legitimacy. In return, however, leaders of ill-disciplined and uncoordinated guerrilla groups may be unable or unwilling to honour the agreements made with the UN. Peacekeeping, by freezing a conflict, favours the status quo at the time of its deployment. This makes it more difficult for UN peacekeeping forces to stay neutral in a civil conflict than in an interstate war. Ceasefires 'in-place' might legitimise ethnic cleansing by the militarily most powerful; efforts to delay a ceasefire until territorial gains have been forcibly reversed will drag the UN into the quagmire of an internal war.

Traditional peacekeeping forces interposed lightly-armed troops to separate consenting combatants after a ceasefire. Civil wars scatter UN troops thinly over a wide geographical area. These are more vulnerable to attacks when not deployed at fixed positions in a neutral area. The result can be that the UN has to devote more time, resources and personnel to protecting its humanitarian mission than to the latter mission itself. All this explains why it is difficult to inject UN forces into active civil wars in which no government — if one exists — has invited them, the fighting forces are unwilling to cooperate with the UN forces, and there is little possibility of bringing pressure to bear on the several factions.<sup>7</sup>

One means of enhancing the deterrent effect of UN peacekeeping forces would be to interpose them between known rivals in advance of hostilities breaking out. Preventive diplomacy could be complemented with 'preventive deployment', that is the emplacement of peacekeeping missions in advance of conflicts erupting into violence. This could be done at the request of all parties in an internal conflict, or at the request of either party in an inter-state conflict.

Should the UN use force against those who would challenge its authority, as in Bosnia and Somalia? Unfortunately, the difficulties associated with the organisation, deployment and use of military

force do not disappear simply because of UN authorisation. States are reluctant to transfer control over their national armed forces to the UN because of doubts over its managerial capacity for military operations,<sup>8</sup> scepticism about its institutional capacity to police the world wisely and effectively, and the fear of creating a military monster that might one day turn against them.

The consensus on traditional peacekeeping was that peacekeepers should not have the obligation, the soldiers or the equipment to engage violators in hostilities. International peacekeeping forces express and facilitate the erstwhile belligerents' will to live in peace; they cannot supervise peace in conditions of war. Turning a peacekeeping operation into a fighting force erodes international consensus on their function, encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, converts it into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and turns it into a target of attack by rival internal factions. That is, peace-enforcement leads to 'mission creep', which in turn produces 'peacekeeping fatigue'. General Sanderson, Force Commander of UNTAC, remarks that enforcement is 'war by another name'. Without neutrality and unity, he says, 'you either go to war or go home'.<sup>9</sup> The predicament of peacekeeping soldiers on the ground is that they are unable to move forward into an unwinnable battle, unable to stay put taking casualties for no purpose, and unable to withdraw without repercussions for national foreign policies.

### **The United Nations and the United States**

The United Nations and the United States have been struggling to learn to coexist in a world in which there is only one superpower and only one general international organisation. The UN cannot embark upon any substantial venture against the wishes of the US. The peace of the world depends upon the US political wisdom and military power. Experience suggests that the US would be better advised to channel its efforts through the authoritative framework of the UN. There is wisdom and virtue in imposing the international discipline and moderating influence of the United Nations upon the exercise of American power.

Conversely, there is danger in permitting American power

calculations to be cloaked uncritically in the UN flag. Collective security under the League was a conscious substitute for systems of alliances and balance of power policies that were 'forever discredited' by the First World War. The United States has power, the United Nations has authority. Progress towards a world order based on justice and law requires that American power be harnessed to UN authority. America will be hard pressed to accomplish much if it should decide to pick and choose on the basis of narrow political calculations. Selective indignation is no basis for a sustainable international policy. A collective security system to be sustainable must be universal in the scope of its application.

### **United Nations University**

The UN's greatest strength is that it is the only universal forum for global cooperation and management. The global public goods of peace, prosperity, sustainable development and good governance cannot be achieved by any country acting on its own. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote recently, 'The United Nations with its near-universal membership, its comprehensive mandate, a span of activities that ranges from the normative to the operational, and an institutional presence that is at once global, regional, and country-based can and should be at the very center'.<sup>10</sup>

In order to do this, the world community must match the demands made on the organisation by the means given to it. The United Nations University (UNU) is the embodiment of the UN ideal with regard to the international community of scholars. Based on human solidarity and transcending national perspectives, the UNU provides and manages the framework for bringing together the world's leading scholars to tackle the pressing problems of the day for the survival, development and welfare of all human beings everywhere. Headquartered in Tokyo, our 'faculties' are located around the world: in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin and North America. The method of the UNU — research, reflection and capacity-building, especially in developing countries, through a global network of scholars, academic institutions and think tanks — distinguishes it both from other UN organisations and from other universities.

Projects supported by the UNU, without compromising the

scientific quality of the research, are comparative, drawing upon the diversity of experience and cultural perspectives that make up the UN system. The UNU exploits its comparative advantages to promote joint, network-based scholarship and training. We are ideally placed to pursue broad, comparative, inter-disciplinary and cross-cultural themes and perspectives.

The idea of force has become anathema to the modern conscience. The United Nations Charter repudiates the unilateral use of force in world affairs. The United Nations University exists to test the limits of what can be achieved through the force of ideas. Its mission is to contribute, through research and capacity building, to efforts to resolve the pressing global problems that are of concern to the United Nations and its Member States. As the think tank of the UN system, we are the conceptual and policy bridge between the worlds of ideas and praxis, of values and policy: between scholars, governments, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

### Conclusion

In the midst of the swirling tides of change, the United Nations must strive for a balance between the desirable and the possible. In Dag Hammarskjöld's words, 'the constant struggle to close the gap between aspiration and performance... makes the difference between civilization and chaos'.<sup>11</sup> The greatest strength of the United Nations is that it is the only universal forum for international cooperation and management. UN involvement is a way of internationalising an issue. Set up by agreement among states, it helps them to engage in regular patterns of consultations and to implement decisions jointly made.

The UN needs to sharpen its skills at identifying potential conflicts before the fact so that parties to disputes can be brought together during the period of infancy: disputes are much harder to resolve when they have matured to fully grown conflicts. The UN needs to become an activist organisation in regard to human rights instead of merely reacting to complaints of abuses. It also needs to become involved in post-conflict peace-building by identifying, supporting and deepening the structures which will consolidate

peace and enhance people's sense of confidence and well-being. Finally, the United Nations must continue to play a central role in establishing a normative order which strikes a balance between the competing demands of equity and justice, on the one hand, and efficacy and political reality on the other.

### Notes

5. Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, *A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarsköld Foundation, 1990), p. 18.
6. See Paul F. Diehl, 'Peacekeeping in Civil Wars', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 223-36; Adam Roberts, 'The United Nations and International Security', *Survival* 35 (Summer 1993), pp. 9-11.
7. Brian Urquhart, 'Who Can Police the World?', *New York Review of Books*, 12 May 1994, p. 29.
8. Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, the former Canadian head of UN forces in Sarajevo, made the memorable comment that a UN commander in the field should not get into trouble 'after 5 p.m. in New York, or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone'. In 1993 the UN established a 24-hour, seven days a week Situation Room that provides a direct link to its peacekeeping operations.
9. John M. Sanderson, 'The UNTAC Military Component', in Ramesh Thakur, ed., *Past Imperfect, Future UNCertain: The United Nations at Fifty* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 121, 123.
10. Kofi Annan, 'The Quiet Revolution', *Global Governance* 4 (April-June 1998), p. 127.
11. Quoted in Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p. 378.

# US Global Strategy and Asian Security

MASAHIRO AKIYAMA

In the past one-year, we have seen the US take initiative on three major security issues – Kosovo, North Korea and East Timor. With regard to Kosovo, the US operated an enormous air campaign over an extended period, although the decision of the campaign was not made by the US, but by NATO. In East Timor, the US seemed very reluctant to dispatch troops even as peacekeepers. However, it took the political initiative. In regards to North Korea, former Defense Secretary Perry's Report shows the strong US intention to maintain a patient political dialogue with North Korea.

The US is now the sole superpower after the end of the Cold War. Measures against security problems taken by the US have differed, although the US has developed a worldwide security policy with its overwhelming military power. What's more, reasons why the US has engaged in the events have also differed. Roughly speaking, the US has given the following reasons for its actions: to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; to reform the political and economic structure of Indonesia; to make North Korea give up the development of nuclear weapons.

We must understand the US national interest which constituted these different responses. From the viewpoint of national self-interest, the US is deeply interested in strengthening NATO, planting a market-oriented economy in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintaining the status quo in Northeast Asia.

The US has also been engaged in the India-Pakistan problem, specifically the nuclear policy related to these countries as well as the Middle East Peace Agenda. The US is also involved in promoting relations with Russia, China, dealing with the Taiwan problem, Iraq, Iran, Haiti, Cambodia and so on.

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US diplomatic policy is often described as an idealistic one, reminding us of freedom, human rights, democracy, market-oriented economy, etc. But the US always takes into consideration the development of its economy and the security of its country, both of which demand peace and stability, though they approve of battling against non-democratic regimes or dictatorships if necessary.

The US has a big national interest in the Asia-Pacific region from an economic and security standpoint. The maintenance of peace and stability in the region contributes to, and is indispensable for, US national interests. There are many sensitive security issues in East Asia. These include the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea, North Korea's development and deployment of missile systems, the South China Sea problem, Taiwan, East Timor, the Asian economic crisis, a strengthening China and so on.

The Japan-US security alliance has played the largest role concerning bilateral security ties between the US and other countries in the region. The US engagement in the region and its military presence have significantly contributed to East Asian stability. In reviewing their security alliance since the end of the Cold War, Japan and the US have reached the conclusion that the alliance must be maintained and strengthened for the peace and stability in the region to continue. The new security initiative was made public to the world through the Joint Security Declaration by then Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton in 1996.

The US considers South Asia as an important item in its list of Asian security issues. Also included in this agenda are Northeast Asian relations, China, and Taiwan. I would like to point out several aspects on the US security policy related to your country.

The US of course is interested in the expected strong development of the Indian economy. At this point, the US realises the importance of the political relationship between itself and India. On the other hand, the US security approach to India is somewhat complicated. The South Asia problem is directly related to nuclear policy issues, which are at the core of US security itself. Both the US and India possess nuclear weapons. The US is engaged in the



battle against the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction with a strong intention of keeping its superiority of nuclear power. I think the US is deeply concerned about the recent process of nuclear development between India and Pakistan.

The US also seems concerned about the possibility of military conflicts in South Asia. The US maintains a strategic military policy based on "Two Major Regional Conflicts." It means that the US must have the military capability to be able to take military countermeasures against two major regional level conflicts simultaneously. The US assumes that the two conflicts will be located in the Middle East and in North East Asia. I don't know how the US thinks about South Asia from that viewpoint. But we must take into consideration its security policy.

I would like to point out five security issues regarding the Asia Pacific situation. First regards the Korean peninsula situation. Last autumn, after reviewing the policy for almost one year, former US Defence Secretary Perry presented a report on the North Korea problem. The US decided to begin studying the problem in the Fall of 1998 because it suspected that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. North Korea also conducted a missile test in which it launched a missile over the Japanese archipelago. The report recommended that the US promote dialogue in a positive manner and that North Korea should agree to maintain a framework related to the development of nuclear weapons, restrain from missile tests and stop the development of long-range missiles. The US supported positive dialogue, although it stated that it might have to take a tougher course. It was very important and effective that the US, Japan and Korea held many discussions and co-ordinated efforts during the period of review. By this I mean to suggest that the process was not US unilateralism.

Second, with regard to Taiwan, President Lee's statement of "special state-to-state relations" triggered China's strong response against such a concept. Taiwan has a presidential election at the end of March, and the process is being watched not only by the US and Japan but also China. The reason is that the voters will show the attitude of the Taiwanese public towards the future of

Taiwan, particularly as it relates to China. Taiwanese have sensed the difference between the democracy of Taiwan and the communism of China, although they also have a concept for the meaning of One-China. Recently, many of them have started to feel that Taiwan is an independent culture.

The US and Japan maintain the One-China policy and hope that the problem is resolved in a peaceful manner. Direct dialogue between China and Taiwan is indispensable and we have to create an appropriate environment for them to discuss their differences. Whether or not the process goes well depends particularly on Sino-US relations. In that sense, we must watch the US presidential election race as well.

Third, the Asian economic crisis followed by the East Timor problem. Regarding East Timor, through the process of the referendum held there last summer, the international community is now endeavouring to restore peace and stability to an independent East Timor. I don't think the process has necessarily been the best or a big success. Developments after the referendum created a large tragedy in East Timor. In the past one or two years, the Indonesian political regime has been undermined too much. The Asian financial crisis triggered the collapse of the Suharto regime and many criticise the IMF pressure on Indonesia, saying that its initiatives and policies have broken the economic structure and national regime much more than necessary. Now, we must find a good solution so that Indonesia doesn't destabilise further. Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, etc, were hit hard by the Asian financial crisis. Most of them have recently recovered, but it took a lot of time and Malaysia had to take measures against IMF policy recommendations. We should study carefully these issues and processes and see how they may positively affect future policy.

At any rate, it must be noted with great wonder that the US has enjoyed historically high economic growth during these difficult times. In fact, this high growth may have contributed to the recent recovery in the region. China's maintenance of relatively high economic growth with no change in the value of the Chinese Yuan, as well as the enormous financial aid from Japan, are also recognised as important elements for Asia's financial recovery.

Fourth, there are many territorial conflicts in the Asian region. With regard to Japan, there is the long-debated Northern Territory conflict with Russia, two small islands disputed with South Korea and China, and the controversial discussion on national boundaries as related to the Law of the Sea. The South China Sea has become a hot area with complicated territorial conflicts over the Spratly Islands among five different countries.

Some of these territorial issues are conventional debates, but many have come up due to the possible presence of oil resources beneath the sea. Recently, ocean lane communications has been discussed as well. Some relevant countries like the Philippines want to find a solution through multilateral discussion, but others, including China, want to resolve them through bilateral negotiation. Not only the US, but also Japan, watches these developments carefully because we don't want to see instability in the region, particularly with regards to our strong, mutual interest in the freedom of navigation.

The fifth is China. China is a huge country which brings to mind such topics as population, territory, history, culture, political influence, development of economy, and so on. China exists as a big nation in Asia from both geographical and political viewpoints. Japan is very close to China with a direct Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) border on the sea. We have strong relations concerning history, culture, and of course economics and politics. At the same time, we have a very difficult problem related to Japan's invasion of China in the half first of the Twentieth Century. The political regimes of our two countries are also quite different. This means that it is not easy for our two countries to become politically close and to co-operate on various issues.

You can easily understand that China is engaged in all security issues I have previously mentioned – sometimes deeply, sometimes indirectly. This creates a big agenda for Japan, and of course for the US. We must strengthen relations with China so that China can play an appropriate role in the peace and stability in this region.

The Sino-Japan relationship, particularly in the military field,

has recently developed dramatically. In 1998, on the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Sino-Japan Friendly relations, defence ministers of both countries officially visited each other's country for the first time. With the visit to China by the Japanese Chief of Joint Staff Council, we initiated a deputy minister-level security dialogue. Through the past several years of mutual endeavour, we have become able to exchange frank views on whatever each is interested in. We also started a Track Two level trilateral security talk between the US, Japan and China at the beginning of last year. The third in the series will be at Beijing this spring.

As can be seen, the US is engaged in all of these security issues and takes initiative by playing a role as the sole super-power. At the same time, Japan has become recently very interested in peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the security of Japan itself. In 1995, Japan renewed the National Defence Program Outline – Japan's basic defence policy, in order to make the policy compatible with the situation after the end of the Cold War. It makes clear the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as well as supports international activities including peace-keeping operations (PKO) conducted by Japan Self Defence Forces.

President Clinton and the then Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto made public the Japan-US Joint Security Declaration in 1996, which was then followed by the review of the Guidelines governing the two countries' defence co-operation and the development of various kinds of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), including security dialogue, military exchange, etc. While the US is the sole super-power and maintains a strong and effective military capability including power projection and worldwide deployment, Japan's role is quite different. Also, Japan has a lot of very strict restraints as a result of its Constitution concerning security policy.

I would like to take this opportunity to explain Japan's defence policy, in particular the principles and concepts reflecting its Constitution, so that you may understand well and help us mutually develop the relationship between our two countries. Japan's defence policy consists of three pillars.

1. An exclusively defence-oriented policy.
2. Maintenance of the Japan-US security alliance.
3. Contribution to creation of a more stable security environment.

You can easily understand these policy points. But people who have only a slight interest in Japan in terms of security issues can see that Japan's security and defence policy is not clear. I think these people are correct and the situation that makes Japan's policy obscure has not been explained much. I will highlight a current topic and try to make you understand the basic situation affecting the defence policy of Japan. This topic is East Timor and the study of PKO dispatch from Japan.

The international community is now facing a difficult situation in East Timor after the referendum. Australia raised its hand to dispatch its troops at an early stage and some Asian countries have announced military co-operation. Why not Japan? Only money again? Only consultation? This is related to the constitutional restraints.

In 1990, Japan failed to introduce a new PKO law to dispatch JSDF (Japan Self-Defence Forces) to the Persian Gulf. After the Gulf War, just before or during the start of the largest PKO activity conducted by the UN in Cambodia in 1992, the Government of Japan tried again to introduce another new PKO law, which led to controversial political debates. Two problems were focused on in the deliberations. One was how to use weapons and another was whether or not dispatching military force abroad was constitutional. As a result, the basic guidelines – the so-called Five Principles, were set into the law. The Five Principles are as follows.

1. Agreement on a cease-fire among related parties.
2. Their consent to deployment of PKO, including Japan's participation.
3. The PKO activities must keep impartiality, not favouring any party.

4. Japan may withdraw if these conditions cease to be satisfied.
5. Using weapons is limited to the minimum necessary to protect personnel's lives.

You can understand that Japan cannot help solve the East Timor problem by using military personnel according to the present law, because we cannot realise the agreement on a cease-fire among related parties. These conditions come from Japan's constitutional restraints.

Article 9 of the Constitution discusses the renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential including land, sea, and air forces, and the denial of the right of belligerence of the state. Since the introduction of the Constitution, opposition parties and many opinion leaders in the Left Wing have insisted that Japan could not possess military power and that the SDF was unconstitutional. However, the majority agree that the Constitution does not deny the inherent right of self-defence to a sovereign nation and that it does not prohibit Japan from possessing the minimum necessary level of armed strength to exercise that right of self-defence.

Since then Japan has maintained a strictly restrained defence policy. I will show you three major restraints related to the Constitution.

1. Prohibition of possessing offensive weapons, like long-range strategic bombers, ICBMs, offensive carrier vehicles.
2. Prohibition of sending Armed Forces to foreign territories for the purpose of using force.
3. Prohibition of the exercise of the right of collective self-defence.

These restraints brought the Five Principles into the PKO law.

At the same time, Japan has kept the exclusively defence-oriented policy associated with its not becoming a military power. Japan has adhered to the three non-nuclear principles (not possess,

not make, not bring into Japan), to securing civilian control and to the three principles on arms export (not export military weapon and technology except to the US).

With regard to the East Timor problem, the Government of Japan decided on the transportation operation conducted by ASDF (Air Self-Defence Forces). It is a humanitarian relief that is not due to the PKO law. Japan is also considering the revision of the PKO law to make operations more flexible, responsive and effective, meeting the international system.

Here, I would like to refer to the review of the Japan-US Defence Co-operation Guideline in terms of its relation to the Constitution. According to the new Guideline, in case of a contingency in the area surrounding Japan which would influence or compromise Japan's security, Japan can co-operate with US Forces. Japan can exercise logistical support activities, but only in the rear area zone where no military combat is expected. This severe restriction comes from the constitutional restraints that were mentioned above. Japan is prohibited from exercising the right of collective self-defence even with the US, Japan's sole military ally.

Further discussion over the review of the Constitution itself is to start in the *Diet* through an ordinary session which opened last week.

I would like to refer to the Japan-India relationship. It was big news that the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, visited Japan officially for the first time and reached an agreement that both countries should hold regular, high level security meetings between the respective defence ministries. The defence summit was a big success for both countries. But the relations between Japan and India is not understood to be a very close one. Japan has not been strongly interested in South Asian security issues. But we have become interested in the area, particularly very concerned about the recent development of nuclear weapons in the region.

Likewise, India has not been interested much in the security situation in North East Asia. But your country has recently become



interested gradually in the Korean Peninsula, Spratly Islands, etc. Of course, your country has a big national interest with China.

Both Japan and India have a common agenda of securing the navigation freedom or sea lane communications and the ocean governance related to the pirate problem.

Here, I would like to compare some figures between India, Indonesia and China (1997 base) according to the Diplomat Blue Paper of Japan. Population : India 930 million, Indonesia 190 million, China 1.2 billion; Land : in the same line, 3.3 million square km, 1.9 million square km, 9.6 million square km; GNP : \$ 320 billion, \$190 billion, \$ 740 billion; Trade with Japan : \$5.1 billion, #23.8 billion, \$60 billion; ODA from Japan: \$0.6 billion, \$1.0 billion, \$0.9 billion. I just want to point out that the figures related to trade between Japan and India is very low in comparison with other figures.

Trade and investment have recently developed rapidly, but the level is still not very high. The reasons are : the Indian industry structure, low interest in India from the Japanese private sector, etc. On the other hand, we have a lot of room for the Japan-India relationship to develop.

We must not wait, but mutually endeavour to build links. Otherwise, we will lose the chance to build a firm relationship between Japan and India. Development in trade, investment, and economy, especially in the private sector, is important. Also, it is necessary to promote many kinds of exchange programmes including, of course, in the military field – particularly Navy-to-Navy exchange, dialogue, discussion and talks at all levels. Public relations in terms of Japan-India relations are another key element.

I would like to express my strong hope that India formulates firm relationships with the US, which has a worldwide security strategy and is the sole ally of Japan. I have described the Japan-US security alliance as a sort of international public good, particularly for the Asia-Pacific region. I think the strengthening of India-US relations is indispensable for peace and stability in South Asia.



## The Futility of National and Theatre Missile Defences

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".....umbrella'd, capped, and padded against the weather, I step out into the dark day... The rain cuts across and soaks my trousers below the knee. The umbrella with its weak spokes becomes a crazy black soil."

- Vikram Seth, *An Equal Music*, p.106.

"It's a paper tiger – fierce enough to frighten away cowards only."

– Sha Zukang, China's top disarmament official, on the potential threat of the proposed US missile-defence system. – *Asia Week*, 4 February 2000.

Russia has already gone on record to the effect that it had enough weapons to counter any anti-ballistic missile system, and has threatened to deploy more atomic warheads if Washington builds a national missile defence system. This was reported in the Washington Post on 26 October 1999. The Post quoted Mr Nikolai Mikhailov, First Deputy Defence Minister, as saying a day earlier that Russia's arsenal has such "technical capabilities" to overcome any anti-missile defences. He said that the technology was available and would be used if the USA pushes Russia toward it.

"Since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that defences of peace must be constructed." - UNESCO Constitution.

**T**he genesis of the paper on the futility or, more aptly, utility of theatre missile defence (TMD) – the term includes National Missile Defence (NMD) – goes back to the closing decades of the last century, to the launching of the Strategic Defence Initiative by the Reagan administration in the USA. Nearly twenty years down the road from the time that the Initiative first impinged on the global consciousness, the world is witnessing the birth of a deadlier, more menacing, arms race on a planet already reeling under the wounds

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inflicted by the Twentieth Century. This paper endeavours to challenge the basic premise on which the unilateral step that the USA appears well on the way to taking rests.

It should be possible to commence with the assertion that not only will NMD/TMD not provide the desired immunity to the USA but that it could end up actually imperiling the security of its principal allies, Canada, Europe and Japan. Additionally, it could contribute to the greater imperilment of all US defence establishments outside continental USA.

### **Examining the Proposal**

The theatre missile defence being considered by the USA can be examined from several differing perspectives; European, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Canadian, Indian, to name a few, as also the overall global perspective. These countries will have to factor in the new development into their own defence planning in the years ahead. How each entity would be affected would become apparent further on. Looking first, at the motivation of the proponents of TMD in the USA, one can straightaway discern the streams in their thinking that must have led the military industrial complex to push for a system that could severely jolt the existing global equilibrium which, by any reckoning, is heavily tilted in 'favour' of the United States of America.

The defence planners in USA would have calculated that should they be able to get away with TMD – which is tantamount to having one's cake and eating it too – they would derive two distinct advantages from the potentially hazardous venture. By their reckoning, these advantages boil down to :

- (a) Affording themselves sufficient immunity against retaliation through TMD deployment. They could safely proceed, thereafter, to use mini nukes a few years down the line to neutralise the potential of their lesser adversaries, the so-called 'rogue' states. The other major powers would hardly be in a position to do anything about it except voice protests – as was the case with the bombing of Yugoslavia, where the relative impotence of Russia and China was clearly demonstrated. Of course, the

USA would retain the option to add to, or subtract from, the list of rogue states at will.

(b) The second big advantage would accrue through the imperceptible strengthening of TMD to give them a qualitative edge over their major potential adversaries, currently Russia and China. (The anxiety over the rogue states hitting continental USA could merely be a smokescreen).

Arguments like these would, no doubt, have been used to persuade the US government to seek the abrogation of a treaty that has not only held for nearly three decades, but one which was well on the way to becoming the bedrock for other treaties of a similar nature; treaties that should have laid the groundwork for the emerging global equilibrium of the new millennium. There would certainly have been doubts in some quarters on the efficacy of TMD in a 'fog of war' scenario, as opposed to the near perfect launch conditions when carrying out proving tests. Notwithstanding such doubts, the Pentagon experts (much emboldened by their bombing successes of the nineties) in their presentations to the concerned committees would hardly be taking into account the fact that the lessons derived from the Gulf War and the bombing of Yugoslavia were not entirely correct. In the first case, they had overwhelming superiority; and, more importantly, there was no disruption of the decision-making process: of the chains of command in Continental USA, intermediate command posts in Europe, Turkey and the Middle East. It was a clean run all the way to the target countries. Very perfect operating conditions indeed.

The recent failure of its Anti-Ballistic Missile System to hit a speeding warhead high over the Pacific Ocean should have its lessons for the US Defence Department, which might have presumed that such a test was wholly routine. The projected missile interception had not materialised in a third test, though the earlier anti-missile launch had succeeded in hitting a similar warhead. This was a clear indication that where highly advanced electronic technology is involved, requiring checks for ensuring hundred per cent flawless performances of all the inputs prior to every launch, there would be no question of success turning out to be repeatable. This becomes clear from the

Pentagon's disclosure that there had been technical problems associated with the test, which had become more difficult because of its having to be integrated with the ground-based radar in Hawaii and Kwajalein. If, as it appears, successive launchings of the missile system require such integration with a global radar network, it further compounds the uncertainties of missile launches.

The elaboration became necessary to show that perfect co-ordination at several levels and at several points becomes necessary to achieve a perfect intercept. It also shows that the adversary contemplating a strike could take collateral measures to degrade the intercept mechanism at any or several intermediate link points. Add to this the fact that no single defence contractor or agency fabricates the entire intercept system. This would indicate that the performance of a widespread network of vendors to whom orders for crucial components are farmed out might not be wholly error-free. In the previous (successful) test a modified unarmed Minuteman ICBM fired from California was intercepted and destroyed over the Pacific Ocean by a "kill vehicle" fired from the Marshall Islands. The kill device developed by Raytheon carried aloft by a rocket was (reportedly) a machine shaped somewhat like a television camera that weighed 55 kg and was 55 inches long. *It carries a computer that enables it to determine its location by the position of certain stars and then selects the target and attacks.* The test, worth 100 million dollars, was the first of about 20 NMD system trials planned for the next six years.

Here one needs to keep in mind the 'fudging' indulged in by almost all R&D agencies in the world, India not excluded. In unholy alliance with their prime contractors, they apply every subterfuge to extract the next tranche of funds. Positive outcomes are played up, while negative outcomes are underplayed. Conscientious scientists and potential whistle-blowers are kept at arm's length. To anyone seriously examining the TMD proposal from a technical viewpoint, it becomes reasonably clear that the chances of such deployment actually meeting its stated aims – which are more for public consumption – would be remote. Should that be the case, realisation begins to dawn, with mounting horror, that the real aim of the proponents of TMD – and here we go to the heart of the military

industrial complex – is to promote another arms race knowing full well that they are miles ahead of the rest of the world (or so they believe) due to the SDI of the Reagan era and the tens of billions of dollars already spent on it. They want to recover that amount by forcing the world to move in that direction, while they themselves change direction after deployment of TMD. Their scientists already 'have' some tentative counters to TMD in case the rest of the world catches up. The rest of the world's nations, not at all interested in another global arms race, must do something 'now' while they can. The *post facto* stage, once deployment is effected, is not far off. Activities relating to TMD deployment are moving at a 'fast and furious' pace. One can discern definite attempts to push the White House for approval of first phase deployment. The US President, Mr Bill Clinton, is expected to decide in July whether to begin deploying a \$ 12 billion system of interceptor missiles based in Alaska or await further development work following the failure of a test launch in February 2000.

If the approval were to be given, it would be the proverbial crossing of the Rubicon. Turning back would hardly be possible thereafter. They would have burned their bridges 'and' boats behind them: the former with Russia, to force another arms race through the violation of the ABM Treaty; the latter with the rest of the world. The timing of the decision – summer of 2000 – could also be deliberate. With the US presidential election campaign gathering steam, one can hardly see the concerned Senate or House Committees seriously challenging the decision, even had they been inclined to do so.

One can feel the 'full steam ahead' effect again taking shape as it did at the height of the Cold War – not to give any respite for second thoughts or for a more reasoned examination of the issues involved. US Department of Defence exploratory teams were in Japan recently to determine the best locations to position the sophisticated ground-based radar, which uses an X-band frequency. Well before the end of the year, the US Department of Defence is expected to end years of controversy by deciding which military service will head the multibillion dollar National Missile Defence (NMD) programmes, thus giving it the lead in future space combat programmes.

Every now and then there are loud protestations from some spokesman or the other in Washington to the effect that TMD

deployment does not really violate the 1972 ABM Treaty. The only counter one has in the face of such travesty is to quote Emerson: "What you are shouts so loudly in my ears I cannot hear what you say."

### **Global Consequences of Deployment of NMD/TMD**

Since it is becoming fairly obvious that certain interests are hell bent upon deploying TMD, regardless of the global consequences, it would be worth examining what those consequences could turn out to be. First and foremost, it will once again force colossal spending on defence research rather than on other planetary benefits. The psychological transition point of the new millennium for peace and goodwill on earth would lie shattered in the very first year of the new millennium.

The BMD system merits attention for the technology headway which the US has made for ensuring that it stays ahead with the massive destructive capabilities it has built up for the wars it might wage in the future. The latest failure of its intercept weapon to hit a speeding missile could convey to the Pentagon a message which would be a very disquieting one for the rest of the world. If it conveys a warning that a certain percentage of such weapons in stock, however small, are likely to fail, the US could decide on the build-up of a stockpile large enough to ensure that nothing is left to chance. The response to any such move on the part of the US from countries that do not feel comforted by the trend would be to fortify themselves adequately. There are indications that Russia is already very much disturbed by the US becoming more hostile after the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO. A document published by Russia states very bluntly that it would even consider using nuclear weapons and calls for stepping up Moscow's defence preparedness. Washington should, therefore, keep in mind the response that an offensive military strategy could provoke.

The US action – intentionally or otherwise – could provoke elements inimical to US hegemony to step up their activities, thereby making the Americans more paranoid about their own security. A few examples will suffice:

- The USA is creating another 44 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams to add to the 10 created last October, designed to counter chemical or biological weapon (CBW) attacks by terrorists.
- The US Department of Defence is considering relocation of the offices of senior civilian and military officials in the vast Pentagon complex due to what is perceived as their increased vulnerability to sniper fire, rocket-propelled grenades and other potential terrorist threats.
- "For America and Europe, the threat of missiles from rogue nations is substantial and growing. We never want to be in the position of being blackmailed by anyone posing a threat to our national security interests," Mr William Cohen reportedly stated while defending US plans to move ahead with its TMD programme.

All this would lead the US military into another mad spiral of counter, then counter counter, followed by counter counter counter, as was seen in the ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) spiral of the earlier decades. It would be recalled that ECM was followed by ECCM and so on. Before the ordinary folk in the United States become any the wiser, they would be ensconced in the last gilded ghetto on the planet. Their sky and shorelines would bristle with sensors, SPRINT missiles, SWAT, RAID and other quick reaction, counter measure teams. Everyone 'out there' would become a potential Red (or the modern day derivative of the proverbial enemy of the Cold War). The description just given should not be seen as indulgence in hyperbole or an attempt at levity. It is not.

The active supporters of TMD do not realise that although other countries have held themselves back so far by honouring the spirit of the 1972 ABM Treaty, it should not be imagined that they have not been anxiously watching the developments in the USA. At 1/10<sup>th</sup> or possibly 1/100<sup>th</sup> or maybe even 1/1000<sup>th</sup> the cost of the US programme, TMD, in all probability, will be effectively neutralised in less than three to five years, if not earlier, thus resulting in the pouring down the drain of a few hundred billion dollars of the US taxpayers money and a much greater toll on the environment of the planet. No sane person should



be contemplating such fiendish horrors for the living organisms on the planet.

At this juncture it should be possible to briefly tabulate the reactions that could take place in the countries that would immediately be affected in some form or the other by the outright abrogation or violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

- China is reportedly monitoring US forces through 17 spy satellites. Other countries could be obliged to follow suit.
- TMD, in actual fact, ratifies and perpetuates for another century the subordinate status of Japan, Canada and Continental Europe after the demise of the Cold War.
- It would lead to the deployment and proliferation of sub-strategic nuclear weapons on surface vessels and attack submarines. The attack submarines would not have to be the sophisticated type. Rather, the philosophy of deployment would shift to the low grade, low cost Soviet and Chinese tactic of employment of mass – *low cost saturation of phenomenally high cost systems*.
- At the present time Russia does not have sufficient power to prevent the West from taking advantage of its weakness. The US action might force the Russians to boldly change tack.
- Russia, as a consequence of the US actions, is reportedly offering China the use of its space-based navigation system (GLONASS) for a joint counter to the US TMD initiative.
- No ratification of START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) by Russia; START III virtually out of the question; possible tampering with START I (something inconceivable just a few months ago).
- China would become even more non-amenable to fissile materials cut-off.
- North Korea would virtually be goaded into stepping up missile production. So would many other nations.



- In as far as it relates to France, it would be worth recalling President Francois Mitterand's famous 1983 statement. He said "Le dissuasion, c'est moi". He elaborated that the decision to use nuclear weapons belongs to the President of the French Republic and to him only. In classical French nuclear thinking, there can be no form of decision sharing, since the 'autonomy of decision' is the guarantee of national independence and of French strategic sovereignty. The possibility of the French reverting to a neo-Gaullist independent military posture cannot be ruled out.
- US and Japanese officials are expected to shortly finalise, if they haven't already done so, a joint theatre missile defence (TMD) research programme. They are also considering positioning the radar from a developmental Theater High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system in Japan. The Chinese could well respond by setting up a perimeter along the Spratly Islands all the way to North Korea, resulting in the total destruction of the marine ecosystem in areas that are perilously fragile.
- TMD will force the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons so that the adversary can have the satisfaction of at least some damage of sufficient intensity to US forces deployed in theatres 'outside' Continental USA, making all such elements sacrificial goats. Unless the Pentagon is planning to saturate the globe with NMD, dozens of local TMD and the mobile Navy Theatre Wide (NTW) shipboard missile defence systems. (Once violated, violating other clauses of the ABM Treaty would scarcely matter).
- India will no doubt be obliged to take into account the new military escalation being forced upon war-weary humanity.
- There has to be a ripple effect extending to Iran and many other countries. And so the spiral goes on and on and on.

The tragedy is that sane voices will get drowned out when the military dimension once again pushes all other dimensions of human endeavour into the background. It has happened before and after the First and Second World Wars. Even as the CTBT debate is raging,

research on fourth generation nuclear weapons is proceeding apace in the US and other P5 countries. A possibility being considered is the use of a non-fission trigger for fusion devices. The Nobel Laureate Hans Bethe in a letter to President Clinton in April 1997 emphasised that the US should cease work on all new types of nuclear weapons, including pure fusion devices. Similar appeals by some of the most eminent scientists of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century went unheeded.

It should be obvious to anyone looking at the TMD initiative that the military industrial complex is further strengthening – or so they think – the defences of Continental USA at the cost of their allies of the last century, namely, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea and many lesser allies. They are providing strategic depth to Continental USA and nothing else. It hardly needs reiteration that for the foreseeable future, and even beyond, nobody would be thinking of attacking Western Europe or Canada in the military sense. After NMD/TMD becomes a reality, they automatically become the battleground for the next major war. Their second class status will get congealed for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. What Canada and West Europe provide for the defence of Continental USA from the East and North gets replicated from the other direction by Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. It would not entirely displease the military industrial complex in the new century were China, Japan, North Korea or South Korea to lock horns in any regional internecine combination and dissipate their military and economic strengths. This would be the most likely outcome once TMD is set up over the Pacific Ocean marine littoral of Asia. All these countries must enter into a regional dialogue to secure their future.

Statesmen, scientists and intellectuals must shed their Cold War mindsets and consciously sit back to take stock of where they are headed. They must analyse whether the direction being taken is a conscious, well-reasoned decision for the common good or whether having stultified into the Cold War mental gridlock they are being propelled into another dangerous drift against their better judgment. Such an analysis on the part of the West European nations becomes essential for not only the good of Europe but for the good of the world as a whole. Canada and Europe are about the only entities at this point in time who could take a firm stand against the new US global deployments. They must act now, while it is possible to definitively

check the deadly descent toward another world war – not immediately perhaps, but in the not too distant future.

Why only Europeans or Canadians? Should concerned people in the US, not directly involved with the pork barrel politics surrounding the military industrial complex, decide to examine the NMD/TMD proposal dispassionately, they too would discover the unreal nature of the proposal. Dozens of low cost options would be available for neutralising the efficacy of the new deployment being contemplated. TMD can demonstrate its efficacy in carefully orchestrated tests under ideal conditions, but would not be in a position to do so under imperfect warlike conditions. For, an adversary wanting to beat the NMD would surely take collateral measures that could lead to a premature release of retaliatory nuclear might, resulting in a global holocaust.

### **Several Pathways for Neutralisation of TMD**

In this paper an attempt is being made to list out, in a very rudimentary fashion, the diverse pathways that would be available to neutralise TMD. Any or several pathways could be developed, not only by the so-called rogue states, but by military industrial groups of many countries, for the sake of developing the counter to a new military menace on the global horizon, simply because it exists. To name just a few :

- Suicide mission with mini nuclear weapons.
- Robots with a similar mission.
- Ships with Land Attack Missile Systems. Once these proliferate, the US Coastguard would not know whether the innocent-looking trawler lying off just beyond the exclusive maritime zone posed a real threat or not. (Ergo, another fifty or hundred special teams to counter a potential menace of this nature on the West as well as the East Coast. In which case special forces would have to be kept as standby for the Panama Canal Zone, not knowing whether the Hong Kong-based Chinese company operating the Canal had been infiltrated by the Triads or other elements inimical to US interests).

- New shielding materials – which considerably reduce the capability of several types of sensors and ordinary detection monitors. Hence there would be proposals for another billion dollars to deploy more sophisticated instruments overhead, at every available point, night and day. (This could soon become the new reality. It is not an exercise in *reductio ad absurdum*).
- Intermediate point mini nuclear bursts by decoy systems concomitant with the launch of main nukes. The fallout from decoys, countering systems, etc, will generally be over the oceans, Canada, Western Europe, Mexico, Japan, Taiwan and several other points, 'well away' from Continental USA. (The allies, expendable commodities *in extremis*, were always the first tier of US defences).
- Decoy dirigibles.
- Physical destruction, laser blinding and electronic warfare are all likely to be employed to deny the enemy the use of his satellites. (Hence false alarms, ruses to test US systems and increased spying, will lead to greater brinkmanship than in the Cold War era).
- Satellite neutralisation actions, concurrent with nuclear attack options or independently. In the latter case, one could never be certain whether the destruction or loss of orbit was due to technical failure, inadvertence or mischief. If the latter, then mischief on whose part? After all, now there are many actors on the world stage who, in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, have the technical capability to interfere with another nation's or even a rival's commercial satellite. Such technologies are proliferating exponentially. (Meanwhile, systems can be swamped, driven out of their minds so to say, by being made to chase illusions all the time in a virtual reality world).
- Laser blinding of missile optics, etc, crisscrossing the skies (with collateral damage to so many other users and life forms).
- Countering sensors at each stage i.e., the IR sensors on geostationary orbits to detect the tremendous heat from a ballistic missile launch, seconds after launch. Possibility of testing out several different ways to simulate the launch activity and so on at every stage. (After all, when some state actor decides to launch nuclear-tipped missiles on the world's super power, the decision-makers would be under no illusion that Armageddon

had commenced. Also, it would be difficult to know beforehand the type of warhead or WMD package that the missile, decoy or real, was carrying).

- Weather modifications would become the next arena of the global destruction sweepstakes to neutralise certain types of sensors being utilised by TMD/NMD systems.
- Race for anti-satellite weapons will commence in real earnest.
- Ground-based ballistic missile defences, sea-based ballistic missile defences and other defences of this type will proliferate to newer regions of the world.
- Reverse simulation for defeating any system.
- False echoes at launch, mid flight, terminal end. Gyration, etc.
- Computer hacking to start TMD launches. Disgruntled elements breaking the codes.
- Subcritical flooding of the flight pathway.
- Clouds of sprays.
- Pressure vacuums.
- A Japanese-made unmanned airship capable of staying airborne for up to two years will use high-definition cameras and radar sensors to check the ground for people and any other large objects. The airship can see golf ball-sized objects and advise bombers to stop immediately if a suspect object is seen. It will use technology from America's Star Wars programme and has been developed in conjunction with the American military.
- USAF mini-decoys may lead enemy missiles astray.
- MALD (Miniature Air-launched Decoys).
- The US Navy is eyeing UCAV (Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle).
- Vertical attitude take off and landing (VATOL) design for small surface combat ships.
- A submarine-launched VATOL concept.
- And last but not the least, there would always be an element of unpredictability (gnomes).
- Loss of equanimity (*samta*) at any stage cannot be factored in.

All these concepts, in their less sophisticated forms, are capable of being replicated by several adversaries, leading to further pollution for marine life and greater threat to Continental USA in a world turned hostile.

## Ecological Consequences of TMD

At this stage it becomes necessary to pause a while to take note of the ecological consequences of the renewed military activity. According to the Report of the Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission dispatched by the UN Secretary General to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

through explosive reactions, fires and the burning of great amounts of different materials and chemicals and through intensive actions of military airplanes, the millions of tons of oxygen that the living world needs, have been irretrievably spent.

Here is another excerpt from a paper circulated at the behest of the UN Secretary General to the task force set up for the purpose in the Balkans:

It would not be easy to make the world at large see the enormity of the harm being done to myriad life forms on the ecological plane – life forms that depend upon their in-built sensors to communicate, navigate, attract mates, find food or to ward off danger. There have been protests about the ecological damage to the Danube river basin but nowhere commensurate to the magnitude of the ecological impoverishment of the region taking place day by day with increasing intensity.\*

Very obviously, in spite of the alarm bells ringing from every corner of the globe on the dangerous levels of eco destruction taking place, the military industrial complex of the major power shows scant regard for such concerns.

The increasing reliance on electronics in the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is slowly destroying the life support sensory abilities of the myriad life forms inhabiting the planet. The world seems to have become oblivious to the needs of the other species. Soon enough it would become clear to every human being that today : "The

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\* "The Ecological Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis," note prepared by Eco Monitors Society in April 1999).

dangers that we face from eco-destruction dwarf the mere problems of national security".

### Recommendations

Immediate action, therefore, needs to be taken at the global level by national governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and the media to prevent the world from entering another arms race. Towards this end, recommendations that could conceivably ward off the looming catastrophe are tabulated below.

- Convening an emergency session of the UN General Assembly for calling a halt to the militarisation of space.
- UN Secretary General in concert with UNESCO, WHO, and other global organisations to issue a call for an immediate halt to NMD/TMD.
- UN Secretary General to nominate a panel of eminent global citizens to analyse the consequences of the militarisation of space.
- Nation states opposed to the violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty in concert with Russia to approach the International Court of Justice.
- The world must guard against undue (and irresistible) pressure being put on Russia to accept dilution of the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. (It is feared that attempts to buy Russian silence may well be under way. Note must be taken here of the rescheduling of the Russian debt. It is to be hoped that strings of this nature were not attached).
- The no first use (NFU) declaration by any state to have credibility would have to be 'unconditional and irrevocable' to really constitute a safeguard for the interim stage towards the abolition of nuclear weapons.
- The principle of 'supreme planetary interest' has to be the linchpin of future human progress and existence on Earth. The military dimension is submerging the other dimensions that



sustain life on the planet and enrich the cultural identity of nations and societies. SDI-related research could ultimately give yields that could turn out to be a *trillion times* more powerful than current yields. Continuous pressure by non-governmental organisations for the dismantlement of Star Wars type technologies.

- Global initiative for strengthening the 1972 ABM Treaty – to be converted into a binding global protocol.
- One of the respected US philanthropic foundations could be persuaded to set up an independent 'environmental effects panel' to assess the damage to life forms once the TMD race kicks off and the current level of US military activity related to TMD is multiplied by a factor of 10, 50 or even 100 as other nations start limbering up for the new 'planet destruction sweepstakes'. The panelists could be from the USA itself – respected intellectuals, scientists and environmentalists from outside the 'milsience' fraternity.
- An international, linux-type project on the internet for the citizens of the world to design add-on neutralisation modules to counter the P5 and force them into the dismantlement of TMD and subsequently nuclear weapons.
- Without prejudice to their existing military agreements, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan to nominate a panel of respected intellectuals, scientists and eminent citizens (not in the government) to study the likely environmental impact of enhanced military deployments in the region.
- A subsidiary panel to study alternative models of regional security for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. (Once such impartial studies are completed, it would become eminently clear that the only real security threat to the region is from retaining the security models of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. All these run counter to the actual aspirations of the peoples of these countries).
- Russia, China and Japan to become joint signatories for guaranteeing the territorial integrity of South Korea. Phased withdrawal of US military presence in South Korea by 2010.
- China to pledge to maintain sufficient pressure on North Korea



for eschewing militarism. The regional co-sponsors (China, Russia and Japan) to jointly work for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

- China to deposit an affidavit (pledge) before the International Court of Justice that it would never use force for the reunification of Taiwan.
- Taiwan would pledge to respect the principle of reunification in three stages. Stage 1 – Free commerce and exchange between it and the mainland of China up to 2025; Stage 2 – Taiwan accepts integration, but would retain full provincial autonomy under an 'irrevocable' Article 370 type (as in the case of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir) dispensation.
- Phased dismantling of the Japan-USA Security Pact(s) by 2020.
- China, Japan, South Korea (eventually reunified Korea), Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan to enter a peace and tranquility pact for the maintenance of peace in the maritime littoral of the Asia-Pacific region and for the eco-revival of the region.
- The Spratly Islands to be managed by a joint holding company for sustainable exploitation of resources. An independent tribunal to be established for working out the pro rata holding pattern between the claimants. The award to be ratified by all the concerned countries and the instrument to be deposited at the International Court of Justice. Full demilitarisation of the Spratly group of islands by 2005.
- US Senate to invite a committee of national and international experts to independently verify the claims of the US Departments of Defence and State on the efficacy of the TMD proposal as well as its likely global ramifications.
- Global regulatory military satellite (milsat) body to prevent milsats from proliferating exponentially in lower and upper atmosphere regions and perhaps in outer space as well. This global body would be in the form of a joint holding company with shares allocated to state and non-state actors. A golden share would be held by the global regulatory body, which would be responsible

for depositing the instruments and articles of association with the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. It would automatically make miltat data available to all state and non-state parties on a purely commercial basis, thus obviating the need for national military satellites. If nations don't agree, a group of world citizens to go ahead. Transparency should be paramount.

- Need for an international approach on issues that threaten mankind as a whole.
- Five year moratorium to be agreed to, in principle, for the prevention of all military space activities. This period would become the interregnum for the drafting of global protocols for the demilitarisation of the planet in a phased manner.

### Conclusion

"The United States of America has become the undisputed leader in the field of scientific growth. Never before in the history of mankind has any one nation dominated the world in so many diverse ways. The USA is truly the hub of the world whichever way the wheel of mankind's destiny spins in the coming millennium. Even if it stops spinning America is the only country which has the technological potential to restart the spin. Tragically it is also at the forefront of the race that could write '*finis*' to the tale of mankind". — *Third Millennium Equipoise*, Page x.

Today, and for the foreseeable future, the fate of mankind is in the hands of the USA. The rest of the world can keep making noises at the periphery. It will make scant difference. It is only when the US establishment is persuaded to reverse direction will the world change direction — in the right direction. The problem is now time-critical. We are in a situation where the super laboratories of the world are working overtime with large monetary grants to design more and more lethal forms of destructive mechanisms. Once these see the light of day, they will again force increased spending on defence research into areas that can defeat TMD; with consequences not yet projected onto the global consciousness. By now it is well known that no political decision to govern the conduct of military operations can hope to work

once initial control has been transferred to the military. Invariably, maximum overkill and saturation attacks would follow. The psychological transition point of the new millennium, the hoped for harbinger of peace and goodwill on earth, lies shattered in the very first year of the new era. This brings one to the most fundamental question of humankind's existence in the world today.

"Why are the overwhelming majority of the citizens of the world, fully aware of the consequences to the planet of another arms race – potentially more virulent than that of an earlier era – walking away from their responsibility – to themselves, to successor generations and to all life forms on the planet"?

In 1945 at the conclusion of the Second World War, the Cold War intervened, leaving the rest of the world with little choice. Another historic opportunity at global harmonisation is being missed at the turn of the millennium. As at the turn of the last century the global decision-makers are primarily the leaders of the Western world. This could turn out to be their last chance in world history to usher in a harmonious world order. Can they measure up to the challenge and opportunity?

Irrationality is fast becoming the order of the day. The world is being conditioned to live with insanity. Paleontologists tell us that extinctions of an order of magnitude have occurred on Earth every 65 million years or so. These have generally been attributed to cosmic events. The last such extinction saw the disappearance of the dinosaurs. This time round the extinction is being programmed by the most evolved being – for himself and for those sentient beings that nurtured human existence on the planet for millions of years and provided companionship to this evolved creature.

Today the global mass is yearning for arms control, reduction of armaments and disarmament. The straining at the leash by the military industrial complex represents a diametrically opposite urge – the rearmament of the planet and the militarisation of space. It runs counter to whatever humanity stands for at the present time. Should the 1972 ABM Treaty be abrogated, or violated, then, hypothetically at least, every Convention, Treaty and Protocol would stand (potentially) abrogated; and the consensus built up painstakingly over

half a century would be destroyed, leading to global anarchy on a scale which would have been difficult to comprehend in the century we have just left behind.

All systems are amorphous and constantly mutating. The ordinary people across the globe would never come to know as to what new types of monsters were being spawned in the spawning hatcheries being set up in different parts of the globe. Top secret laboratories pulsating with hideous planet-destroying creations. There is a fallacy in the concept of immunity being provided by TMD.

Globally, across the political spectrum, there is palpable decline in the quality and moral fibre of political leadership. The dawn of the new millennium represents a window of opportunity for the world. After several decades, if not centuries, the great nations of the world who have the arsenals to destroy the world, have arrived at a momentary global equipoise where no insurmountable tension exists between any of the major powers. A remarkable interregnum, representing possibly the opportunity of the millennium. The peoples of the world should have been entering the new millennium with joy in their hearts and a song on their lips. The military industrial complex deems it otherwise.

As Franklin D Roosevelt, one of the great Americans of the last century commented : "You cannot organize civilisation around the core of militarism and at the same time expect reason to control human destinies".

## Letter to the Editor

*Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services*

Sir,

'A nation that does not remember its past, will have to pay a heavy penalty for the future', so goes the old adage. However, my namesake, General Ulysses Grant, felt that historical luggage would impede progressive thinking. He said, to quote, "If men make war in slavish obedience to rules and laid down principles, they will fail", unquote.

If World War II would have been fought on the pattern of World War I's static trench type tactics, history would have been quite different today. It is ironic that, General Patton, who was a great student of military history and made it a point to visit his future battle areas, where Alexander and Hannibal once operated, yet, his tactics in the battle of the Bulge were abnormal.

Coming nearer home, what military lessons could be learnt from *Op Blue Star*, *Op Pawan*, or even *Op Vijay*, except the one to oppose the political masters in not going to war unprepared? What lessons could be learnt from history on how to deal with the J&K and North East militants? Then again, while theoretically the commander is required to equip, train and practice combat, in recent years, his role has been seen from that of fighting a war to maintenance of peace.

In the last two centuries, Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler are credited with changing the face of war by developing tactics never before used on the battlefield. The US Pentagon hopes to do the same in the next century with a project called *JOINT VISION 2010*. Whereas the revolutionary tactics of Napoleon and Hitler won the battles but not the war, the aim of *Joint Vision 2010* is to win both.

Instead of the age old massive forces and fire power, we will have to rely increasingly on information technology to outsmart foes by knowing enemy positions more precisely, attacking them more quickly, and fighting more decisively while having to put fewer lives at risk.

The extraordinary advances taking place in computers, sensors and communications – coupled with new ideas about battlefield tactics and military structures – are leading towards military planners regard as one of the most sweeping revolutions in warfare since the advent of the mass army under Napoleon two centuries ago, or what Pershing did in World War I or Eisenhower mustered in World War II. Information technology is going to change our doctrine, our tactics and leadership development. A study of past military history will not help.

Comments from readers will be appreciated on whether military history should still form a part of our military study curricula.

*Brigadier N B Grant, AVSM (Retd)*

## The Palestinian Identity\*

BRIG SUBHASH KAPILA (RETD)\*\*

The Palestinian problem forms the core issue of Middle East stability discussions. For Israel the issue of Palestinian identity and the creation of an independent Palestinian state are domestically divisive and vexing challenges.

Voluminous accounts exist on the history of the creation of Israel and the justifications that prompted the Western powers to create a homeland and ultimately a nation for the widely dispersed and inhumanely persecuted Jewish people. One cannot but admire the courage of the Jewish people to rise above their persecution and create a vibrant nation in a desolate land.

Many have now recognised that the issue of Palestinian identity and the creation of an independent Palestinian state cannot be wished away. To understand these issues in the correct perspective, the book by Rashid Khalidi provides useful insights and a documented study of the history of a separate Palestinian identity, as distinct from a later emergence of a larger Arab identity. Palestinian nationalism according to the study pre-dated both Israel's creation and Arab nationalism. Rashid Khalidi has illustrated how when Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire his ancestral family and many other notables had constantly raised the issue of Palestinian identity and how the Ottomans recognised that Palestine was a separate geographical and administrative entity in that empire as distinct from the other Arab lands.

While many accounts exist about Israeli identity and state, Rashid Khalidi's account of the Palestinian identity fills the void of hearing the other side of the story. His historical narrative is devoid of bitterness and therefore more appreciable. Going through this story, one comes to the conclusion that Israel alone cannot be blamed for the events that led to the creation of the Jewish state. It seems that Britain, the United States and France went overboard to create a Jewish State more as a recompense for their guilt in having allowed the persecution of Jews without effective intervention

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\* **Palestinian Identity : The Construction of Modern National Consciousness.** By Rashid Khalidi (New York : Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.309, ISBN 0-231-10515-0 (Pbk).

\*\* Brig Subhash Kapila (Retd) is engaged in analysis of policy and strategic issues pertaining to global strategic sub systems.

in the years preceding. In the process the Palestinian identity was obliterated and the British policy of divide and rule came into play. What seems to have been overlooked is that the Palestinians were not responsible for the persecution of the Jewish people in Europe. So why should they have been displaced by the British? Were not other alternatives available?

Rashid Khalidi's account also raises some questions about the attitudes of Arab nations towards the Palestinian identity. Were some of them exploiting the Palestinian issue for their own domestic or external gains?

The book is well documented and is supported by exhaustive notes which provide interesting amplifications. Khalidi brings forth in his work the rich academic experience as Professor of History and Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Chicago. He served as one of the advisors to the Palestinian delegation at the Madrid Conference in 1991 and thereafter in discussions in Washington.

A useful and scholarly book for all those interested in an objective study of the Middle East imbroglio. This insightful book has been awarded the Albert Hourani Book Award by the Middle East Studies Association.

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## Short Reviews of Recent Books

**The Next World War : The Warriors and Weapons of the New Battlefields in Cyberspace.** By James Adams (London, UK : Random House, 1998), pp.366, £ 18.99, ISBN 0-09-180232-6.

*The Next World War* is an attempt to delineate the security challenges confronting the United States in the coming years because of the RMA. The author has tried to drive home the point that information warfare would require a transformation in the mindset of government, military and society if the benefits of the RMA are to be fully harnessed.

The book is divided into three sections. Section One is a review of the impact of information technology in contemporary warfare. The author compares the operations in the Gulf, Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti and attributes the success of the Allied Forces in the Gulf War to an intelligent application of information technologies. Poor gathering, analysis and dissemination of intelligence as well as neglect of an important aspect of information warfare viz. psyops (including propaganda) are cited as reasons for the failures in the other regions. In this section, Adams also brings two of the greatest military strategists viz. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu face-to-face vis-a-vis their significance in the information age. According to the author, the Clausewitzian "fog of war" will be blown away by the information revolution while Sun Tzu would still retain his relevance.

Section Two deliberates on emerging technologies such as Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems and Non-lethal Weapons and the impact they would have on future warfare. This section also discusses the bane of networked systems - viruses, worms, hackers and crackers - and how their employment with very low investments could paralyse systems the world over with an almost negligible chance of detection and prosecution of the perpetrators. Adams argues that protection schemes against these attacks are sadly in a primitive stage of development. He contends that agencies like the CIA, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) etc have lost their monopoly on near-real time information and intelligence due to their inept practices and prejudices and that military commanders are increasingly turning to commercial avenues for current, time-relevant information.

Section Three highlights the status of information warfare preparedness of various countries and the US vulnerabilities. Adams explains that the Russians have a grasp of information technology and its potentials but the current political situation precludes any qualitative or quantitative



achievement being made. The Chinese, on the other hand, have acquired western technologies (as a quid-pro-quo for contribution to Clinton's re-election campaign) and are supposedly on the way to winning the information war. The French use of computer hackers for economic espionage and the Japanese economic intelligence strategy to penetrate US markets are realities that the US has to live with.

For readers who are unfamiliar with the potential of information warfare and its ability to destabilise a wide range of operations (including financial transactions, electric supply systems, railroad traffic, telephone switching facilities etc) the book makes the concept more accessible. However, there are no doctrinal or policy guidelines on how to overcome the vulnerabilities associated with an information-based attack on infrastructure. To that extent, security professionals may be disappointed with the book.

*Lieutenant Commander A Anand*

**In Athena's Camp : Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age.**

*Edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1997), pp.501, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2514-7.*

In this path-breaking treatise, Rand suggests ways and means of preparing for conflict in the information age, by recommending recourse to the wisdom of Athena rather than the martial rough-shodding of the God of war: Mars. Van Creveld is preferred over Von Clausewitz; the Oriental game of Go over chess; networks over hierarchies; potent mini-units over massed mechanised columns; spheres of influence over manoeuvre; consultation and coordination over command and control; debilitation over death and destruction; and confusion over fear, that hitherto held the key. A paradigm doctrinal shift from war of attrition to a humane conflict, where blood-letting and the cruelty of killing could be things of the past, is mooted. In short, this book is about the revolution in military affairs (RMA). It is, indeed, a wake-up call to all resolvers of conflicts in the new millennium; which will be saturated with info-tech spin-offs in all avenues of the human endeavour. They are urged to prepare for the 'war' of the future and not for the one last fought.

Cyber-war and net-war are dealt with under many interesting motifs. The crux of the matter in conflicts will be cyber-concerns. Information revolution will include technology as well as an organisational slant towards networks. The entire range of conflicts is being recast where threats will be all-inclusive, scattered, non-linear and multi dimensional. These will entail forging of new concepts of schematisation, dogma, generalship and tactics.

The looming realities of the net-worked world would mean that not only the military leaders but all take a good look at the emerging security scenario of the future.

*Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)*

**Unipolar Politics : Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War.**  
*Edited by Ethan B Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (West Sussex, UK : Colombia University Press, 1999), pp.525, £ 14.95, ISBN-0-231-11309-9.*

This book provides for a critical examination of the Realist theory in light of the current unipolar moment in world affairs. It seeks to illumine the future. Its canvas is broad, as befits its galaxy of contributors. Thus, the book can be expected to be a landmark in realist theorising. Gauging through the realist perspective, the academicians decipher the meaning the present status of world affairs holds for the major powers. Realism being a rich philosophy, there are diverse and equally compelling viewpoints. More impressive is the analytical vigour with which the conclusions are arrived at.

However, India remains peripheral to the book - it being a power beyond the time horizon. Unfortunately, it is only a fond hope that such a book would not be about realism. Clearly, as the authors and editors opine, realism will outlast this century - just as it has the last one. Even if confined to the economic battlefield, it is unlikely to be any less hurtful.

*Major Ali Ahmed*

**Unsettled Times - The 1996 Chatham House Forum Report.** *Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1996), pp.132, Price not indicated, ISBN 1-86203-006-5.*

Rationalised crystal gazing through projection of current knowledge and emerging trends has primarily contributed to the West's progress. The Report by Chatham House Forum of the Royal Institute of International Affairs highlights this trend. Its theme is to study the nature of forces which will impinge on nations and commerce of the Industrialised World (IW) with a view to evolve possible scenarios for the year 2015. Starting with a survey of coupling forces in the IW such as open resources, falling barriers, integrating criteria and carriers of change, the impact of transformation on these forces is analysed to conclude that the competitive environment is likely to increase with globalisation denoted by integration and value addition by networks and innovation not fixed to locales.

Basic structures for economic development are identified as an open competitive and transparent economy, development of predictable and culturally representative government, creation of an informed machinery to balance needs and human capital with supporting infrastructure. Of particular significance is the conclusion that in the emerging global order, China will be a key player. Three scenarios for 2015 have been portrayed. The first is, "Faster, Faster" wherein the pace of change will be so rapid that nations that cannot keep up will perish under the strain of transformation. "Post Industrial Revolution" is the more benign model of the former and "Rough Neighbors" an unstable scenario wherein the forces of change would create divisions in society. The report is diligently researched and supported by carefully analysed data, charts, tables and figures. Extrapolating the conclusions to the developing world and particularly India should provide us useful insights on the possible road ahead. Having identified the stable "Post Industrial Revolution" as the ideal scenario for the future, guidelines to achieve the paradigms could have immensely added value to the Report.

*Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle, SM*

**Space : Emerging Options for National Power.** By Dana J Johnson, Scott Pace and C Bryan Gabbard (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1998), pp.90, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2493-0

*Operation Desert Storm* brought into sharp focus the emerging power of space to enhance the traditional war-fighting capabilities of the conventional forces. Space satellite systems were effectively used to generate data for maps and locate military and command and control locations. Space based communication systems were additionally put in place to transmit military data. Use of weather satellites to plan assault and other space-based operational innovations enabled battlefield commanders to enjoy excellent situational awareness.

The book under review is an effort by the authors to examine the impact of space-power, both military and economic, on national security as well as its effect on future military operations. The report concentrates on the dichotomy existing between military and civilian activities and proposes a concrete framework to integrate the two. The authors trace the proliferation of space applications from performing a single track function of deterrence of strategic nuclear conflict during the Cold War to the current array of functions that include early warning, attack assessment, satellite communication, navigation and positioning. This has been necessitated by a concurrent proliferation of conflicts and threats, the

newest one being that of information warfare. Also included is a discussion on factors that allow different sectors of a nation to dominate various space-related functions as well as the areas which are most likely to lead to conflicts between these entities. For example, space launch was the exclusive domain of the United States in 1970s till the Ariane family of vehicles developed by European Space Agency came along. Thus from a 100 per cent market share in 1980 for launch of commercial satellites, the United States' share fell steadily to 37 per cent while Ariane pegged at 58 per cent and a new entrant China accounted for five per cent of the pie in 1990.

Three viable strategy options with associated strengths and organisational restructuring, to augment space-based national security objectives, are indicated. Named as minimalist, enhanced and aerospace force strategy options, the authors envisage that each of these would be supported by a strong interaction amongst the military, civil and intelligence agencies.

The report has been influenced by a plethora of publications from the US strategic community. The chapter on space-power policy has borrowed heavily from the National Space Policy, National Military Strategy, Joint Vision 2010 and the US SPACECOM Vision. Laced with figures and a large number of tables that effectively summarise the concepts discussed, the report is lucid in its presentation. A serious drawback, however, is the lack of financial implications of space-power implementation. Despite this omission, the report manages to present a comprehensive view of the military and commercial trends in space-related functional areas. Recommended for defence policy makers who are involved in activities of deployment, acquisition and development of space systems for national security.

*Lieutenant Commander A Anand*

**In Light of India.** By Octavio Paz (London : Harvill Press, 1997), pp.209, £ 9.99, ISBN 1-86046-425-4.

India captivated people from times immemorial. Its distinction is its diversity in all walks of life; many of them are commendable. Octavio Paz being a poet is thus an unbridled creator with a restless soul and very strong concepts. The exquisitely refined language used in this book even for expressing the darker side of our existing practices and way of life is styled in a way that can be described as most civilised approach to bring the negative aspects of a society to the knowledge of everyone and hope for its eradication without hurting anyone's feelings.

The literary comments are specially praiseworthy since it encompasses the influence of Indian literature on western writers during various phases of historical development. The critical analysis of Indian literature also reflects the depth of knowledge and interest of the author in the subject. The beauty of this book lies in its approach to unravelling the various historical moments in Indian history followed by the personal interpretation by the author, and an exquisite comparative analysis with various other civilisations and systems. However, Octavio's research at certain places shows the difference in the way this country is understood by an Indian as compared to the point of view propounded by an outsider. The interpretation of *Jati* not as class but as species will raise many an eyebrow. Further his interpretation of *Varna*, a Sanskrit word that actually means the caste system, as a group of living beings with common characteristics, may not go down very well with many readers. At some places Paz holds the caste system as the basic attribute for the unity and the survival of Indian society for over 2000 years but he also says it is a wrong system that needs immediate transformation, without giving the alternative system that can replace the withering system of *Varnas* in modern Indian context.

Another outstanding feature of this book is the in-depth study of various political philosophies prevalent at various junctures of history and its interpretation from the author's viewpoint. Strong views are expressed especially on the political front. He criticises BJP as an ultra nationalistic party that must not come to power but fails to condemn Muslim League that created Pakistan.

The hard work and dedication of Paz to assimilate various aspects of our history to write such a book is commendable.

*Captain Rajiv Ojha (Retd)*

**Sandhurst to the Khyber : 1932-1940 Pre-War Service with Gurkhas.**  
*By Lieutenant Colonel Tony Mains, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 9<sup>th</sup> Gurkha Rifles (Durham, UK : The Memoir Club, 1999), pp.162, £ 14.95, ISBN 1-84104-007-X.*

Soldiering, by the very nature of its calling, is a life of adventure; and every soldier who lives to tell the tale, has a book in him.

Lt Col Tony Main's book *Sandhurst to the Khyber* takes us on an interesting, journey in time from pre-war England through undivided India. The authors narrative starts with his years at Sandhurst and then takes us through an India that most of the older generation would be familiar with. The officer of that era will look through an envelope of nostalgia at an India

whose pace of life in the army was predictable and unhurried. The young officer of today will find these descriptions almost unrecognisable.

Reading through accounts of military history like this one tends to transpose 'Past Perfect' to 'Present Tense' and in the reading of the author's account of the Khyber one cannot help wondering whether Pakistan in Talibanising Afghanistan has not in the process Talibanised herself. The spill-over in J&K is all too evident.

To those who belong to Gurkha Regiments, his description of life with Gurkha troops will ring familiar. To others it would probably answer questions they never asked.

*Major General Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)*

**Corruption and Government : Causes, Consequences and Reform.** By Susan Rose Ackerman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 266, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-521-65912-4

Mrs Indira Gandhi had once said that "Corruption was a World-wide phenomenon". This, of course, was in answer to the criticism of the rampant corruption that flourished in the country. The book brings out very forcefully the truth in her statement. Writing about corruption of high-level officials, the author states, "Corruption in contracting occurs in every country - even those at the high end of the honesty index such as the Scandinavian countries, Singapore and New Zealand." She goes on to give several examples to justify this statement.

Though in India most of us have, at sometime or the other, come across corruption in some form or the other, few of us have even bothered to analyse its evil effects on the economy of the country and its adverse effects on various other aspects of the society. In this book the author has done a detailed analysis of the causes of this evil practice, its effects on various aspects of the society and its governance, and finally examines various reforms by which its levels could be reduced if not totally eliminated. She goes on to distinguish between gifts and bribes. She rightly points out that if gifts are to be considered legal and proper, then they ought to be openly acknowledged and properly reported.

The author details the role of Governments and politicians in encouraging corruption in the country and its effects at various levels of officialdom. In her discussion on rooting out corruption she correctly states the inadequacy

of trying to just prune out the 'bad apples' and punish the culprits. On the contrary efforts must include reforms to bring about a systemic change of rules and practices that give rise to corruption in the first instance. In this she is right in suggesting the simplification of rules, such as taxation laws, and reducing bureaucratic discretion. This book is well worth studying to understand and appreciate the full impact of the evil of corruption on a country and its security, and how it could be reduced if not eliminated.

*Major General S C Sinha, PVSM (Retd)*

**Indian Politics and the 1998 Elections : Regionalism Hindutva and State Politics.** Edited by Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (New Delhi : Sage, 1999), pp.375, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 0-7169-9388-6.

The Indian political scene has indeed undergone a sea change in its texture over the last decade. Many a prophet, clairvoyant and self styled expert claiming deep insight, bit the dust because the political dynamics in themselves were undergoing a fundamental shift. The book elucidates the impact of changing forms, patterns and alignments on the 1998 elections. The analyses and commentaries are segmented in Statewise chapters authored, in the main, by alumni of the US and Canadian Universities.

The statistical dispersion, notwithstanding the much touted competition between secularism and communalism, in the editor's view, suggests that coalition politics at the Centre have come to stay for the foreseeable future. The paradox of course is that while the dominant political parties cannot obtain a majority on their own, the regional parties cannot become a central force for providing leadership in a coalition at the Centre. The changing base of support has not only been due to Hindutva, but more so due to ethnification, a term generically applied to religious, casteist and sectarian segmentation. In this context the chapters on UP and Bihar are particularly relevant. The analyses show how certain parties have attempted to draw support by mobilising votes through divisive means. In fact ethnic divisions have resulted from what one author has called the ownership of the state. As far as the trends in other states are concerned analyses highlight the regional factors that influenced outcomes. It was the awareness amongst the rural electorate, which voted in larger numbers in comparison to the urban voters, that proved decisive in the 1998 election results.

*Air Marshal K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)*



**Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India.** By Maya Chadda (New York : Colombia University Press, 1997), pp.286, \$18.50, ISBN 0231-10737-4.

The rash of writing on ethnicity post Cold War has had as its stimulus the Balkans scenario. Dr Chadda explores the same in a South Asian setting, where it has been relatively successfully managed by India. According to her the Indian recipe comprises adroit 'interlocking balances' between the modernising state and the constituent ethno-nationalities. To her, the means India uses to this end is 'relational control', in that, it seeks to influence the structure of the relationship and the regional environment through appropriate leverages. Relational control involves negotiation, accommodation and coercion in the effort to gain options and favourable outcomes.

This conceptualisation is opposed to the two pre-existing theses on the behaviour of the Indian state, namely: the neo-Marxist one on subjugation of the under-privileged; and, the 'pluralist' one on a hegemonic maximisation of power. This is her contribution to the study of post colonial nation-state formation. She utilises case-studies of the Punjab and Kashmir crisis, and of the Tamil issue in Indo-Sri Lankan relations, to arrive at her conclusions. Her efforts have been considerable, as evident from her footnotes and list of eminent interviewees.

Though a benign view of the Indian state, hers is a dispassionate account, and does provide readers with yet another conceptual handle with which to approach the inherently contradictory Indian reality. She marshals the material and arguments at the confluence of international relations and political science. The book is a tribute to her engagement with her Indian roots, for, in it, she tackles a theme that has been central to the Indian, and, indeed, the global, experience over the past decade.

Major Ali Ahmed

**A Shattered Dream : Understanding Pakistan's Under Development.** By Ghulam Kibria (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.234, Rs.495.00, ISBN 0-19-577947-9.

According to the author, what prompted him to write this Book was a search to determine why a perfectly viable country like Pakistan, which was the granary of erstwhile India, had a fairly well developed infrastructure, the finest canal system in the world, exported machinery and had a reservoir of skilled manpower, failed to become an 'Asian Economic Tiger'.



Two chapters, 'Pakistan after Jinnah' and 'Pakistan in Peril' tellingly delineate how the country progressively became a victim of misrule, successive military coups and disintegration. This, the author candidly admits, was because people were denied their identity, their language, their culture and equal opportunities. The process that welds a state into a nation in fact never took root since religion historically had never been a nation-state cementing factor. The author deserves credit for admitting that Nationalist Muslims in erstwhile India were indeed prescient in predicting the problems presently besetting Pakistan. In the epilogue the author talks of similarities in the problems being faced by India and Pakistan. He, however, forgets that the empowerment of the deprived and the under-privileged in India, through the democratic process, is a fundamental difference distinguishing the two countries.

The book is somewhat repetitive but even then is valuable for understanding the developments in Pakistan since partition.

*Air Marshal K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)*

**Performing Collaborative Research with Nontraditional Military Suppliers.** By Kenneth P Horn, Elliot I Axelband, Ike Yi Chang, Paul S Steinberg, Carolyn Wong and Howell Yee (Santa Monica, CA : Rand 1997), pp.53, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2483-3.

This Report, prepared for the US Army by the Arroyo Centre, by seven specialists in various fields, focusses on need for collaborative research. The authors in their report have discussed ways and means adopted by the US Army to collaborate with the industry in different fields. The report looks into the options available to the US Army and recommend that CRDA (Co-operative Research and Development Agreement), PLA (Patent Licensing Agreement), contracts and grants to industry to attract NTMS (Non Traditional Military Suppliers) for collaboration in R and D on cost sharing basis whenever possible, should form part of the military strategy to enhance the fighting efficiency of the US Army.

An informative and well researched book of interest to R and D officials and men in uniform particularly of the developing countries, who can tap the resources of industry for R and D and thereafter manufacture equipment on a joint venture basis. A must for all R and D organisations' libraries.

*Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)*

Obsessed with occidental paradigms of political culture, Western scholars seem paranoid towards inimical systems but would do well to stop mirror imaging these in other countries especially the older civilisations as China and India and allow them to evolve into modern states blending their ancient values with the life comforting utilities provided by modern science and technology. However, viewed from a Western perspective, this would be a very useful contribution towards understanding of the likely impact of the multi faceted social and political forces operating within and from outside China and a must read for all students of Chinese polity.

*Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle*

**A Military History of Australia.** By Jeffrey Grey (UK : Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.300, £ 14.95, ISBN 0-521-64483-6.

In this comprehensive military history of Australia from AD 1788 to the end of the 20th Century, the author has discussed the growth of its military from the days of early settlements, and the employment of the military contingents both during conflicts on mainland Australia as well as overseas, in the colonial wars fought by Britain. Significantly, the Army contributed considerably to the development and administration.

The author narrates, in great detail, the operations of Australian Armed Forces in various theatres of the two World Wars, and its limited participation in Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War. His review of Australia's strategic perceptions, successive defence policy formulations in the context of the geo-politics of Australia due to its location and demographic peculiarity (large European emigrants), explains Australia's security considerations and the national ethos.

This is indeed a useful contribution to enhancing knowledge on military as well as political history of Australia.

*Major General S K Talwar (Retd)*

**Muslim Palestine : The Ideology of Hamas.** By Andrea Nüsse (Netherlands : Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), pp.190, \$ 22.00, ISBN 90-5702-3304-2.

The writer has painstakingly researched primary source material. This was available only in Arabic, e.g. the Mihaq, and the journal *Filastin al-Muslima*, which is considered as the official organ of the Hamas. It is

obvious that this has enabled her to get a rare perspicacity in to the viewpoints of a praetorian outfit like the Hamas. Contrary to the general perception, she has also been able to bring out the pliancy and pragmatism of the Islamic thought process. This, indeed, is not the worldview. This book; therefore; makes for refreshing reading for the research scholar.

Nüsse, focusses on the ideology mostly, and touches on the socio-economic developments in the Palestinian society leading on to the *Intifada*, only in the passing. Later in the narrative, she brings out the sense of urgency at the mass immigration of the Soviet Jews and the perceived sequestering of the Muslims on the political rostrum, both in the western and Arab playing field. The intended mechanism of achieving the aim, namely, *Jihad*, in the guise of *Intifada*, and the democratisation in Arab states, is discussed at some length, subsequently.

In the second part of the book the author describes how the general prescripts enunciated are applied to particular events as mentioned earlier in this review. The relationship between the Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority; in reformulations and adjustments for nation building, consequent to the Oslo Declaration; are dealt with in the light of some very telegenic events of the time. Some of these are the first Palestinian Elections in January 1996, the wave of Hamas suicide operations in February-March that followed the hustings, and the encounters between the Palestinian Police and the citizenry in July-August 1996. Lastly, some kite-flying is resorted to on the future prospects of the Hamas—it could develop into a political party, provided it tones down its fundamentalist and radical countenance.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

**Kargil and the Kanchi : A Saga of Faith and Fortitude.** By Brigadier D S Jaggi (Published by Author, Marketed by Sultan Chand Sons, 2000), pp.72, Rs.175.00

"C O Sahib, Hamro Tactics fail bhayo" - a remark by a wounded soldier of 5/3 GR commanded by Lt Col D S Jaggi during 1971 Indo-Pak War in Kargil Sector, gave birth to this book. The unit located near Leh had been allotted to 121 Infantry Brigade Group by General Officer Commanding (GOC) 3 Infantry Division for special operations, was moved post haste to Kargil on 6 December 1971. Much against his military judgement Jaggi was persuaded/cajoled to concentrate the Battalion on a Plateau near Kargil Airfield. Here they came under effective Pakistani artillery fire resulting in avoidable casualties. While going around his wounded men, he heard this remark from a Johnny, which set him thinking-*How Right the Soldier Was?*

relationship when Japan refused to reverse its post-1945 anti-military policy. Finally, the demise of the Soviet Union "removed the common enemy that helped Americans and Japanese ignore their differences". The post-Cold War scenario is bringing up issues that will need attending to sooner than later. Of primary concern is the fact that the US has 50,000 troops and overwhelming naval and air power in and around Japan for the latter's security. Should this continue or should US encourage Japan to develop a ratio of military to economic power comparable to that of other large, rich countries? There is resentment in the USA that against Iraq, Japan only shelled out some money, that too reluctantly, and not lives. Many Americans wonder how long they should continue to be "loyal allies" of Japan voluntarily serving the latter's security interests without demanding military reciprocity. Increasing economic clashes further exacerbate tension between the two countries. The Japanese have a great sense of history and tradition and their policies owe their origin to these factors rather than to external developments. Try as they might, the Americans have largely been frustrated at trying to change Japanese economic policies which have remained largely constant.

The author is one of America's leading historians and has won the Bancroft Prize for this book. As they say for thrillers, the book is 'unput-downable' and is an invaluable study in international relations.

*Commodore R N Sharma (Retd)*

**The Rebirth of Politics in Russia.** *By Michael Urban with Vyacheslav Igrunov and Sergei Mitrokhin (UK : Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp 429, £ 18.95, ISBN 0-521-56611-8 (pbk)*

There cannot be rebirth without death. The author assumes that politics died in Russia when a "seventy-year political ice-age of communism" began. He thinks that politics is all about freedom and democracy, and when Russia became the Soviet Union, the communist dictatorship usurped these essentials of politics.

Can there be no politics under communism? The father of communism, Karl Marx, was basically a humanist. He was moved by the brutal exploitation of the British working class and decided that class struggle was the only way for liberation and power should be captured by the workers through a revolution. No doubt, he talked of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but that was to be temporary till a society based on equality and social justice is established. Later, even the state was to wither away

leading to a world where "each worked according to his ability and each got according to his needs".

Post-war Soviet Union became a powerful communist empire expanding into Eastern Europe, with dependent allies in Asia and even South America. It, along with the USA, became one of the two big powers of the world, hostile to each other. The two big powers, fearing one another, went on an arms race, amassing weapons with a capacity of destroying the world several times over. It was really a MAD (mutual assured destruction) race!

The book vividly describes the process of dismantling communism in Russia by popular upsurge as well as the inherent weaknesses of dictatorship. It details the growth of dissent after Stalin, the revelations of the dictator's misdeeds in the 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress by Khrushchev, the introduction of Perestroika and Glasnost (reforms and transparency) by Gorbachev and the final collapse of the communist edifice under Yeltsin.

*Subedar Major N Kunju (Retd)*

**China's Transition.** By Andrew J Nathan with Contributions from Tianjian Shi and Helena VS Ho (New York : Colombia University Press, 1997), pp.313, \$ 19.50, ISBN 0-231-11023-5.

Andrew Nathan's essays on China's transition represent an erudite pedagogue's view of transformation of Chinese society from a totalitarian state to democracy. Atypical of the clinical approach of Western scholars, Nathan, a noted Sinologist, succeeds in putting life into his narrative through the wealth of his personal observations and anecdotes on China which makes the account highly readable.

Nathan commences with a detailed survey of Chinese social and political structures over the years. The initial chapters, expectedly are devoted to the influence of Mao Tse Dong and how his human frailties contributed to the larger decisions he took affecting destinies of millions of Chinese to whom he was demi God. The author feels that the inner contradictions generated by simultaneity of diverse economic and political engagement renders predictive assessment highly risky. However a number of scenarios varying from a doomsday revolutionary to a benign evolutionary have been charted. Ultimately constitutional reforms and emergence of a human rights regime driven by external forces are the predicated paths for China's transition to democracy.

**Airborne Intercept Boost and Ascent-Phase Options and Issues.** *Edited by David R Vaughan, Jeffrey A Isaacson and Joel S Kvitky (Santa Monica, Rand, 1996), pp.28, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2434-5.*

The report provides the US Air Force with an indepth study of policy alternatives offering the development, employment and combat readiness of future aerospace forces. The three authors with vast experience in this field have discussed with facts, figures and tables the viability of airborne intercept using manned aircraft. The following four important aspects have been discussed by the authors.

- (a) The intrinsic value of an API (Ascent Phase Intercept) capability;
- (b) Kinematic range capabilities;
- (c) Intercept and Sensor issues; and
- (d) Issue regarding Kinetic Kill Vehicle.

The report concludes that several operational considerations deserve attention in sorting through development options for BPI (Boost Phase Intercept)/API (Ascent Phase Intercept), for interception of TBMs of various ranges in the design of aircraft.

An informative and well researched report of interest to the scientists and research and development officials engaged in the design of aircraft.

*Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)*

**American Intervention in the Balkans.** *Published by The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies in cooperation with Chronicles, USA (1998), pp.125, Price not indicated, ISBN 1-8-82383-07-9.*

The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies was established in 1994 as a non-partisan research institute devoted to studying the Balkan peninsula in all its aspects. The papers presented at the Third Annual Conference devoted to the US policy in South East Europe, in 1997, are compiled in this book. A variety of views are presented by very eminent persons. They have in common the theme that American actions in Balkans are not guided by the high moral principles of its declared policy, but rather the pragmatic self interests of a great power struggling to hold on to and expand its power base vis-à-vis potential rivals. In his foreword to the book, Mr Ronald Hatchett, Director of the Foundation has very aptly stated Clinton Administration's geopolitical goals to be the strengthening of ties with the billion-plus Muslims of the world, to give a new purpose to NATO,

to acquire new strategic bases from which it can oppose any resurgence of Russia and oversee the flow of oil from Caspian region. The participants in the Conference could be justly proud of making an endeavour, however mild, to keep the US away from arrogance and overextension and thus minimise pointless sacrifices. Of course, subsequent developments have proved the futility of this endeavour. The coup-de-grace is the Epilogue written by Mr Brian Patrick Mitchell, who has well extracted the best of the Conference.

As the subsequent events have proved, the Book is grossly outdated. Its usefulness now lies in study of political history. Not recommended for unit libraries. Albeit, in Institutional and formation libraries it could be of some use. It can be ordered from the Lord Byron Foundation, 2400-Whiskey Road # 175, Aiken, SC 29801, USA.

*Major General Yatindra Pratap (Retd)*

**The Clash : US-Japanese Relations Throughout History.** By Walter La Feber (New York : WW Norton, 1997), pp.508, \$ 15.95, ISBN 0-393-31837-0.

This is an intriguing title for a history book. But then, it is so well written that it reads like a fascinating story than a boring treatise on history of US-Japanese relations or 'clash' for the last 150 years.

The book expounds three themes. Firstly, the effect of the clashes extending into the 1970s is so serious that "public opinion polls revealed that with the end of the Cold War, Japanese and Americans, each saw the other - rather than the Soviet military - as now posing the greatest threat to themselves." Secondly, the two countries follow different forms of capitalism. Whereas the Japanese believe in a strong central government guiding "the subtle, informal networks that run the economy," the Americans believe in a "sprawling pluralistic, open-ended society" interested in an open international market place. Thirdly, the countries have differing views on China. The Japanese see China as "a source of their culture and...frontier of opportunity," the "Americans view Asia as only part of a larger opportunity."

Three major events in recent years have highlighted the clashes. The June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre brought out different perceptions over human rights. The Gulf War in 1990-91 embittered the

From then on Jaggi decided that come what may, he will not be pressurised by higher commanders and would work according to his tactical sense, even if it meant being sacked. But the achievements of his Battalion in next 10 days would be envy of any commander and a leader.

Maj Gen S P Malhotra, GOC gave an independent task to 5/3 G R, to capture all Pak Posts along Shingo River dominating the Srinagar - Leh road, at altitudes upto 15,000-ft. From 8 December to 17 December 1971, after bitter fighting including close-combat using Khukris, the unit captured nine Pak Posts held by nearly three companies of Scouts. The enemy was well entrenched, stocked, supported by artillery and mortars, and had laid extensive mines and wire along the slopes of the hills. Thus, daylight attacks were to be avoided and emphasis laid on achieving surprise. Bhanot and Shankar achieved this in their assaults, which the book covers vividly. But when given a chance, even daylight attacks were launched with artillery and mortar fire support, as narrated for actions lead by Subedar Bal Bahadur and Havildar Man Bahadur Thapa. The planning and execution of each stage of operation has been very clearly narrated by the author in simple language, making it easily understandable by even non-military persons.

Jaggi confesses that when in danger he sought strength by reciting prayers and explains his confidence in the Strength of the God Almighty - a very honest statement. The book is divided in two parts, the bulk dealing with the operations of the unit. In the second part the author has analysed the established Principles of War, and made a very refreshing new recommendation of Five Ps- Punctuality, Perseverance, Planning, Protocol and Prayers. While all may not agree, his thoughts are indeed new and merit consideration.

Written from his heart, the author has dedicated all proceeds from the book to 5/3 GR Welfare Trust, a very noble cause. The simple style, language and personal touch give additional value to the book, not only for all officers of the Army but even for civilians. In 70 pages, with good maps and sketches, Jaggi has documented achievements of his unit in a frank manner, accepting mistakes without blaming others. His anguish at the heroic deeds of his men not being fully rewarded (only two Vir Chakras) is the only time he becomes critical of the system, but being the Commanding Officer who led from the front, he has every right to feel so.

An account of historic military operations at battalion level under difficult conditions with plenty of lessons, which makes interesting reading for soldiers and civilians alike.

*Lieutenant General Y M Bammi (Retd)*



**Men at Arnhem.** (*Revised Edition*). By Geoffrey Powell (London : Leo Cooper, 1998), pp.206, £ 16.95, ISBN 0-85052-626-4.

The operations of the British 1<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division at Arnhem, during the final stages of World War II, were a part of Operation 'Market Garden'. This Operation was undertaken along with 82<sup>nd</sup> and the 101<sup>st</sup> US Airborne Divisions in order to facilitate the advance of the British Second Army into Germany across Holland. While the operations of the two US Airborne Divisions were a success, unfortunately that of the British 1<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division turned out to be an epic disaster. Their failure was not only due to the inaccurate estimates made of the German opposition near the selected dropping zones but also because of the failure of the Second Army to link up with the Airborne troops even many days after the stipulated 48 hours time frame laid down in the plans.

*Men at Arnhem* is the story of the 156 British Parachute Regiment, which was dropped to reinforce the 1<sup>st</sup> British Parachute Brigade, which had captured and were holding on grimly the bridge at Arnhem over the Lower Rhine. In spite of its determined and courageous efforts, the Battalion failed to join up with the paratroopers desperately holding the Arnhem Bridge. Author Powell gives a thrilling 'blow by blow' account of the Battalion's attempts to reach its objective and of the rather confused fighting that followed.

This book was first published in 1976. The author points out that the book cannot be categorised as military history in the strictest sense since it was written nearly thirty years after the event and is only as accurate as his memory allowed after such a long lapse of time. Be that as it may, the author has, however, succeeded in vividly describing the various sub-unit and individual actions bringing out emphatically the resulting confusion and the hazards of battle, the valour displayed by well led troops against overwhelming odds and finally their staying power in the most adverse circumstances. The pity of it all was that all the valour and sacrifice got so totally wasted, when weighed against the results and the successes achieved. This book is difficult to put down and its thrilling account of the various actions fought is well worth reading.

Major General SC Sinha, PVSM (Retd)

**One Day in a Very Long War : Wednesday 25 October 1944.** By John Ellis (London : Pimlico, 1999), pp.592, £9.99, ISBN 0-7126-7465-9

In a novel break-away from conventional approach of war historians, John Ellis has focussed on the story of the Great War on a specific day-

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**The Military Balance 1999-2000**, London, U K: Oxford University Press, 1999, Rs 3500.00, ISBN 0-19-922-4250

**NAVY – INDIA**

18. Behera, K S

**Maritime Heritage of India**, New Delhi: Aryan Books, 1999, Rs 1950.00, ISBN 81-7305-094-

19. Hiranandani, GM  
(Vice Adm)

**Transition to Triumph: Indian Navy 1965-1975**, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, Rs.1195.00, ISBN 1-897829-72-8

**PAKISTAN-POLITY**20. Mohan, Sulakshan  
(Maj)

**Pakistan Under Musharraf**, Delhi: Indian Publishers, Rs.475.00, ISBN 81-7341-138-7

**TERRORISM**

21. Bloeria, Sudhir S

**Pakistan's Insurgency versus India's Security: Tackling Militancy in Kashmir**, New Delhi: Manas, Rs 795.00, ISBN 81-7049-116-9

22. Stern, J

**The Ultimate Terrorists**, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, \$ 22.95, ISBN 0-674-61790-8

**WARS – ANALYSIS**

23. Panakal, Thomas

**They Were Not World Wars**, New Delhi: Mudrak, 1999, Rs 215.00, ISBN 81-87161-05-1 [EB 5]

24. Mitford, R C W

**To Caubul with the Cavalry Brigade**, New Delhi: Bhavana Books, Rs 495.00, ISBN 81-86505-31-8

25. Sarkar, Bhaskar(Col)

**Outstanding Victories of the Indian Army 1947-1971**, New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, Rs 495.00, ISBN 1 897829-73-6

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*(The books reviewed in October-December 1999 issue have been added  
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)*

### **AFGHANISTAN WAR**

1. Shah, Sirdar Iqbal Ali      **Afghanistan of the Afghans, Vol.I**, New Delhi: Bhavana Books, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-86505-26-1
2. Dorn, Bernhard              **History of Afghanistan**, New Delhi: Bhavana Books, Rs 595.00, ISBN 81-86505-28-8
3. Kaye, J W                      **History of the War in Afghanistan**, New Delhi: Bhavana Books, Rs 3000.00, ISBN 81-86505-29-6

### **AIR POWER**

4. Singh, NB (Air Cmde)      **Air Power in the New Millennium**, New Delhi: Manas, Rs 595.00, ISBN 81-7049-076-6

### **CENTRAL ASIA AND INDIA**

5. Vohra, NN                      **Culture, Society and Politics in Central Asia and India**, New Delhi: Shipra, 1999, Rs 495.00, ISBN 81-7541-040-X

### **CORRUPTION**

6. Vittal, N                        **Fighting Corruption and Restructuring Government**, New Delhi: Manas, Rs 495.00, ISBN 81-7049-118-5

### **DISASTER MANAGEMENT**

7. Narayan, S (ed)              **Anthropology of Disaster Management**, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, Rs 300.00, ISBN 81-212-0683-9

**INDIA - DEFENCE**

8. Jasjit Singh (Air Cmde) **India's Defence Spending: Assessing Future Needs**, New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with IDSA, Rs 850.00, ISBN 81-86019-25-1

9. Joshi, Ashok (Lt Gen) **Restructuring National Security**, New Delhi: Manas Publications, Rs.495.00, ISBN 81-7049-100-2

**INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS**

10. Bajpai K & Mattoo A **The Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, Rs 695.00, ISBN 81-241-0642-8

**INDIA - NUCLEAR**

11. Perkovich, George **India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation**, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, Rs 645.00, ISBN 0 19 565207 X

12. Khanna, VN **India's Nuclear Doctrine**, New Delhi: Sanskriti, Rs 495.00, ISBN 81-87374-02-0

13. Khan, Roedad  
(Compiled & Selected) **The American Papers: Secret and Confidential India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Documents-1965-1973**, Pakistan : Oxford University Press, 1999, Rs. 895.00, ISBN 0-19-579190-8

**INTELLIGENCE/SECRET DOCUMENTS**

14. Manickam, R N (IPS) **Security Espionage and Counter Intelligence**, New Delhi: Manas, Rs 395.00, ISBN 81-7049-104-5

15. Jasjit Singh (Air Cmde) **Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir**, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999, Rs.430.00, ISBN 81-86019-22-7

**MEMOIRS**

16. Kaul, T N **A Diplomat's Diary 1947-1999: The Tantalising Triangle-China, India and USA** Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, Rs 345.00, ISBN 0 333 93340 0

25 October 1944. He has built up the battlefield scenarios as well as human responses thereto, in each sector, front and theatre, on land and at sea, on the European Continent, the Pacific Ocean, and mainland China. The prologue to the book itself gives a good insight into the mind of the allied leaders as they tackled their domestic national matters and global military developments in their heavy daily routine.

The author has projected the actions and battle conditions as faced by the troops as well as civil folk in the battle zone. He has also highlighted the responses of force commanders. Each sector and operation has been presented in separate chapters of the book, allotted to the Allies and the Axis forces. The chapter on the German Air Force - Luftwaffe and its aspirations for a grand slam bid - Der Gross Schlog - is enlightening. Similarly the chapters on sweep by the Red Army into the Balkan States and Yugoslavia and the War in China explain the spread of communism and the rise of Mao Tse-Tung's China in the post-war era.

The compacted overview of the Second World War pertaining to a particular point of time drives home its special features. It was a global war both in terms of space and of nationalities and people of pronounced diverse psyche. Warfare in Europe, in South East Asia and the Pacific being contextually different placed different demands on the fighting men.

A commendable presentation of the Second World War.

*Major General S K Talwar (Retd)*

**Light at the End of the Tunnel : A Vietnam War Anthology.** Edited by Andrew J Rotter (Washington : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), pp.440, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8420-2713-0.

In the history of modern warfare, from Napoleon to the missile age of nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War was one of the longest wars fought by the unwilling American GIs, led by the unqualified junior commanders, doing the unnecessary for the ungrateful. The United States lost the war after fighting the North Vietnamese Army regulars and guerrillas over a period of more than 15 years. At the height of the war in 1968 there were more than 540,000 US military personnel in Vietnam. The most superior armed forces possessing the most advanced weapons, fighting dedicated troops in black pyjamas riding bicycles, resulted in the loss of 50,000 US personnel.

The book under review is a revised edition and contains 39 essays written by eminent persons in the civilian and military fields during the

Vietnam War. The list of contributors includes Robert McNamara, George W Ball, William Colby, Henry Kissinger and Noam Chomsky. The essays are generally based on personal experiences at the highest level of policy making in the American administration during the period of the Vietnam War and provide a critical insight into the domestic and international compulsions which led to the prolongation of the conflict and eventual US evacuation from South Vietnam.

There are many lessons which have been well documented in the book. The first and the most important being the vagueness of the political objectives and the limitations put on the armed forces. At the end of the war, a study conducted by the US Army War College found that certain personnel policies led to military mismanagement and a strong bureaucracy. The system of rewards changed the senior officer from a military leader to a bureaucratic manager. Careerism replaced the ethics of the officer corps and personal advancement replaced the desire to get the job done.

In the conduct of the war there were other lessons. Some important ones were : inadequate co-ordination of intelligence; weak counter-intelligence; and lack of integrated planning for use of military forces of different types, particularly those involved in air operations. A very useful book and a must read for those responsible for planning military operations against guerrilla forces in an underdeveloped country.

*Air Commodore N B Singh (Retd)*

**Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements**  
**Fifth Edition : 1996.** *United Nations (New York : United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, 1997), pp. 417, Price not indicated, ISBN 92-1-142221-3.*

A number of international treaties and conventions are discussed and updated for people to know about issues involved and their implications. The United Nations, in this fifth edition has detailed the need for such treaties and conventions, which basically are confidence building measures amongst nations. The treaties and conventions are in the form of articles discussed and finalised by the member countries. The nations which are signatory to these treaties and conventions are obliged to abide by conditions therein. The book also covers in detail, guidelines and restrictions for inspectors who may be detailed to conduct inspection of sites and material.

A well compiled reference book covering all aspects of various treaties and conventions. Of much interest to government officials and scholars engaged in research in this field.

*Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)*

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**Correspondence Courses**

**T**he Institution runs regular correspondence courses for officers of the Armed Forces to assist them in preparing for promotion examinations, and for the entrance examinations to the Defence Services Staff College and Technical Staff College. Over the years, this has been a significant and well-received activity.

**USI Journal**

**T**he USI Journal is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. It is supplied free to all members, and in an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact

provides just such a forum, without regard to seniority and length of service in the Armed Forces, subject of course, to propriety and quality of the written work.

**Centre for Research**

**A** Centre for Research has been established to enable nominated scholars to undertake comprehensive study of selected subjects of topical interest on national security matters.

**Gold Medal Essay Competitions**

**E**very year the Institution organises two gold medal essay competitions: one for Officers below 10 years of service and the other for all members. These essays, the first one of which was introduced in 1871, constitute a barometer of opinion on matters that affect national security in general and the defence forces in particular.

**Lectures and Discussions**

**A** series of lectures and discussions on service matters, international affairs, and topics of general interest to the Services, are organised for the benefit of local members in Delhi.

**MacGregor Medal**

**T**his medal is awarded to Armed Forces personnel for valuable reconnaissance and adventure activity they may have undertaken.

**MEMBERSHIP**

1. All classes of membership except temporary membership and membership of Service Officers applying for Correspondence Courses being conducted by the USI, will be subject to approval by the Executive Committee. The following are ordinarily eligible to become members of the Institution, with full voting rights :-
  - (a) Officers of the Armed Forces.
  - (b) Class I Gazetted Officers of the Central Services associated with the field of Defence (IAS, IFS, IPS).
  - (c) Any category mentioned in sub-para (a) and (b) above will be eligible even though retired or released from the Service.
  - (d) Cadets from the NDA and Cadets from the Service Academies and Midshipmen.
2. Persons entitled to membership, may become Life Members on payment of the subscription laid down from time to time. Cadets from the NDA and other Service Academies can do so only on commissioning.

*For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, (opposite Signals Enclave) Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057*